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This research investigates the EU's intervention into the regulation of players' 
agents, as a policy issue, in the context of EU sports policy. A socio-cultural 
perspective is developed through analyzing the EU policy actors of the socio-
cultural advocacy coalition (the Education and Culture DG within the 
Commission, the Committee on Culture and Education in the European 
Parliament and the Member States) operating within the EU sports policy 
subsystem. The research conceptualizes the socio-cultural regulation of sport as 
the EU policy actors’ strongly held policy core beliefs. In order to deduce policy 
core beliefs, there are three research dimensions examined in relation to the 
regulation of players' agents: coordinated activity between the actors, selective 
perception by policy core beliefs, and the actors' preference with regards to 
policy instruments to regulate players agents at European level. This research 
utilizes the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) as the theoretical framework. 
Primary documentary sources of the EU are analyzed through the method of 
content analysis. 
 
The EU policy actors have gradually coordinated their activities with regards to 
the regulation of players’ agents. During the preparatory phase of the White 
Paper on Sport, there was a weak level of coordination involving interactions 
and information exchange. During the aftermath of the White Paper on Sport, the 
actors fostered a stronger coordination through developing and implementing a 
common plan of action. At the same time, the actors learned about the problems 
within the activities of players’ agents which they perceived as a threat to their 
policy core beliefs. As a result, the EU policy actors developed their policy 
position in relation to players’ agents. In this context, their policy core beliefs 
performed selective perception by selecting, interpreting and ignoring certain 
stimuli in order to support that policy position. Consequently, the EU actors 
agreed on the necessity of a more effective regulatory framework governing 
players’ agents, yet the EU’s constitutional limitations have constrained potential 
available options at European level, in particular the emergence of European 
legal initiative. The research evidences that the EU policy actors’ policy core 
beliefs have been the main driver for their activities, perceptions and 
preferences related to players agents. 
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The EU and Players’ Agents:  A paradox within a paradox 
The EU’s relationship with sport represents a paradox (Garcia 2008) that 
scholars aim to explain (Brown 2000; Parrish 2003a, 2003b; Takorski et al. 
2004; Garcia 2008). The apparent paradox results from the fact that the EU has 
managed to develop a policy related to sport despite the lack of competency in 
the field up until the Lisbon Treaty. The EU is required to act within the limits of 
powers conferred by its Treaties (Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU)) which meant that the EU had no direct authority to develop any kind of 
policy on sport related issues. Hence, the development of the EU sports policy 
needs to be explained.  
 
Despite the lack of direct competency, EU sports policy has developed under two 
policy strands: the single market regulation of sport and the socio-cultural 
regulation of sport (Parrish 2003a, 2003b). The notion of the single market 
regulation of sport is based upon negative integration through the application of 
the EU law, particularly internal market and competition rules, to sport as far as 
it constitutes an economic activity. The socio-cultural regulation of sport, on the 
other, is based upon positive integration and recognizes the socio-cultural 
characteristics of sport in Europe and attempts to balance the EU`s market 
model of regulation of sport with one that promotes its socio-cultural qualities. 
 
Within this context of EU sports policy, the regulation of players’ agents and the 
EU’s involvement on the issue represents a paradox within a paradox.   This is 
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due to the fact that the initial incursion of the EU with the regulation of players’ 
agents was from a single market perspective and both the Commission and the 
General Court confirmed that rules of FIFA in governing the profession of 
players’ agents were compatible with EU internal market and competition rules 
(Laurent Piau v Commission [2005] ECR II-209, Case C-T193/02, hereafter 
referred as Piau). The Competition Directorate General (DG) within the 
Commission and the General Court, formerly known as European Court of First 
Instance (CFI), were the main policy actors that examined the compatibility of 
FIFA’s regulatory framework with EU law under the complaint initiated by 
Laurent. Nonetheless, despite those decisions, the EU’s interest on the issue has 
persisted. In particular, the Member States, the Education and Culture DG in the 
Commission and the Committee on Culture and Education in the European 
Parliament have focused on the regulation of players’ agents. Their efforts led to 
the impact assessment under the White Paper on Sport in 2007 (European 
Commission 2007a), the parliamentary resolution in 2010 (European Parliament 
2010) and the EU Expert Group’ analysis between 2011 and 2013 (Council of 
European Union 2013). This research aims to understand and explain the EU’s 
interest on the issue. In particular the research examines the causal drivers of 
the EU’s intervention into the regulation of players’ agents in the context of the 
socio-cultural regulation of sport. 
  
Why the EU and Players’ Agents? 
There are several justifications for the choice of players’ agents as a policy issue 
to be analyzed in the context of the socio-cultural regulation of sport within the 
EU sports policy subsystem. Firstly, there is scarce academic attention to the 
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regulation of players’ agents from a policy-making perspective (Parrish 2007). 
The literature on players’ agents is generally limited to either the legal analysis 
of the decisions by the Commission and the General Court at European level or 
the descriptive accounts of the regulatory framework that governs the agents’ 
activities at international and national level. These limits and gaps of the existing 
literature are presented in Chapter 3. The research for the first time examines 
players’ agents in the context of public policy making at European level. The 
research also develops a socio-cultural perspective on the regulation of players’ 
agents through analyzing the activities of the EU policy actors of the socio-
cultural advocacy coalition (the Education and Culture DG, the Parliamentary 
Committee on Culture and Education, and the Member States)1 within the EU 
sports policy subsystem. Moreover, the literature on the regulation of players’ 
agents lacks a theoretical approach. There is only one study (Holt et al. 2006) 
which has developed a theoretical perspective on the issue so far. This research 
also aims to fill this gap and develops a theoretical approach, by utilizing the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) as a theoretical framework, which also 
contributes to understanding of EU policy making in the field of sport in relation 
to players’ agents.  
 
Secondly, the intervention by the EU, as a public authority, into the regulation of 
players’ agents, which is a governance issue for football, also requires a 
justification. Sports governing bodies traditionally enjoyed autonomy to regulate 
their sports and the principle of sporting autonomy, the principle that 
                                                        
1 Hereafter the Education and Culture DG, the Parliamentary Committee on Culture and 
Education and the Member States are referred as “the EU policy actors” of the socio-cultural 
advocacy coalition with the EU sports policy.  
  4 
recognizing the sports governing bodies’ authority to regulate their own sport, is 
also widely recognized and respected by the EU. Accordingly, sport governance 
structure at European level comprises the autonomy and diversity of sport 
organizations within a pyramid structure of competitions from grassroots to 
elite level. Within this framework, FIFA developed the regulatory frameworks 
that have been governing the activities of players’ agents. The historical 
background of these regulatory frameworks is outlined in Chapter 2. 
Nonetheless, the autonomy of sport is now constitutionally recognized under 
Article 165 of the Lisbon Treaty. Therefore, it is important to understand the 
motives of the EU in involving with the issue in order to justify the intervention. 
 
Thirdly, the regulation of players’ agents, as a policy issue, provides the right 
context for the analysis of the socio-cultural regulation of sport within the EU 
sports policy subsystem. The issue had been initially confined within the 
boundaries of the EU’s single market regulation of sports (Parrish 2002a, 2002b, 
2003a, 2003b). In this context, the investigation by the Competition DG and the 
Piau judgment of the General Court is presented in Chapter 2 in order to provide 
necessary background context of the EU’ single market approach. However, since 
the preparatory phase of the White Paper on Sport following the Nice 
Declaration in 2000 up until 2015, the issue has dominantly been within the 
socio-cultural realm of the EU sports policy. The time frame of a decade or more 
and the activities of the EU policy actors on players’ agents postulate the 
contextual components to investigate the policy making in the context of socio-
cultural regulation of sport. 
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Finally, I had been a licensed players’ agent since 2008 and actively involved in 
deals with clubs, players and other players’ agent. I have been registered as an 
intermediary following changes to the regulatory framework by FIFA in April 
2015. Being an active agent enabled me to experience some of the problems 
associated with the activities of players’ agents including the exploitation of 
minor players and financial irregularities in transfer payments. In addition, I was 
able to observe some of the deficiencies of a licensing based regulatory 
framework, such as the lack of supervision and monitoring by football governing 
bodies and an incoherent transposition of FIFA’ regulations at national level. 
Accordingly, my first hand experience and an insightful understanding of 
European transfer and player market provide a unique perspective for the 
analysis of the EU`s involvement on the issue.   
 
Research Questions 
This research investigates the EU`s involvement with the regulation of players’ 
agents within the wider context of the EU sports policy subsystem. The core 
research question is: to what extent does the socio-cultural regulation of sport 
actually underpin the EU`s involvement with the regulation of player`s agents?  
 
In doing so, the research takes Parrish`s analysis of EU sports policy (Parrish 
2003a, 2003b), especially the socio-cultural advocacy coalition with its actors 
and beliefs system within the EU sports policy subsystem, as a main point of 
departure. The research adopts two key assumptions from Parrish`s research. 
The first assumption is that the socio-cultural advocacy coalition operates within 
the subsystem with the objective of translating their policy core beliefs into 
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policies at European Union level. The second assumption is that the EU policy 
actors of the socio-cultural advocacy coalition, who are the Education and 
Culture DG, the Parliamentary Committee on Culture and Education and the 
Member States2, referred as “the Maximalists” by Parrish (2003a, p.69), hold 
strong policy core beliefs in relation to the socio-cultural regulation of sport. 
Based upon these two key assumptions, as a result, the research conceptualizes 
the socio-cultural regulation of sport as policy core beliefs of the EU policy actor. 
This conceptualization is fully elucidated in Chapter 3. The research investigates 
the extent of the role played by policy core beliefs of the actors in the case of the 
regulation of players’ agents at European level. The concept is used as an 
analytical tool in a form of policy core beliefs which represents the socio-cultural 
coalition`s basic normative values and causal perceptions. Consequently, the 
adoption of two key assumptions from Parrish’s research and the 
conceptualization of the socio-cultural regulation of sport as the policy core 
beliefs of the EU policy actors also underpin the theoretical choice of the 
research. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is utilized as a theoretical 
framework of the research (Sabatier 1988, 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993, 1999; Sabatier and Weible 2007; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). 
 
The research then develops and investigates three sub-questions, derived 
directly from theoretical assumptions of the ACF. Policy core beliefs are central 
                                                        
2 For the purposes of research, the Member States are taken from the work of Parrish (2003a). 
Parrish defines the Member States in the discourse of development of EU sports policy. Those 
that supported socio-cultural agenda and located within the maximalists include all states except 
Britain, Denmark and Sweden (Parrish, 2003a, p.69). In the context of regulation of players’ 
agents, although it is difficult to determine the individual position of each Member State, all 
Member States have been present involving in a number of activities (through Presidency 
meetings and European Sport Forum) as well as in the configuration of new council post-Lisbon. 
Therefore, the research adopts a holistic approach and refers to all Member States. 
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for these questions.  The questions represent three research dimensions taken 
into account in deducing policy core beliefs of the EU policy actors within the 
socio-cultural advocacy coalition operating within the EU sports policy 
subsystem in relation to the regulations of players’ agents: coordinated activity, 
selective perception by policy core beliefs, and policy preferences. 
 
 RQ1: Is there a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity amongst the EU 
policy actors of the socio-cultural advocacy coalition in relation to the 
regulation of player`s agents within the subsystem? 
The first dimension of research concerns coordinated activity. The sub-question 
aims to deduce policy core beliefs by investigating coordinated activity amongst 
the EU policy actors with regards to the regulation of players’ agents. The 
question derives from the theoretical assumptions of the ACF related to 
coordinated activity. The ACF sees coordinated activity as a necessary 
component for the formation and identification of advocacy coalitions within 
subsystems and assumes that the policy actors with congruent policy core beliefs 
coordinate their activities in order to develop and implement a common strategy 
to translate those beliefs into public policy (Sabatier 1988; Sabatier 1998; 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). In other word, according to the ACF, 
coordination occurs between policy actors who share similar policy core beliefs 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1998, p.103; Matti and Sandstrom 2011, p.388). 
Therefore, RQ1 is based upon the theoretical hypothesis that the EU policy actors 
are likely to coordinate their activities in relation to the regulation of players’ 
agents with each other as a result of their shared policy core beliefs (the socio-
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cultural regulation of sport). Therefore, the research aims to identify coordinated 
activity amongst the EU policy actors which should be present. The research’s 
analysis on coordinated activity is presented in chapter 5. Coordinated activity 
has also been one of the most criticized aspects of the ACF that the research aims 
to clarify and hopefully this will enhance the research’s contribution to 
knowledge. 
 
 RQ2: Do policy core beliefs of the EU policy actors perform selective 
perception in the process of policy-oriented learning, in particular to 
policy analysis and information, related to the regulation of players’ 
agents?  
The second dimension of research examines selective perception performed by 
policy core beliefs. The sub-question aims to deduce policy core beliefs of the EU 
policy actors by examining selective perception performed by policy core belief 
in the process of policy-oriented learning, especially in relation to the acquisition 
of information and relevant policy analysis, with regards to the regulation of 
players’ agents. The sub-question is based upon the ACF’s theoretical assumption 
related to the function of policy core beliefs in selecting and interpreting 
information on specific policy issues. The ACF assumes that the policy actors use 
selective perception to select information and other variables to confirm their 
policy core beliefs and also interpret them in accordance with their pre-existing 
core beliefs (Sabatier 1988; Freudenburg and Gramling 2002; Sabatier and 
Weible 2007; Weible 2008; Matti and Sandtrom 2013; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). 
Selective perception performed by policy core beliefs is a result of the model of 
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the individual used by the ACF, who is instrumentally rational but has cognitive 
limitations in processing information (Sabatier 1986 &1987; Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier and Weible 2007 & 2014).  Therefore, RQ2 is based 
upon the theoretical hypothesis that the EU policy actors are likely to select 
information in their policy analysis that confirms their policy core beliefs (the 
socio-cultural regulation of sport). Based upon the ACF’s theoretical 
assumptions, the EU policy actors’ policy core beliefs should also perform 
selective perception in relation to the regulation of players’ agents and the 
research investigates this and presents its findings in chapter 6. 
 
 RQ3: What are the policy preferences of the EU policy actors in relation to 
policy instruments to regulate players’ agents at European level and to 
what extent do the policy preferences reflect the policy core beliefs of the 
actors? 
The third dimension of the research analyses policy preferences of the EU policy 
actors in relation to policy instruments to regulate players’ agents at European 
level. The sub-question aims to deduce policy core beliefs of the EU policy actors 
from their policy preferences. The fundamental assumption of the ACF behind 
the sub-question is that advocacy coalitions play a central role in policy design 
within subsystems and engage in a non-trivial degree of coordination to 
translate their policy core beliefs into actual policies. The end result of the policy 
process is policy outcomes (policy instruments) that reflect their policy core 
beliefs (Sabatier 1988; Weible and Sabatier 2005; Matti and Sandstrom 2011, 
2013). Therefore, RQ3 is based upon the theoretical hypothesis that the EU 
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policy actors’ policy preferences in relation to policy instruments to regulate 
players’ agents are likely to reflect their policy core beliefs (the socio-cultural 
regulation of sport) or to be in accordance with their policy core beliefs. The 
research investigates this theoretical correlation between the EU policy actors’ 
preferred methods for regulating player`s agents and their shared policy core 
beliefs.  
 
Research Design and Methodology 
This research is theoretically driven and, in this sense, deductive in nature. “A 
deductive approach is concerned with developing a hypothesis (hypotheses) 
based on existing theory, and then designing a research strategy to test the 
hypothesis” (Wilson, 2010, p.7).  The main research question investigated is 
theoretically underpinned resulting from the conceptualization of the socio-
cultural regulation of sport as policy core beliefs of the EU policy actors, which 
finds a conceptual meaning under the ACF. Then, the sub-research questions are 
developed through hypotheses derived from the ACF’s assumptions where policy 
core beliefs, as a theoretical concept, are central.3  The aim of the research is to 
deduce policy core beliefs of the EU policy actors of the socio-cultural advocacy 
coalition by investigating their patterns of coordinated activity, selective 
perception performance by their beliefs and their policy preferences with 
regards to the regulation of players’ agents, as a policy issue. Therefore, the 
research is closer to the theory before research model (Berg 2007, p.23). 
The research also follows deductive reasoning approach. The direction of 
                                                        
3 There are number of studies follows the same methodological approach. They also develop and 
test hypotheses from the ACF’s assumptions. For some of these studies see Weible and Sabatier 
(2009), Ingold (2011), Henry (2011), Matti and Sandstrom (2011, 2013). 
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reasoning circulates around the cycle linking theory, hypotheses and 
observations/data of pattern with each other (May 2011). In this context, the 
stages of the research are as follows; 
a) The analysis of the existing literature in order to develop a theoretical 
perspective on the topic: The research examines the existing literature 
and locates the conceptual meaning of the socio-cultural regulation of 
sport as policy core beliefs within Parrish’s research on the EU sports 
policy.  This conceptual meaning is adopted and has two functions for the 
research: guiding the theoretical choice of research and assisting in the 
development of hypotheses that are the basis of the sub-research 
questions. The review of literature is presented in chapter 3.   
b) Formulating sub-research questions (based upon theoretical hypotheses) 
in operational terms: The formulation of the sub-research questions is 
based upon the theoretical assumptions of the ACF where the policy core 
beliefs are central. The conceptualization, therefore, enables the research 
to focus on the specific query and extraction of specific conclusions. The 
theoretical framework with its core concepts presented in chapter 4. 
c) The testing of the hypotheses through the application of relevant research 
method by observing specific patterns within the activities of policy 
actors (Chapter, 5, 6 &7). 
d) Examining the outcomes and thus confirming or rejecting the theory 
(Chapter 8). 
The theory-based analysis of the research has a dual objective: to explain the EU 
policy making in the context of the EU sports policy in relation to players’ agents 
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(the first objective of the research) and to contribute the theoretical 
advancement of the ACF through testing its hypotheses (the second objective of 
research). The research takes into account the literature on the wider EU sports 
policy and locates the regulation of players’ agents within it. Then, the research 
analyses the regulation of players’ agents from the socio-cultural perspective 
which is a more specific and defined strand of the EU sports policy. This 
represents the research’s specific focus within the wider literature in the field of 
EU sports policy.  At the same time, the research has a specific focus with regards 
to the theory, the ACF. A specific focus is on the concept of policy core beliefs and 
related theoretical concepts within which policy core beliefs are central: 
coordinated activity, selective perception and policy preferences. These concepts 
convey three dimensions of the research for deducing policy core beliefs and the 
findings represents the research’s contribution to literature on the ACF. This 
dual objectivity and findings represent the originality of research and its 
contribution to knowledge. 
In doing so, the research analyses primary and secondary documentary sources 
as primary sources for data/observations. Table 1 outlines the sources that are 
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 European Council Conclusions  
 Official Documents/Reports 
Originates from the Council 
Presidencies 
 Presidency Conclusions of EU sports 
ministers and Directors’ Meetings  
 Official Documents of Working 
Groups 
 Official Documents of the European 
Commission  
 Official Documents/Reports 
Originates from the European 
Commission 
 European Parliament resolutions 
 Verbatim Reports of Debates in the 
European Parliament  
 Parliamentary Questions to the 
Council and the Commission  
 
 Scholarly Journals and Books  
 Chapters and Contributions to Collective 
Books  
 Law Reviews   
 Doctoral Dissertations  
 Reports of Conferences and Research 
Institutes  
 
The choice of primary sources at European level is guided by the research’s focus 
on the EU policy actors of the socio-cultural advocacy coalition. Table 2 lists the 
type of primary source, the specific policy document, the year and the originator 
of the document used for this research. The official EU documents originated 
from these actors are examined and reviewed by the research. These documents 
are sources that provide “historical and context surrounding a specific setting” 
and are also “rich in portraying the values of beliefs of participants in the settings” 
(Marshall and Rossman 1999, p.116).  Moreover, these documentary sources 
satisfy the four criteria in assessing the quality of evidence from these kinds of 
documentary sources: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning 
(May 2011). The authenticity of documents is assessed through “judgment of 
authenticity from the internal evidence of the text comes only when one satisfied 
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that it is technically possible that the document is genuine” (Calvert 1991, p.121). 
The credibility of documents “refers to the extent to which the evidence is 
undistorted and sincere, free from error and evasion” (Scott 1990, p.7). The 
documentary sources of the EU policy actors clearly satisfy both criteria as they 
are available through official EU portals and produced by the actors. 
The document’s representativeness has been referred to as typicality meaning 
that whether “there is a typical document or a typical method of representing a 
topic which we are interested” (May 2011, p.208). Although typicality varies from 
research to research and untypical documents may also be useful for analysis, 
the interest of this research in terms of typicality of document relates to the EU 
policy documents representing the views of the policy actors. These documents, 
as a primary documentary source, have been also used by several scholars 
(Parrish 2003a; Garcia 2007; Takorsky et al. 2004) in analyzing EU sports policy 
or, in broader terms, the EU’s relationship with sport. Therefore, the 
representativeness of those documents is also without any problem. 
Finally, there is a document’s meaning that is referred as the clarity and 
comprehensibility of a document to the analyst. In this connection, two questions 
are of concern: “what is it and what does it tell us” (Scott 1990, p.8). However, 
these questions are not easy to answer and necessitate studying documents, 
especially the text of documents, within its social context (May 2011, p.208). The 
contextualization of the regulation of players’ agents within the EU’s socio-
cultural regulation of sport enables us to understand the meaning despite the 
use of words varies and meanings may change. Furthermore, the research adopts 
the method of qualitative content analysis, explained below, aiming at extracting 
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the right meanings from the documents investigated. 
The research utilizes the content analysis, as a method, to analyze the 
documents. Content analysis, as a method, can take both quantitative and 
qualitative form whilst comprising three stages: stating the research problem, 
retrieving the text and interpretation and analysis (Ericson et. al. 1991, p.50).  
Although for the identification of the relevant documentary sources at European 
level, i.e the official EU policy documents, some form of quantitative analysis is 
undertaken, the general nature of analysis is qualitative. Quantitative content 
analysis seeks “to show patter of regularities in content through repetition” (May 
2011, p.209) and the primary sources were determined through analysis of the 
contents in search of text related to the regulation of players’ agents. Through 
this investigation the research has compiled the documentary sources to be 
analyzed at the European level, as presented in Table 2. Nonetheless, 
quantitative analysis is limited in examining the overall meaning of text and also 
the frequency of words and phrases occur in a text may not offer any form of 
explanation (May 2011, p.210). Therefore, the research adopts qualitative 
content analysis in order to engage in meaning construction. “In the process, the 
analyst pick out what is relevant for analysis and pieces it together to create 
tendencies, sequences, patterns and orders. The process of deconstruction, 
interpretation, and reconstruction breaks down many of the assumptions dear to 
quantitative analysts” (Ericson et. al. 1991, p.55). This process also enables the 
researcher “to consider not only in which meaning is constructed, but also the ways 
in which new meanings are developed and employed” (May 2011, p.211).   
Additionally, the ACF scholars also view the content analysis of relevant 
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documents as a most promising method to investigate the theoretical aspects of 
the framework, especially the content of beliefs systems and policy change 
(Sabatier 1988, p. 147). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith devoted a whole chapter to 
the content analysis method for future use of the ACF (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1993, pp. 237-256). Therefore, this scholar guidance also led the research 
to adopt the method of content analysis of the documentary sources for the 
purposes of research. 
This research has also a longitudinal component in examining the EU’s 
intervention into the regulation of players’ agents. The research primarily 
investigates policy-making within the EU and the period extends over a decade 
from the Nice Declaration in 2000 until 2015. The focus on a timespan of a 
decade or more is one of the basic premises of the ACF (Sabatier 1988, p.131) 
and derives from the importance of the enlightenment function of policy 
research (Weiss, 1977). The long-term perspective is important for 
understanding the strategic behavior and learning of coalition actors as well as 
assessing the success or failure of public policy (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014, 
p.193). The research’s longitudinal component therefore has a theoretical 
underpinning. As a result, the research also takes a long-term perspective and 
analyses the discourse of the EU’s intervention into regulation of players’ agents 
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Table 2: Primary Sources 
The Nice Declaration in 2000 to the White Paper on Sport in 2007 
Primary Sources Documents Time 
Frame 
Policy Actors 
European Council Conclusions Rolling Agenda on Sport 2004 The Member States 
European Council Conclusions Report of EU Sports Minister Meeting Dec 2005 The Member States 
Official Documents of the European 
Commission 
Report of Consultation Meeting with 
Sport federation - Sport Governance in  
Europe 
Sep 2006 The Education and 
Culture DG 
Official Documents/Reports Originates 
from the Council Presidencies 





The Member States 
Official Documents of the European 
Commission 
Report of Online Consultation Feb 2007 The Education and 
Culture DG 
Official Documents of Working Groups 
 
Report of Meeting of Member States 
Working Group on White Paper 
Mar 2007 
 
The Member States 
 
Official Documents of the European 
Commission 
The White Paper on Sport July 2007 
 
The Education and 
Culture DG 




The Committee on Culture 
and Education 
Verbatim Reports of Debates in the 
European Parliament 
Report of Parliamentary Debate Mar 2007 The Committee on Culture 
and Education 
The Aftermath of the White Paper on Sport 
Primary Sources Documents Time 
Frame 
Policy Actors 
Presidency Conclusions of EU Sports 
Ministers and Directors’ Meetings 
Report of Meeting of EU Sports Ministers Oct 2007 The Member States 
Official Documents of the European 
Commission 
Report of Consultation Meeting on the 
White Paper on Sport 
Oct 2007 
 
The Education and 
Culture DG 
Official Documents of Working Groups 
 
Report of Meeting of Member States 
Working Group on White Paper 
Jan 2008 
 
The Member States 
 
Presidency Conclusions of EU sports 
Ministers and Directors’ Meetings 




The Member States 
 




The Committee on Culture 
and Education 
Verbatim Reports of Debates in the 
European Parliament 
Report of Parliamentary Debate May 2008 The Committee on Culture 
and Education 
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Limits of the Research 
 
There are some limitations of the research that need to be outlined from the 
outset. Firstly, this research focuses on the EU policy actors (the Education and 
Culture DG, the Committee on Culture and Education, and the Member States) of 
the socio-cultural advocacy coalition. The primary objective of the research is to 
understand the motivations of EU’s intervention into the issue and analyse these 
by utilizing the ACF. In this context, coordinated activity, selective perception 
and policy preferences of the EU policy actors are investigated in order to deduce 
Official Documents/Reports Originates 
from the Council Presidencies 
The Presidency Programme July 2008 
 
The Member States 
Official Documents/Reports Originates 
from the European Commission 




The Education and 
Culture DG 
Parliamentary Questions to the Council 
and the Commission 




The Committee on Culture 
and Education 
Verbatim Reports of Debates in the 
European Parliament 
Report of Parliamentary Debate June 
2010 
The Committee on Culture 
and Education 
European Parliament Resolutions Resolution on Players’ Agents June 
2010 
The Committee on Culture 
and Education 
The Aftermath of Lisbon Treaty 
Primary Sources Documents Time 
Frame 
The EU Policy Actors 
Official Documents of the European 
Commission 




The Education and 
Culture DG 
European Council Conclusions The EU Work Plan for Sport 2011-2014 June 
2011 
The Member States 
Official Documents/Reports Originates 
from the European Commission 




The Education and 
Culture DG 
Verbatim Reports of Debates in the 
European Parliament 




The Committee on Culture 
and Education 
European Parliament resolutions 
 
Resolution on Developing European 
Dimension of Sport 
Feb 2012 
 
The Committee on Culture 
and Education 
Official Documents/Reports Originates 
from the Council Presidencies 
 
 
Expert Group Report on Sports Agent Dec 2013 The Member States 
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their policy core beliefs. Policy core beliefs are central to the ACF’s model of 
individual and represent cognitive characteristics of policy actors in guiding 
their behaviours, perceptions and preferences (Sabatier 1988; Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier and Weible 2007; Weible et al. 2012; Jenkins-Smith 
et al. 2014). For this reason, in order to explore these concepts it is required to 
narrow the scope of policy actors to be analysed and also to focus on individual 
policy actors. In the case of this research, those actors are the EU policy actors. 
Moreover, the EU policy actors are the Maximalists within the socio-cultural 
advocacy coalition who hold strong policy core beliefs about the socio-cultural 
regulation of sport (Parrish 2003a, p.69). This is one of the key assumptions the 
research has adopted from the existing literature (Parrish 2003a, 2003b). 
Therefore, the research concentrates on these actors, so that their policy core 
beliefs can be deduced from the investigations related to their coordinated 
activity, selective perception and policy preferences. 
 
In addition, the regulation of players’ agents, as a policy issue, provides a case 
study context for the research in exploring the motivations of the EU on the 
issue. The research aims to examine potential explanations previously advanced 
within the EU sports policy literature or to investigate findings from a previous 
case study examining similar phenomena in a new context (Gerring 2007).  In 
the terms of this research, the objective is to explore the existence of policy core 
beliefs (the socio-cultural regulation of sport) hold by the EU policy actors in the 
context of regulation of players’ agents. Hence, it aims to advance the theoretical 
understanding of EU sports policy previously developed by Parrish (2003a). 
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Therefore, this approach also justifies the limits of the research in relation to the 
EU policy actors. 
 
There is also the time frame. The research investigates the post-Nice period from 
2000 to 2015. The reason for not investigating the pre-Nice period is the 
existence of a rich literature analyzing the EU sports policy during that period. 
Additionally, this research is complimentary to the existing literature on the EU 
policy making in the field of sport and in particular builds upon Parrish’s 
research which carries out an extensive analysis of the pre-Nice period. 
However, in order to provide a historical contextual background in chapter 2, 
there are some analyses of the pre-Nice period in the context of the single 




Following this introduction, chapter 2 provides the necessary contextual 
background in order to fully understand the following chapters. Chapter 2 
locates players’ agents within the European player market through outlining a 
brief historical background, their core activities and their socio-economic weight 
in numbers. The chapter then explains the historical development of the 
regulatory framework that governs activities of players’ agents through locating 
it within the governance framework of football. The EU’s earlier intervention in 
the context of single market regulation is presented next. Finally, the chapter 
concludes by presenting the new regulatory framework adopted by FIFA (the 
concept of intermediaries).  
 
  21 
Chapter 3 presents the literature review of the research. The objective of the 
review for the research is to conceptualize the socio-cultural regulation of sport 
as policy core beliefs. Therefore, the chapter postulates the analysis of the 
literature locating the socio-cultural regulation of sport in different conceptual 
meanings. The chapter then locates the socio-cultural regulation of sport within 
the wider literature of EU sports policy and outlines the adoption of key 
assumptions from Parrish’s research resulting from the conceptualization of the 
socio-cultural regulation of sport as policy core beliefs. 
 
Chapter 4 outlines the theoretical framework of the research, the ACF.  The 
chapter begins with a general conceptual outlines of the framework and then, 
moves on to present the key concepts used by the research: coordinated activity, 
selective perception and policy preferences. 
 
Chapter 5 focuses on coordinated activity amongst the EU policy actors.  The 
chapter first analyses coordinated activity during the period from the Nice 
Declaration in 2000 to the White Paper on Sport in 2007. During this period a 
minimum level of activity is identified and presented. Then, it moves on to 
examine the aftermath of the White Paper on Sport and outlines a strong 
coordinated activity within the EU policy actors. The chapter concludes with 
analysis of coordinated activity in the post-Lisbon era. 
 
Chapter 6 considers selective perception performed by policy core beliefs. The 
same periods, from the Nice Declaration to the White Paper on Sport and the 
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aftermath of the White Paper, are examined. The chapter presents the evidence 
of selective perception. 
 
Chapter 7 moves on to analyze policy preferences of the EU policy actors in 
relation to policy instruments to regulate players’ agents at European level. The 
chapter presents the change in the preferences of the actors. Then, it investigates 
the factors that affecting policy making within the EU sports policy subsystem, in 
particular the constitutional limits of the EU as relatively stable parameters.  
 
Finally, chapter 8 concludes the thesis through presenting the research’s 
findings with regards to the EU policy making and the theoretical advancement 
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CHAPTER 2 
Players’ Agents and the EU: A Historical Background 
 
Introduction 
This thesis intends to explain the motives of the EU in intervening into the 
regulation of players’ agents, in particular to understand the extent of socio-
cultural regulation of sport underpinning such intervention. In order to achieve 
this objective it is, first of all, necessary to understand the nature of players’ 
agents activities in socio-economic terms providing insights into their presence 
in the European player market. There is also a necessity to explain the historical 
evolution of the regulatory framework governing their activities including the 
impact of the EU’s intervention on the issue from the single market perspective. 
The historical context aims to provide basic information in order to under stand 
the following chapters. 
 
In doing so, the chapter firstly highlights the role and socio-economic dimension 
of players’ agents in European football. Secondly, it examines the historical 
development of FIFA’s regulatory framework governing players’ agents through 
locating the discourse within the wider structure of football governance. It then 
moves on to analyze the impact of the EU’s single market approach on the 
regulation regulatory framework and contextualizes them in the context of the 
EU sports policy. The problems within the activities of players’ agents and the 
new regulatory framework, the concept of intermediaries, are analyzed in the 
final parts of this chapter. 
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Players’ Agents: the Definition and their Socio-economic Presence in 
European Football 
Historically, the origins of players’ agent profession in European football can be 
traced back to the late 19th century and the profession has gone under a 
significant evolution since then. In the days of amateurism and the early case of 
professionalism in European football during the 1880s, the visibility and role of 
players’ agents was limited and confined to assisting clubs to discover new 
talents. Then, clubs lacked the organizational structures and scouting networks 
to source players and players’ agents were able to exploit the incapability of 
early professional clubs. As a result, in early days, players’ agents represented 
clubs rather than players (Banks 2002). This also resulted from the “retain and 
transfer” system that operated in European football under which clubs were able 
to exercise a greater degree of control over players’ movements. Under the 
system, players were purely deemed to be a commodity without any rights on 
their employment prospect with another club and they were generally 
negotiating their playing contracts without any professional advice. By the mid-
1950s, players’ agents had started to represent and support players’ interests as 
European football went through a number of developments. With the growing 
success of football and increased match day revenues, European clubs looked for 
players abroad in order to be more competitive which led to the expansion of the 
transfer market, whilst players also demanded better employment terms with 
their existing clubs as the possibility of offering their services somewhere else 
grew.  Additionally, players’ rights were enhanced due to unionization efforts 
and the increasing powers of players’ unions (Holt et al. 2006; Holt 2007). In this 
context, players’ agents offered their services to players who held stronger 
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bargaining power and became marketable beyond national borders. As a result, 
they became an influential figure within the European transfer market offering 
services both clubs and players. In 1994, FIFA formally recognized the role of 
players’ agents in football and regulated their activities through a licensing based 
regulatory framework, which was also adopted by all national football 
federations, marking the evolution of the activity of players’ agents into a 
profession. 
 
The profession of players’ agents has undergone a further transformation during 
the last two decades. Combined impact of the increased freedom of movement of 
players, due to the Bosman ruling of the CJEU in 1995, and an exponential 
revenue growth in football industry, as a result of the de-regulation in the 
European broadcasting market, was the development of a truly European player 
market (Holt 2007; Poli 2010). Within this complex market players relied on 
players’ agents to fully exploit their bargaining power and the transfer freedom 
that they enjoyed (Poli 2010).  Clubs, on the other hand, required the services of 
players’ agents in particular to selling their players while they were still under 
contract in order to avoid losing them once they became free agents. At the same 
time, clubs were also forced to offer improved terms for players that they 
wanted to retain prior to the expiry of their contracts. The situation had further 
strengthened the bargaining position of players resulting in increased salaries 
and longer playing contracts that have eventually became almost a norm in 
European football (Poli 2010). The end result was that players’ agents became a 
dominant figure in the European player market with some substantial earnings 
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from negotiating playing contracts on behalf of players and sourcing players for 
clubs (KEA et al. 2009; Poli 2010). 
 
The developments also led players’ agents to transform their structures and the 
services offered to their clients. In order to improve on services they offered, 
players’ agents formed larger companies offering multiple services extending 
beyond the negotiation of contracts and the sourcing players (KEA 2009; Poli 
2010; Poli and Rossi 2012). The services diversified to cater for the every day 
needs of their clients, in particular for players in order to allow them to fully 
focus on their game. The services extended to the negotiations of players’ 
marketing and commercial contracts. Image rights of players had become one of 
the key elements that were negotiated by agents with clubs, whilst commercial 
contracts related to sponsorship endorsements had also been negotiated.  
Additionally, the diversity of services offered included services related to legal 
counseling and dispute resolution, career and post-career planning, financial and 
marketing planning, and personal care. 
 
The different nature of services offered by players’ agents was highlighted in the 
empirical study undertaken by Poli and Rossi (2012). The study focused on 
players’ agents domiciled within countries hosting the big five European leagues: 
England, Spain, Germany, France and Italy. Agents were asked to respond to a 
questionnaire about their services for players and clubs. With regards to services 
for players, 98% of the respondents identified the negotiation of their players’ 
contracts as their main core activity. 65% of the respondents, on the other hand, 
also assisted players in their marketing and endorsement contracts, whilst 51% 
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indicated that they also provided legal counseling and dispute resolution. Almost 
half of respondents, 48% and 46%, specify respectively career and post-career 
planning and personal care amongst the services provided to players (Poli and 
Rossi 2012, p.56). In relation to services offered to clubs, 71% of players’ agents 
responded to assist clubs in the intermediation for transferring players.  The 
65% of the respondents indicated that they also helped clubs to scout 
professional players and half of the respondents scout young players on their 
behalf (Poli and Rossi 2012, p.59). The study highlighted the diversity of services 
offered by players’ agents. 
 
The number of licensed players’ agents has also drastically increased over the 
last two decades. The increase was due to the soaring players’ salaries as a result 
of spending powers of clubs due to substantial revenue growths (Poli 2010; Poli 
and Rossi 2012). There were only 613 licensed players’ agents worldwide in 
February 2001, whereas by September 2007 the numbers reached over 4,000 
(Poli 2010, p.206). In December 2011, there were 6,082 licensed players’ agents 
operating worldwide (Poli and Rossi 2012, p.2). In Europe, players’ agents are 
present in each of the 27 Member States (KEA at al. 2009, p. 36) and football is by 
far the sport with the highest number of agents in Europe (KEA et al. 2009, p. 
40). In 2009, there were 2,913 in Europe and the highest concentration of 
players’ agents has been within Italy, England, Spain, Germany and France, 
referred as “the Big Five” in European football (KEA et al. 2009, p. 41). In 2009, 
there were 563 licensed players’ agents in Italy, 560 in England, 558 in Spain, 
259 in Germany and 253 in France (KEA et al. 2009, p. 41). These numbers 
represented 75% of the total number of players’ agents in Europe (KEA et al. 
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2009, p. 41). In 2012, the total number of players’ agents domiciled within these 
countries represented 41% of the total numbers worldwide (Poli and Rossi 
2012, p.2).   Meanwhile, the yearly turnover of players’ agents operating just 
within the EU was estimated to be around €200 million (KEA et al. 2009, p. 4) 
whereas it is believed that this is a modest estimation and it may be twice as 
much, up to €400 million  (Poli and Rossi 2012, p.15). 
 
FIFA Players’ Agents Regulations: Establishing a Regulatory Framework 
The first FIFA regulations on players’ agents that established the regulatory 
framework based on licensing needs to be contextualized within the wider 
football governance structure. Resembling a hierarchical pyramid, from the 
bottom-up, the structure is formed by clubs, the national associations, the 
continental federations and the global governing body, FIFA. The structure 
establishes a single governing body for each national territory, a single 
confederation in each continent and a single worldwide federation (Holt 2007; 
Arnout 2010). There is a hierarchical competency to regulate football within the 
system. FIFA makes the rules at international level and ensures the applicability 
at all levels through a membership mechanism that also creates contractual 
chains for jurisdictional competency to sanction any regulatory breach.  The 
national associations and the continental federations are members of FIFA who 
agree to comply with its internationally applicable rules and regulations as well 
as enforcing them within their territory. On the other hand, clubs and players are 
not formal members of FIFA, albeit clubs generally agree to abide by rules and 
regulations whilst playing contracts incorporate provisions compelling players 
to comply with them. The integration of all participants as stakeholders through 
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one framework based on a vertical hierarchy ensures that FIFA, continental 
federations and the national associations monopolize the regulation and 
organization of football.  
 
When FIFA took the decision to regulate players’ agents, it represented a 
challenge as agents sit outside the governance structure. They are not direct 
members of FIFA and there is no natural contractual link with FIFA. Players’ 
agents would not require an approval of any football governing body in order to 
carry out their activities which are peripheral and lie outside the direct 
responsibility of those bodies. Yet, the activities of the players’ agents have a 
direct impact on the members of governing bodies, ie; clubs and players, which 
compelled FIFA to regulate with the objective of protecting the proper 
functioning of competitions and their image in the eyes of the public (KEA et al. 
2009).  
 
In this context, in 1994, FIFA established the regulatory framework based on 
licensing to govern the activities of players’ agents in order to bring them under 
the realm of the governance structure. Under the framework, the accession to the 
profession became subject to a license requirement. Clubs and players were 
obliged only to use licensed players’ agents during transfers and contract 
negotiations. By doing this, effectively players’ agents were obliged to enter into 
contractual ties with governing bodies through the grant of a license allowing the 
imposition of regulatory obligations.  FIFA adopted the regulations setting out 
principles determining how a licensed players’ agent should operate and 
required the national associations to adopt their own regulations incorporating 
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those principles. The transposition of FIFA regulations into the national 
association law aims to achieve coherent application worldwide. The candidates 
who did not satisfy certain criteria or were not prepared to comply with FIFA’s 
and the national associations’ regulations were not allowed to obtain a license 
and the validity of a license was subject to continuous compliance. 
 
The original regulations, FIFA Players’ Agents Regulations 1994, establishing the 
license based framework were first adopted by the FIFA Executive Committee at 
a meeting held on 20 May 1994, which were amended on 11 December 1995, and 
came in to force on 1 January 1996.  Under the regulations, the license was to be 
issued either by FIFA for all types of transfers or by the national associations for 
domestic transfers. Only natural persons were allowed to enter into the 
profession. The close relatives of the players and qualified lawyers, legally 
authorized in compliance with the rules in force in his country of domicile, were 
defined as exempt individuals with a right to exercise the profession without 
license (FIFA 1994, Article 1).  The regulations laid down a procedure to obtain 
the license. The candidates were required to submit a written request to relevant 
associations and to attend an interview to ascertain their knowledge regarding 
football regulations and civil law (FIFA 1994, Article 2). After the interview it 
was the responsibility of the competent national association who decided the 
admissibility of the candidate into the profession. If there were no objections 
against the grant of the license, as a next step, the candidate had to deposit a 
bank guarantee of 200,000 Swiss Franc (CHF) (FIFA 1994, Article 9). Upon 
receipt of the bank guarantee FIFA issued the license that was personal and non-
transferable (FIFA 1994, Article 11).  
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The original regulations also provided provisions governing the relationship of 
licensed players’ agents with their principals, i.e. players or clubs and laid out 
sanctions for regulatory breaches. Licensed players’ agents had rights to contact 
any player not contracted to a club or to represent the interest of any player or 
club requesting him to negotiate or/and conclude contracts on his/their behalf.  
Players` agents were required to enter into a written representation contract to 
exercise the rights which cannot be more than a maximum period of two years 
and renewable (FIFA 1994, Article 13).  In the case of infringement of the 
regulations, licensed agents could be subject to a number of sanctions including a 
fine and the withdrawal of the license (FIFA 1994, Article 15). Clubs and players 
were prohibited from using the services of unlicensed agents (FIFA 1994, Article 
16 & 18) and could also be liable to sanctions such as disciplinary suspensions 
for the player and a ban on all national and international footballing activity for 
the clubs (FIFA 1994, Article 17 & 19). The Players’ Status Committee was the 
designated body within FIFA for the supervision of the regulations. 
 
The EU & Players’ Agents: The Single Market Perspective 
The decision by FIFA to regulate the activities of players’ agents also coincided 
with some important developments that were eventually to become catalysts for 
the transformation of the governance structure in football. The changing media 
landscape was the initial factor that triggered the traditional hierarchical nature 
of the governance structure to come under pressure (Holt 2007; Arnout 2012). 
At the beginning of 1990 the television industry was de-regulated in the EU 
through a number of competition law measures ending monopoly of public 
service broadcasters (Garcia 2008).  The development of pay television 
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technologies resulted in increased revenue growth and changes in consumption 
(Holt 2007). The development was closely associated with an increased demand 
to view and to broadcast games that featuring best teams in the world. The 
financial power of the broadcasters ensured a surge of alternative leagues, 
UEFA’s Champions League being the prime example (Holt 2007). Consequently, 
clubs and the leagues sought greater autonomy to exploit their market power 
and emerged as powerful stakeholders contesting their lack of participation in 
the governance structure (Holt 2007; Arnout 2012).  
 
In the discourse of the transformation of football governance, the EU became a 
key terrain for the stakeholders to challenge the decisions of governing bodies 
(Foster 2000; Parrish 2003a, 2003b). The commercialization and 
commodification of football ran parallel to the completion of EU’s Single 
European Market project and the EU had desired to see all commercial entities 
respecting the economic basis of the Union (Takorski et al. 2004). The EU was 
particularly concerned with the rules and regulations of governing bodies 
interfering with the competition and free movement rules (Parrish 2003a, 
2003b).  Referred to as the single market regulations of sport (Parrish 2003a, pp. 
8-12), the EU institutions, particularly the European Commission and the 
European Court of Justice, dealt with a significant number of cases resulting from 
the EU’s internal market competences (Parrish 2003a). In particular, the 
Competition DG took the view that the organization and operation of sport may 
fall within the scope of EU competition law and there were significant numbers 
of complaints to the Commission, as it was a cheaper and easier option and in the 
form of private right action, against governing bodies for acting in anti-
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competitive manner (Foster 2000). In this connection, the Competition DG 
examined various aspects of football including the applicability of revised 
transfers rules following the Bosman ruling the ECJ (Jean Marc Bosman v. Union 
Royale Belge Sociétés de Football Association, case C-415/93 [1995] ECR I-4921, 
hereinafter Bosman), ticketing arrangements for major international football 
events and sports broadcasting rights (Parrish 2000). As a result, the EU 
established a supervisory role offering governing bodies a degree of supervised 
authority, or conditional autonomy as defined by Weatherill (2009a), in exchange 
for greater stakeholder representation within governance structure (Garcia 
2009). 
The initial incursion of the EU with the regulation of players’ agents was in the 
context of the single market regulation of sport. The authority of FIFA to regulate 
players’ agents and the compatibility of its original regulations with EU law came 
under scrutiny, firstly before the Commission and then the General Court. On 20 
February 1996, Multiplayers International Denmark lodged a complaint to the 
Commission alleging that the regulations were contrary to Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU (formerly Article 81 and 82 of EC Treaty) (Piau, para.9). French national, 
Laurent Piau, submitted another complaint on 23 March 1998. In his complaint, 
Mr. Piau alleged that the original FIFA regulations were contrary to the 
provisions of the EU’s free movement rules related to services, in particular 
Article 59 TFEU (formerly Article 49 of EC Treaty). His challenge was based 
firstly on the fact that opaque examination procedures, the requirement of a 
bank guarantee, and controls and sanctions imposed under the regulations 
constituted restrictions on access to the profession (Branco Martins 2007). 
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Secondly, he complained that no legal remedy was available against the decisions 
of governing bodies or against the sanctions imposed under the regulations 
(Branco Martins 2007). Finally, he also alleged discriminatory nature of the 
regulations against the national of the Member States (Branco Martins 2007). 
 
The Commission examined the regulations by FIFA and sent a statement of 
objections to the governing body on 19 October 1999 (Piau para. 10). The 
Commission concluded that the regulations by FIFA constituted a decision by an 
association of undertakings under Article 101 TFEU. The restrictions under the 
regulations related to the licensing requirement, being only open to natural 
persons, the prohibition on using unlicensed agents, and the compulsory bank 
guarantee requirement were questioned by the Commission (Piau para.10). On 4 
January 2000 FIFA responded the statement and disputed the classification of 
the regulations as a decision by an association of undertakings.  FIFA argued that 
the restrictions were aimed at the legitimate justification of raising ethical 
standards for the profession and could be exempted under Article 101(3) TFEU 
(Piau, para.11). 
 
The complaints led to amendments to the regulations by FIFA. Following the 
statement of objections by the Commission, there was a hearing held at the 
Commission attended by FIFA, the representatives of Mr. Piau and FIFPro. The 
hearing was instrumental for FIFA to decide on the amendments. On 10 
December 2000, FIFA adopted its new regulation on players’ agents (FIFA 
Players’ Agents Regulations 2001) which came into force on 1 March 2001. The 
objective of the amendments in the new regulations was to remove the alleged 
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infringements of EU law under the original regulations. Under the amended 
regulations, the profession was still subject to a license issued for an indefinite 
period and also was still reserved for natural persons only (FIFA 2001, Article 1 
& 2). The procedure to obtain a license was revised. Instead of the interview, the 
candidates were required to undertake a written examination, consisting of 
multiple-choice questions, to assess their knowledge of law and sport and they 
needed to satisfy the requirement of having an impeccable reputation (FIFA 
2001, Article 2, 4 & 5). The candidates needed to take out either a professional 
liability insurance policy or to deposit a bank guarantee for the amount of 
100.000 Swiss CHF prior to the issue of the license (FIFA 2001, Article 6 & 7). 
The players’ agents were also required to sign a new code of conduct, annexed to 
the regulations, outlining set of rules and responsibilities to be followed by 
players’ agents (FIFA 2001, Article 8). Clubs and players were still prohibited 
from using the services of unlicensed players’ agents whilst players’ agents were 
prohibited to approach any player contracted with any club. The written 
representation contract was still required to enter into a relationship with either 
club or player, which can only be signed for two years and can be renewed, and 
there was a standard contract annexed to the regulations which players’ agents 
were required to use in their activities. The contract was to be signed by both 
parties in quadruple and lodged with the national association and FIFA whilst 
both parties kept a copy too. Under the representation contract, players’ agents’ 
remuneration must be stipulated, if the contract is silent it is fixed at 5%, based 
upon the player’s basic gross salary and either payable in a lump sum or periodic 
installments (FIFA 2001, Article 12). In terms of sanctions, the system sanctions 
for players’ agents, clubs and players remained in place (FIFA 2001, Article 15,17 
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& 19).  The Players’ Status Committee and the competent national association 
were given authority to deal with the disputes (FIFA 2001, Article 22). 
 
Following the adoption of the new regulations by FIFA, the European 
Commission wrote to both parties, Mr. Piau and Multiplayers International 
Denmark, advising them that the main restrictive aspects of the original 
regulations by FIFA were eliminated and continuing with the proceedings 
represented no community interest (Piau, para. 19). On 28 September 2001, Mr. 
Piau responded to the Commission and maintained his complaint (Piau, para. 
21). He alleged that the restrictions were still remaining under the new 
regulations in relation to the requirements of a written examination and 
professional indemnity insurance. In addition, some new restrictions were 
imposed with respect to professional conduct, the standard written contract and 
the establishment of the level of remuneration.  Mr. Piau claimed that these 
restrictions were neither compatible with Article 101(1) TFEU nor could be 
covered by an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. Furthermore, he also 
argued that the Commission failed to examine the regulations with regards to 
Article 102 TFEU (Piau, para. 21). On 15th April 2002, the Commission rejected 
Mr. Piau’s complaint by issuing its decision arguing that the most important 
restrictive measures were removed under the new regulations and the 
remaining ones could be exempted whilst Article 102 TFEU was not applicable to 
the case (Piau, para. 22). For the Commission, FIFA’s aims of extending good 
practice, raising professional standards and protecting its members from 
unqualified and unscrupulous individuals prevailed over competition 
considerations (KEA et al. 2009). Mr. Piau still was not satisfied and appealed to 
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the General Court on 14 June 2002 (Piau, para. 23). 
In the Piau case the General Court upheld the decision of the Commission and 
rejected the appeal by Mr. Piau (Piau, para. 106). In reaching the decision, the 
Court initially assessed the nature of FIFA and its regulations from the 
competition law perspective to determine whether FIFA constituted an 
association of undertakings and its players’ regulations a decision by an 
association of undertakings in order to establish the applicability of Article 101 
and 102 TFEU to the case. On this point, the Court established that FIFA’s 
members are national associations consisting of groupings of football clubs who 
practice football as an economic activity. As a result, football clubs are also 
undertakings with regards to Article 101 TFEU and the national associations are 
associations of undertakings within the meaning of that provision (Piau, para. 
69). The Court concluded that FIFA is also an association of undertakings as the 
body is the group of national associations who are its members (Piau, para. 72). 
With regards to the concept of a decision by an association of undertakings, the 
Court classed FIFA’s regulations as a decision of an association of undertakings 
due to the fact that the occupation of players’ agent is an economic activity 
involving the provisions of services (Piau, para. 73).  Furthermore, for the Court 
the regulations are binding on the national associations who are members of 
FIFA and compelled to adopt similar regulations and the regulations are the 
reflection of FIFA’s effort to coordinate the conduct of its members in relation to 
the activities of players’ agents (Piau, para. 74).  
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The General Court, then, moved onto assess the lawfulness of the Commission’s 
decision against Mr. Piau’s complaint and based its analysis on three 
considerations by the Commission in reaching its decision: the repeal of the most 
restrictive provisions contained in the original regulations; the eligibility of the 
provisions of the amended regulations for an exemption under Article 101(3) 
TFEU; and the inapplicability of Article 102 TFEU. The Court underlined the fact 
that there was no manifest error by the Commission in establishing that the 
amended regulation by FIFA actually removed the most restrictive provisions of 
the original regulations (Piau, para. 99). According to the Court, the Commission 
was right in considering that the written examination under the amended 
regulations offered satisfactory guarantees of objectivity and transparency; the 
requirement of professional liability insurance was not disproportionate; and 
the provisions regulating the remuneration of players’ agents was not a price 
fixing from the perspective of competition law (Piau, para. 90). Furthermore, for 
the court, the standard contract annexed to the regulations, the two-year 
limitation on the duration of representation contract and the sanctions regime 
lacked any anti-competitive effect (Piau, para. 91-95). 
 
In the view of the Court, the actual principle of the license, as required by FIFA 
and a condition to carry out the profession of players’ agent, constituted an 
obstacle for accessing to an economic activity at European level and inevitably 
effects competition (Piau, para. 101). Nonetheless, the Court concluded that 
restrictions that have arisen as a result of the compulsory nature of license might 
benefit from an exemption under Article 101 (3) TFEU.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court noted that there is a general lack of legislation in the EU, 
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apart from France, governing the activities of players’ agents. Additionally, the 
profession of players’ agent does not have an internal organization and certain 
activities of players’ agents could have harmed players and clubs financially and 
professionally. The court also emphasized that competition is not eliminated by 
the licensing system since it appears that the system results in a qualitative 
selection rather than a quantitative restriction on access to the profession (Piau, 
para. 102). With regards to consideration of the inapplicability of Article 102 
TFEU, the Court established that Article 102 TFEU was applicable as FIFA holds a 
collective dominant position on the players’ agents’ market but concluded that 
the position was not abused by FIFA (Piau, para. 117). According to the Court, 
the removal of the most restrictive provisions from its original regulations and 
the enjoyment of the license system from the exemptions consequently led to a 
conclusion of an absence of infringement under Article 102 TFEU (Piau, para. 
119).  
 
The Piau judgement marked the end of the EU’s intervention into the regulation 
of players’ agents from the single market perspective. The judgment was 
particularly significant for FIFA as it confirmed the compatibility of FIFA’s agents 
regulations with the EU law and also recognized the regulatory power of FIFA to 
govern activities of players’ agents. Following the Piau judgement, FIFA 
undertook another revision to its regulations in 2008 in order to provide more 
control over the activities of players’ agents. Various requirements established 
by the regulations 2001 remained in power. However, an important change was 
made in relation to the renewal of licenses. The validity of licenses were limited 
to 5 years instead of an indefinite period and players’ agents were required to 
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take the exam in order to renew their license. If they fail to pass the exam then, 
their license would be suspended until the examination was passed (FIFA 2008, 
Article 17). These regulations remained in power until FIFA’ established a new 
regulatory framework in 2015. 
 
The Problems Associated with Players’ Agents 
The problems associated the activities of players’ agents have been observed and 
reported despite FIFA’s efforts to improve the regulatory framework governing 
them. Football was identified as the most vulnerable sector for financial crime, in 
particular for money laundering (FATF 2009, p.8). There are certain mechanics 
in European transfer market indicate the instances of money laundering  (FATF 
2009, p.22).  Players’ agents are considered to be central to these mechanics due 
to their influential role in transfers (FATF 2009, p.22). Overvaluation of the price 
of the player is a technique to extract an additional value from criminal activities. 
The excess proceedings of individual transfers are later distributed amongst the 
representatives of clubs, managers, players and players’ agents, hidden 
payments known as “bungs”, in order to facilitate future transfers involving same 
individuals and clubs.  13 people were convicted of hidden payments, including 
six players’ agents, by a criminal court in France at the end of a trial in June 2006 
where player transfers by French football club, Olympique de Marseille, were 
investigated between 1997 and 1999 (KEA et al. 2009, p.113). In the UK an 
independent inquiry, the Quest Inquiry, was commissioned by the Premier 
League to investigate a number of transfers possibly involving irregularities such 
as unauthorized and fraudulent payments (KEA et al. 2009, p.115). There were 
362 transfer deals involving Premier League clubs investigated. The final report 
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highlighted irregularities in these transfers, in particular related to the conduct 
of players’ agents within 17 transfers (Duthie et al. 2008, p.694, KEA et al. 2009, 
p.116).  
 
The other potential mechanic for money laundering is the ownership of the 
players. Known as either “talent pool” or “third-party ownership” where the 
players’ economic rights are owned by third-party investors rather than clubs is 
a relatively recent development in football (KEA et al. 2009).  The third-party 
investors generally invest in certain percentage of players’ economic rights for 
the return of investment during the future transfer of those players. The classic 
example of potential money laundering is when the club officially declares only 
half of the player’s economic value in the transfer. As a result, if the player is 
later transferred to another club for a higher value, all parties gain from the 
transaction. The club will be able sign more players, the investors will launder 
half of their money and gain a significant return for their investment whilst the 
agent involved usually will get a large commission (FATF 2009, p.24).  
 
The protection of minor players who have been subject to trafficking and 
exploitation over the years has become an emerging sporting and social issue in 
the world of football that also involved players’ agents (KEA et al. 2009, pp. 126-
132). The increase in players’ salaries in Europe was the main factor for 
European clubs to source a cheaper labour supply from non-European 
territories, in particular Africa and Latin America (KEA et al. 2009, p.130). The 
success of African and Latin American players in European football also led the 
European clubs to headhunt young players from those continents. The young 
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players have also been eager to move to the lucrative European leagues with a 
prospect of better lifestyle and higher earnings have also contributed to the 
problem. Players’ agents have been generally involved in trafficking of these 
players into Europa (KEA et al. 2009, p.121). Players’ agents played an 
introductory role in arranging trials for those players with European clubs who 
were otherwise very unlikely to offer trials. However, when the chances of 
getting contracts for the clubs were gone those players have been very 
vulnerable to exploitation in a foreign country without any money and not able 
to speak the language and generally ended up on the streets abandoned by 
players’ agents. 20,000 African boys were estimated to be living in the streets of 
Europe after failing to secure contracts with European clubs following their trials 
(Weir 2009, p.46).  The failure in trails meant that those players were ashamed 
to go back to their families and communities.  They ended up either working 
illegally without a work permit to make some money to send their families or 
living in destitution on the street. 
 
Inducement to breach contract undermining the contractual stability for players 
and clubs is another problem in European football that players’ agents have been 
involved in. Two types of inducement were observed within the activities of 
players’ agents:  inducement to breach the playing contract of the player without 
the knowledge and consent of the club holding his registration, known as 
“tapping up” and inducement to breach the agency contract of a player signed 
with another agent, known as “poaching”.  A high profile tapping up case in 
English football in 2005 highlighted the role of players’ agents within such 
activity. The Premier League Disciplinary Commission found the agent of Ashley 
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Cole, then a player of Arsenal, guilty of misconduct for making arrangements for 
Cole to meet with the representatives of Chelsea Football Club in order to discuss 
his transfer to Chelsea at the expiry of his contract with Arsenal (Football 
Association Premier League Ltd. v Ashley Cole, Chelsea Football Club and Jose 
Mourinho, 1st June 2015).  The English Football Association viewed this case 
most seriously as it involved two of leading clubs of English football and an 
international player and suspended the agent`s license for 18 months combined 
with a fine (Duthie et al. 2008, p. 703). Another high profile case in the UK, the 
Proform case (Proform Sports Management Limited v Proactive Sport 
Management Limited and Paul Stretford, HHJ Hodge Chancery Division [2006] 
EWHC 2812 (Ch) [2006] All ER (D) 38 [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 356 [2007] 1 All 
ER 542), involving the player Wayne Rooney and his agent, Paul Stretford, 
illustrated poaching activity. Proform Sports Management Limited signed a two-
year representation agreement in December 2000 with Wayne Rooney when he 
was 15 years old.  Prior to expiry of his contract in September 2002 Rooney 
signed an eight-year representation agreement with Proactive Sports 
Management Limited where the principal agent was Paul Stretford. Proform 
initiated legal proceedings against Proactive and Paul Stretford for inducing 
Wayne Rooney to breach his contract with them. Although the court ruled in the 
favour of Proactive, the English Football Association initiated disciplinary 
proceedings against Paul Stretford and charged him with the breach of 
regulations related to prohibition of enticing a player away from another agent.4 
These examples illustrated the problem of inducement within the activities of 
players’ agents.  
                                                        
4 Extensive analysis of the case can be found in Duthie et al. (2008). 
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Finally, there were a significant number of unlicensed players’ agents active in 
the player market. FIFA acknowledged the fact that only 25% to 30% of 
international transfers are organized through licensed agents (Villiger 2011). As 
FIFA and national associations were not able to impose any sanctions on these 
unlicensed agents, eventually FIFA decided to move away from the licensing 
based regulatory framework and to establish a framework within which the 
activity rather than individuals is to be controlled (Villiger 2011). 
 
FIFA’s 2015 New Regulatory Framework: The Concept of Intermediaries: 
There are several shortfalls identified within the current licensing-based 
regulatory framework that create regulatory deficiencies that undermine the 
effectiveness of whole system. The enforcement has been a particular problem 
for FIFA and the national associations due to their restricted jurisdictional reach. 
Players’ agents are not direct members of FIFA and the national associations and 
FIFA aimed to overcome the lack of a contractual link for effective enforcement 
by establishing the license-based system. By using its direct contractual 
relationship with clubs and players, FIFA obliged them to work with licensed 
players’ agents and aimed to create a regulatory hook for players’ agents through 
the grant of a license. Nevertheless, it meant that FIFA has no power regarding 
players’ agents operating without a license. As a result, unlicensed agents are 
able to operate in the player market and it is literally impossible for FIFA and the 
national associations to impose any disciplinary sanctions on them. 
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 The other problem identified is in relation to the transposition of FIFA`s agent 
regulations into the regulations of national associations (Parrish 2007). The 
pattern of transposition has been rather inconsistent and conflicting since the 
national associations are also allowed to derogate from any provisions of FIFA 
regulations that are contrary to legislation in force in the territory of the 
association. The associations, who are based in non-interventionist systems 
which are characterized by a degree of autonomy for governing bodies and a lack 
of legislation in the field of sport, simply incorporate the regulations by FIFA 
regulations into their own. Some associations in interventionist systems also 
have legislation applicable to players’ agents alongside the national association 
law and FIFA regulations (Branco Martins 2009). France has been one of the 
prime examples of this. There is a piece of legislation, adopted in 1992, 
governing the profession of sports agent which is enforced in addition to 
individual regulations by sports governing bodies (Verheyden 2007). 
Consequently, there are conflicting provisions within these different regulations 
causing incoherency and uncertainty in practice which directly impact on the 
effectiveness of the regulatory system.  
 
On 3 June 2009, FIFA decided to conduct an in-depth reform of the licensing 
system through a new approach based on the concept of intermediaries during 
its 59th Congress in order to overcome the deficiencies of the licensing-based 
regulatory system (EPFL 2009). Through the new system FIFA aims to establish 
an overarching regulatory framework for an efficient control of the activity 
rather than regulating access to the profession. The new framework supersedes 
the license-based regulatory framework and abandons the license requirement. 
  46 
The framework lays down minimum standards and requirements as well as a 
registration system for intermediaries who represent players or clubs in the 
conclusion of employment contracts or transfer agreements. In FIFA’s view, the 
new system is considered to be more transparent and simpler to administer and 
implement which would also lead for a better enforcement at national level 
(Villiger 2009). 
 
The new system is also a result of an extensive consultation process involving all 
stakeholders in football (FIFA 2015b).  FIFA’s Committee for Club Football 
established a sub-committee who was mandated to develop the new system. The 
sub-committee undertook a lengthy and extensive consultation process with 
representatives of member associations, confederations, clubs, FIFPro and 
professional football leagues. The draft regulations on the concept of 
intermediaries were analysed within the framework of a number of working 
groups, including the Players’ Status Committee and the Legal Committee (FIFA 
2015b). The new Regulations on Working with Intermediaries were approved by 
the FIFA Executive Committee on 21 March 2014 and the 64th FIFA Congress on 
11 June 2014 approved the amendments to the FIFA Statutes and Regulations 
Governing the Application of the FIFA Statutes necessary for the implementation 
of new regulations. The new regulations came into force on 1 April 2015 
allowing the member associations enough time to adapt to the system. 
Under the new system, FIFA keeps the concept of intermediary much broader 
than the notion of players’ agent. An intermediary is defined as “a natural or 
legal person who, for a fee or free of charge, represents players and/or clubs in 
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negotiations with a view to concluding an employment contract or represents clubs 
in negotiations with a view to concluding a transfer agreement” (FIFA 2015a, p.4). 
As opposed to the licensing system under which the profession was only open to 
natural persons, legal persons can also act as an intermediary now. 
Intermediaries offering agency services free of charge are also incorporated into 
the definition of intermediary, whereas under the previous system the 
regulations are only applicable if a fee is paid.   
The new system abolishes the licensing requirement but replaces it with a 
registration system. Intermediaries are no longer required to hold a license to 
represent players or clubs and the requirement to obtain professional indemnity 
insurance or, alternatively, a bank guarantee is abolished too. Instead, 
intermediaries must be registered in the relevant registration system each time 
they are individually involved in specific transactions. The registration system is 
implemented and managed by the national associations (FIFA 2015a, Article 
3.1). In order to register, the intermediary must have an impeccable reputation 
that needs to be ascertained by the national associations, who also establish that 
the intermediary has no contractual relationship with leagues, associations, 
confederations or FIFA that could lead to a potential conflict of interest (FIFA 
2015a, Article 4). All intermediaries execute the registration through the 
completion of mandatory intermediary declaration (FIFA 2015a, Article 3.2). By 
signing the declaration, the intermediary confirms to adhere to the applicable 
statutes and regulations of FIFA and those of the confederations and the national 
associations when carrying out its activities. Once registered, the submission of a 
signed declaration must be made each time for each transfer agreement with 
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which the intermediary is involved (FIFA 2015a, Article 3.5).  The signed 
declaration needs to be submitted to the association of the club with which the 
player signs his employment contract, or in the case of the representation of a 
club, the club needs to submit the declaration to the association of the club with 
which the player in question is to be registered (FIFA 2015a, Article 3.3 & 3.4). 
With the objective of regulating the intermediation activity rather than 
individuals, the new regulations bring stringent disclosure requirements for the 
parties that are involved in the transactions, in particular for clubs and players. 
Players and clubs are required to act with due diligence in the selection and 
engaging process of intermediaries requiring them to ensure that the 
intermediaries sign the relevant intermediary declaration and the 
representation contract concluded between the parties (FIFA 2015a, Article 2). 
Players and clubs are also required to disclose, to their associations, the full 
details of any and all agreed remunerations or payments of whatsoever nature 
that they have made or that are to be made to the intermediary (FIFA 2015a, 
Article 6.1). The associations are also required to publish annually, at the end of 
March each year, the names of all intermediaries that they have registered, the 
transactions in which those intermediaries were involved, and the total amount 
of all remunerations or payments actually made to intermediaries by their 
registered players and by each of their affiliated clubs (FIFA 2015a, Article 6.3). 
This is to ensure that disclosure of such information will create better 
transparency and accountability of actions that will help to provide oversight by 
adopting a structured approach. 
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Furthermore, for the sake of transparency, players and clubs are required to 
enter into a representation contract outlining the nature of their legal 
relationship and incorporating minimum details of that relationship (FIFA 
2015a, Article 5). Under the representation contract, the parties need to specify 
the nature of the legal relationship with the player or the club, whether being a 
consultancy service, the conclusion of a transfer agreement or employment 
contract, or any other legal relationship (FIFA 2015a, Article 5.1). There are also 
minimum details that must be stipulated under the contract including the names 
of the parties, the scope of services, the duration of the legal relationship, the 
remuneration due to the intermediary, the general terms of payment, the date of 
conclusion, the termination provisions and the signatures of the parties (FIFA 
2015a, Article 5.2). However, there is no standard contract annexed to the new 
regulations that needs to be used by intermediaries and no restriction on the 
duration of the contract for its validity is stipulated under the new regulations 
(FIFA 2015a, Article 5). 
 The new system also establishes a stricter approach in relation to the payments 
being made to intermediaries. In doing so, FIFA seeks to prevent financial 
irregularities and to bring more transparency. A limit of 3% of a player’s basic 
gross salary, for the entire duration of the relevant employment contract, or of 
the eventual transfer fee paid by the club, in the event of conclusion of a transfer 
agreement, is recommended to be paid to intermediaries as commission (FIFA 
2015a, Article 7.3). Clubs will make sure that none of the payments which should 
be made between two clubs involving in the transfer such as solidarity payment 
or training compensation, is either paid to intermediaries or paid by 
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intermediaries. This also includes, but is not limited to, owning any interest in 
any transfer compensation or future transfer value of players. The assignment of 
claims is also prohibited (FIFA 2015a, Article 7.4). Payments to intermediaries 
are to be made exclusively by the client of the intermediary, either being a club 
or a player. In addition, intermediaries are prohibited from receiving any 
payment if acting on behalf of minor players (FIFA 2015a, Article 7.8). The 
changes to the payments and particular commission cap is one of the most 
significant changes under the new system which FIFA aims to control the level of 
commission received by the intermediaries and bring more transparency.  
The new system also aims to avoid conflicts of interest between the 
intermediaries and their principals. Players and clubs are required to use 
“reasonable endeavors” to ensure that no conflicts of interest exist or are likely 
to exist prior to engaging the services of an intermediary (FIFA 2015a, Article 
8.1). However, as a general rule, it would be deemed that there is no conflict of 
interest if any actual or potential interest is disclosed in writing by the 
intermediary and the express written consent of all parties involved is obtained 
prior to the start of the negotiations (FIFA 2015a, Article 8.2). Players and clubs 
are also allowed to engage the services of the same intermediary within the 
scope of the same transaction as long as they give their express written consent 
and inform each other in writing about which party to remunerate the 
intermediary (FIFA 2015a, Article 8.3). The relevant national associations will be 
also informed of the agreement in relation to conflicts of interest and all relevant 
documents to be submitted within the registration process (FIFA 2015a, Article 
8). 
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Under the new system, the national associations are responsible for the 
imposition of sanctions on any party under their jurisdiction violating the 
applicable provisions. The associations have the obligation to publish 
accordingly and to inform FIFA of any disciplinary sanctions taken against any 
intermediary. Then, the FIFA Disciplinary Committee can extend the sanction 
imposed to have worldwide effect in accordance with the FIFA Disciplinary Code. 
FIFA is also responsible for the monitoring of national associations in 
implementing the new system.  The FIFA Disciplinary Committee is to deal with 
the situation if the principles under the new regulations are not complied with in 
accordance with the FIFA Disciplinary Code (FIFA 2015a, Article 9). 
 
FIFA, through the new system, aims to overcome the deficiencies of the previous 
license-based system (Eppel and Miller, 2014). In order to tackle the issue of 
unlicensed agents, FIFA have completely shifted its approach and instead of 
regulating individuals, the activity of intermediation is regulated. Furthermore, 
FIFA have also shifted the responsibility of liability onto clubs and players, who 
are members and legally bound by its regulations. By placing the onus of due 
diligence onto clubs and players through requiring them to use reasonable 
endavours in the selection and engagement of intermediaries, FIFA would be 
able to sanction any wrong-doings. FIFA have also introduced the registration 
and disclosure requirements in order to improve transparency and the control of 
activities. 
 
Conversely, the new system has already come under scrutiny and is not without 
any challenge and criticisms. Seen as the de-regulation of the players’ agent 
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profession, it is claimed that the new system provides a platform for unqualified 
and potentially insalubrious individuals to enter into the European player 
market (Eppel and Miller 2014; De Marco 2014). FIFA, although abolishing the 
payments under the representation contracts with minor players, removes the 
restriction on the duration of representation contracts, which was a maximum of 
two years under the old system, as well as the restriction on the age of player 
with which the intermediary can enter into a representation contract. De Marco 
(2014) argues that allowing the intermediaries to enter into a contract with 
players at any age which could last for a period beyond the minor’s 18th birthday 
defies the objective of protecting young players and would be an issue in the 
future.  
 
In addition, the Association of Football Agents (AFA) has lodged a complaint 
before the European Commission challenging FIFA’s recommended 3% cap. The 
pending complaint is on the grounds that it infringes competition law and 
considered as price-fixing (De Marco, 2014). According to Turner (2013) “when 
applying Article 101 TFEU, it may be found that the proposed cap affects trade 
between member states, as it is sufficient for there to be a direct or indirect, actual 
or potential, effect on the pattern of trade between member states; has an 
appreciable effect on trade, as it affects the whole of the relevant market; and has 
the effect (if not the object) of distorting competition as a form of price fixing”. 
Therefore, the Commission’s decision on the complaint is significant for the 
future of the new regulatory regime and could pave the way for further 
intervention into the issue from the single market perspective.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the role of players’ agents in the European player market, 
the historical evolution of FIFA’s regulatory frameworks for agents and also 
located the incursion of the EU with the issue in the context of the single market 
regulation of sport. In particular, the EU has been an important actor in shaping 
the regulatory framework and also the development of the profession. As the EU 
became an avenue for unsatisfied stakeholders to challenge the decisions of the 
governing bodies, the regulations of FIFA came under the scrutiny of EU law. 
Additionally, the EU’s single market approach to sport resulted a development of 
sport related case law that had a profound impact on sport. The Bosman 
judgment caused the transformation of labour relationships in football and 
revolutionized the player market within which players' agents blossomed and 
the problems in their activities led to questioning the efficacy of the license-
based framework by FIFA. The Piau judgment of the CFI seemed to mark the end 
of EU’s intervention into the issue, at least, from the single market perspective. 
 
Nonetheless, the EU’s intervention into the regulation of players’ agents has not 
stopped there. In particular, the problems with the activities of players’ agents 
raised questions about the effectiveness of FIFA’s licensing based regulatory 
framework and also led to increased calls on the EU to regulate players’ agents 
by taking European level action. As a result, the EU, in particular the Education 
and Culture DG within the Commission, the Parliamentary Committee on Culture 
and Education, and the Member States, has again been focusing on the regulation 
of players’ agents. In the White Paper on Sport (European Commission, 2007a), 
the European Commission decided to carry out an impact assessment in order to 
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assess the necessity of EU level action. In this connection, the Commission 
launched an independent study on sports agents (KEA et al. 2009) in 2009 as an 
initial stage of its impact assessment. The European Parliament adopted a 
resolution on players’ agents (European Parliament 2010). There was a 
conference on agents, as a next step of the impact assessment, organized by the 
Commission in 2011 bringing together all stakeholders with a view to discussing 
possible solutions to the problems identified and the role of the EU in this 
particular context (European Commission 2011c; 2011d). The Expert Group on 
Good Governance was also set up under the scope of the EU’s first Work Plan for 
Sport (Council of European Union 2011) and given a mandate to carry out action 
related to the agents by delivering follow up work on the Commission’s 
conference. Therefore, how can this regulatory interest of the EU on players’ 
agents at European level be explained? To what extent is this regulatory interest 
actually underpinned by the EU’s socio-cultural regulation of sport? This is what 
this research aims to investigate. In order to proceed with this quest, the next 
chapter aims to conceptualize the socio-cultural regulation of sport within the 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Socio-cultural Regulation of Sport: Developing Theoretical Perspective 
and Key Assumptions 
 
Introduction 
This research concerns the EU’s involvement into the regulation of players’ 
agents and its particular objective is to explore to what extent the socio-cultural 
regulation of sport under the EU sports policy actually underpins this regulatory 
involvement. This chapter examines the existing academic literature on the 
regulation of players’ agents and the EU sports policy. The review of literature 
aims to illustrate the gaps within the literature that the research intends to fill 
and to develop a conceptual understanding of the EU’s socio-cultural regulation 
of sport that will be adopted for the purposes of the research. Developing a 
conceptual meaning is particularly important so as to clarify a key concept of the 
research and which also defines the territory of the research and justifies the 
research’s theoretical and methodological choices.  
 
The chapter commences with the examination of the academic literature on the 
regulation of players’ agents and the EU in pursuit of highlighting the existing 
gaps. Then, a wider literature related to regulation, sport and the EU’s regulation 
of sport is to be considered within which the conceptual meaning of the EU’s 
socio-cultural regulation of sport to be located. 
 
The Regulation of Players’ Agents and the EU: The Review of Literature 
The academic literature on the regulation of players’ agents and the EU is rather 
limited and contains several gaps that this research aims to address. Firstly, 
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there is a lack of theoretical analysis of the regulation of players’ agents within 
the existing literature. The only study to develop a theoretical perspective on the 
issue is by Holt et al. (2006).  The study used the principal-agent (PA) analysis, as 
a theoretical framework, to investigate the impact of conflict of interest within 
the activities of players’ agents, in particular with players, and to develop 
theoretical propositions to resolve the issue (Holt et al. 2006, p.12). Imperfect 
information available to the player (as a principal) about the activities of players’ 
agent (as an agent) and the salaries in the player market was an underlining 
reason for the conflict interest (Holt et al. 2006, p.17). As a result, the study 
argued that the players’ agents’ ability to use information for their own benefit 
causes the potential conflict of interest (Holt et al. 2006, pp.18-26). Then, there 
were recommendations about measures related to a better disclosure of 
information and transparency and a tougher enforcement mechanics involving 
more effective sanctioning to overcome the issue  (Holt et al. 2006, pp.30-31). 
Despite the study was a starting point to develop a theoretical perspective 
related to the regulation of players’ agents, it had very narrow scope: the conflict 
of interest. Moreover, the study did not scrutinize the EU’s intervention into the 
regulation of players’ agents apart from a mere mentioning of the impact of the 
Bosman judgment on the European player market and the activities of players’ 
agents.5 This research aims to fill this gap through developing a theoretical 
perspective on the EU’s intervention into the players’ agents.  
 
                                                        
5 This analysis of Bosman judgment under the study was only one paragraph. See Holt et al. 
(2006) p. 2. 
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Secondly, there is an extensive literature examining FIFA’s regulations of 
players’ agents and thee regulations’ transpositions by national football 
federations into national regulations. Yet, this literature is very descriptive and 
rarely extends beyond the content analysis of the specific regulations 
implemented by national federations. One of the most comprehensive empirical 
studies on various regulations governing the activities of players’ agents was by 
Siekmann et al. (2007). The regulations of 40 different countries were 
examined.6 The key contribution of these analyses to our understanding was to 
illustrate considerable variations in the pattern of regulations in different 
territories which impacted on the efficient control of players’ agents’ activities, in 
particular the problems of enforcement and sanctioning. The problem with the 
descriptive nature of the literature, on the other hand, is that it does not lead to a 
critical scrutiny of the ways of improving the regulatory framework. 
Nevertheless, there was a general consensus was on the ineffectiveness of 
regulations. Nonetheless, the literature neither considered the role of the EU in 
regulating players’ agent nor developed a theoretical approach.  This research 
extends beyond these analyses and brings the EU into consideration. 
 
Thirdly, there is a lack of investigation about the EU’s involvement into the 
regulation of players’ agents in the context of EU sports policy which this 
research concerns. A scarce literature analyzing players’ agents from a European 
perspective had a focus on the EU’s single market approach to the issue. The 
application of the EU law to the FIFA’s players’ agents regulations, in particular 
                                                        
6 To date, this study still remains the most comprehensive in terms of analysis of regulations of 
players’ agents in different countries. A broad scope of the study was captured by its title: 
Players’ Agents Worldwide.  
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their compatibility with the EU competition law, was considered. The study by 
KEA et al. (2009), commissioned by the Education and Culture DG, was the most 
comprehensive study examining European dimension of players’ agents and 
developed a European outlook.7 The study carried out a demographic analysis of 
players’ agents within the different Member States whilst illustrating the socio-
economic weight of the players’ agents industry in Europe. There were also 
analyses of the EU’s intervention into the regulation of players’ agents from an 
economic perspective, in particular in the context of competition law and 
internal market rules. Nevertheless, the study did not consider players’ agents 
from the EU’s socio-cultural perspective. Branco Martins (2005) also focused on 
the EU and players’ agents from the single market perspective and thoroughly 
scrutinized the Piau judgment of the CFI. Yet, Branco Martins (2005) aimed to 
highlight the erroneous nature of the Courts’ legal analysis within the judgment, 
whereas there was no attempt to locate the issue in the context of the EU sports 
policy. This research aims to develop a socio-cultural perspective on players’ 
agents and analyze the issue within the wider context of the EU sports policy.  
 
This research aims to investigate the regulation of players’ agents in the context 
of the EU’s socio-cultural regulation of sport. In their study, Holt et al. (2006, 
p.12) claimed that there was a lack of academic research on players’ agents and 
since then a number of studies have emerged. However, they are limited in their 
nature, as outlined above. Due to the limitations of the existing literature, 
therefore, it is also futile to try to locate the conceptual meaning of the EU’s 
                                                        
7 Although the focus of the study is not limited to players’ agents and rather on sports agents in 
Europe, it clearly acknowledges that football is the sport by far the largest number of official 
agents operates in Europe (KEA et al. 2009, p.4) and the majority parts of the study relates to the 
examination of players’ agents in Europe. 
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socio-cultural regulation of sport. In order to develop a conceptual perspective it 
is necessary to examine wider literature and a logical starting point would be to 
consider the literature on regulation.8  
 
Regulating Sport in the Public Interest 
In a search for the conceptual meaning of the EU’s socio-cultural regulation of 
sport, the regulation theories may offer a good starting point for a conceptual 
insight. Defined as a set of propositions or hypotheses aiming to explain the 
emergence of regulation, the regulation theories are based upon a key dichotomy 
regulation between public interest and private interest (Cave and Baldwin 1999; 
Ogus 2004; Morgan and Yeung 2007). The public interest theorists9 view the 
accomplishment of public interest as the main driver of regulation. The public 
interestedness of regulation is seen as a motivation to pursue collective goals 
with the objective of promoting the general welfare of the community (Cave and 
Baldwin 1999; Feintuck 2010). The assumption is that society’s general welfare 
is enhanced by the correction of market failures and, hence, in public interest. 
The private interest theorists who have developed a diverse set of economic and 
private interest approaches to regulation challenge these perspectives. They 
argue that there is always a regulatory capture by the actors that holding 
economic power who are more interested in their private interest. The private 
interest overrides the public interest and this is inline with observed patterns 
within a number of regulatory systems that examined (Stigler 1971).  
 
                                                        
8 The examination of literature on regulation is due to the fact that the socio-cultural regulation 
of sport in the EU is a regulatory concept and about regulation of sport at European level. 
Therefore, a broad understanding of regulation may help to the efforts of conceptualization. 
9 For a good summary on the public interest theories of regulation see Hantke-Domas (2003). 
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The key dichotomy between public and private interest also postulates the basis 
for the objectives of regulatory interventions. Ogus (2004) argues regulatory 
interventions are either in the pursuit of public interest or the regulatory sphere 
is captured and the subsequent intervention is in the pursuit of private interest. 
Defining the boundaries of distinction for regulatory objectives also paves the 
way for identifying corresponding regulatory models that can most efficiently be 
deployed to realize those objectives. According to Cave and Baldwin (1999), it is 
difficult to identify what constitutes a successful regulatory intervention if the 
substantive regulatory objectives are not clearly defined and outlined. This also 
creates a problem with defending the regulators and policy-makers that are 
charged with the pursuit of those objectives. Feintuck (2010) argues that 
although regulatory failures can arise from a variety of sources, the absence of 
clearly defined regulatory objectives can be a fundamental issue.  
 
The public interest theories of regulation categorize regulatory objectives under 
two headings; in terms of economic efficiency and those encompassing other 
political goals extending beyond the market. Those political goals are premised 
on non-market values which are perceived as valuable to the whole society and 
extend beyond goals that are measured in economic terms (Morgan and Yeung 
2007). The economic version assumes allocative efficiency as an ultimate 
economic value and defines the general welfare of society exclusively in terms of 
efficient resource allocation (Ogus 2004).  The economic version, based upon a 
welfare economics approach and the market model, is a pre-dominant 
theoretical proposition and sees the regulation aimed at curing imperfections 
within the market, referred as market failures. However, Feintuck (2010, p.40) 
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criticizes the failure to identify and to articulate clearly defined basic values that 
inform a legitimate justification of regulatory intervention from the perspective 
of the public.  According to Feintuck (2010, p.42), the economic conception of 
regulation is rather limited in encompassing properly a range of social and 
political values that regulation may aim at and which the political version of 
public interest theory tries to address. The political version attempts to 
incorporate non-economical values into the equation aiming at a broader 
perspective in considering regulation rather than remaining limited concepts of 
monopolies, information deficit, public goods, etc. (Cave and Baldwin 1999; Ogus 
2004). 
 
Sunstein (1990) identifies a number of substantive non-economic values extend 
beyond the market to justify regulation and corresponding regulatory methods 
that are to protect and promote those values. Sunstein sees the prevention of 
harm to future generations, the achievement of public-interested redistribution, 
the reduction of social subordination and the promotion of diversity of 
experience as the non-economic form of justifications for regulation. These 
justifications are not compatible with economic analyses and the mechanics of 
the market model are not appropriate to achieve them. In the context of the 
promotion of diversity of experience, some regulatory programmes can be seen 
as an attempt to foster and promote diverse experience. For example, the 
regulation of broadcasting can be understood in these terms, ensuring a 
diversity of programming through subsidizing public broadcasting and a high 
quality programming available to a wider society which is not available in the 
market place. With regards to social subordination, anti-discrimination law 
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targets behaviours and beliefs that have adverse effects for members of 
disadvantaged groups in society and aims to eliminate or reduce social 
subordination of those social groups. The problem of irreversibility, defined as 
the continuation of certain conduct causing an outcome from which current and 
future generation will not be able recover or only at very high cost, is also seen 
as justification for regulation motivated by a belief in obligations owed by the 
present to future generations. As markets’ focus is the preference of current 
costumers, they fail to take into account the effects of transactions on future 
generations. The protection of endangered species, animals or nature stems from 
this belief in obligations. 
 
There are a number of reasons that the conceptual insight developed by the 
public interest theorists of regulation could encapsulate some aspects of the EU’s 
socio-cultural regulation of sport. Firstly, sport became a growing social and 
cultural phenomenon for European society in addition to its significant economic 
dimension.  The socio-cultural functions performed by sport have a potential to 
deliver collective goals that enhance the general welfare of the society, which 
could arguably be the public interested nature of sport, i.e. general public 
benefiting from sport due to the enhancement of society’s welfare in relation to 
health, education and culture.  Nicholson et al. (2011, p.2) assert that sport is 
supposed to be essential for social inclusion, social connectedness, community 
strengthening, and community well-being which are deemed to be for the benefit 
of the general public. This view is also shared by the Education and Culture DG at 
European level. The Education and Culture DG (2007a, p.2) acknowledges the 
essential role played by sport in bringing the European society closer, particular 
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in the formation of European citizenship as a site for social cohesion and 
integration, which extends beyond its economic dimension. Sport also facilitates 
the development of important values such as team spirit, solidarity, tolerance 
and fair play that contribute to personal development and fulfillment that in turn 
contributes the general well-being of European society (European Commission 
2007a, p.2). In addition, alongside those socio-cultural functions performed by 
sport, the Education and Culture DG emphasizes the health-promotion role of 
sport, seen as a contributor to the improvement of the public health of European 
citizens, and its educational role in a number of ways to educate and train 
children, young people and adults (European Commission 2007a, pp.3-4). The 
Education and Culture DG also considers the potential of sport in contributing to 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, as part of its Europe 2020 Strategy 
aiming to achieve economic growth and employability, and creating new jobs 
through its positive effects on social inclusion, education and training and public 
health (European Commission 2011a, p.3).  
 
Secondly, Parrish (2001, 2003a) identifies two intertwined political factors, 
rather than economic ones, that contributed to the development of the EU’s 
socio-cultural regulation of sport; the growth of the EU’s political interest in 
sport in pursuit of promoting social progress and European solidarity and the 
politicization of the EU’s single market regulation of sport.  Parrish traces back 
the birth of a socio-cultural sporting agenda to the 1984 Fontainebleau Summit 
where the member states recognized the necessity of re-launching European 
integration as political integration stagnated and the legitimacy of the EU in the 
public eye faltered. The result of the summit was the establishment of the 
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Adonnino Committee mandated with the preparation of a report on measures 
that could strengthen the image of the EU in the minds of its citizens. The 
Committee’s report made a number of short and long-term proposals that 
contribute to the establishment of a people’s Europe. Amongst those the 
Committee recommended the use of sport in promoting the idea of a people’s 
Europe which Parrish (2001) considers the beginning of the socio-cultural 
dimension of sport asserting itself into the EU sport policy. 
 
To Parrish (2003a), although the acceptance of the Adonnino Committee’s 
recommendation did more for the commitment to the concept of a people’s 
Europe than the development of the EU sports policy, the spirit of Adonnino 
remained within the EU and the European Parliament emerged as a natural 
home for such a movement. Parrish sees the European Parliament as having a 
strong socio-cultural tradition within the EU by acknowledging that above all 
sport is a social pursuit and can be used for political purposes. In particular, the 
Committee on Culture and Education within the European Parliament is a strong 
proponent of giving the socio-cultural qualities of sport a higher priority at 
European level (Parrish, 2000). Two reports prepared by the Committee, the 
1994 Larive Report on the European Community and Sport (European 
Parliament 1994) and the 1997 Pack Report on the Role of European Union in 
the Field of Sport (European Parliament 1997), underlined the socio-cultural 
qualities of sport. The Pack report considered sport as constituting a basic 
cultural and social phenomenon (emphasis added) and, therefore, crucial to 
European society for the fact that it promotes personal development and a well-
balanced personality. The European Parliament also successfully exploited its 
  65 
legislative powers to incorporate an amendment into the Television Without 
Frontier Directive in 1997 that ensured public viewing of major sporting events 
on television. Parrish, Gardiner and Seikmann (2000) claim that, for Parliament, 
the access to the major sporting events was important for society and views the 
amendment as recognition of sport’s social role in addition to its economic 
significance in Europe. 
 
Parrish (2003a) argues that the EU’s political interest in sport, using sport as the 
one of the tools to achieve politically motivated social and cultural aspirations, 
led to discontent amongst the proponents of the idea, particularly the Committee 
on Culture and Education of the European Parliament and some of the member 
states, towards the EU’s single market approach to sport which was considered 
to paying insufficient attention to sport’s social cultural significance. 
Consequently, the earlier relationship of EU with sport became politicized.  
 
There were also a number of developments that took place in the field of sport 
that the EU viewed as a risk to its socio-cultural values for the European polity 
which contributed to the politicization of the single market approach to sport 
(Takorsky et al., 2004; Borja 2007; Van den Bogaert and Vermeersch 2006).  As 
sport became internationalised, its increased growth in popularity and 
commercialization led to an unprecedented growth in its economic dimension.  
Nonetheless, the EU saw that these developments also led to a number of 
challenges and threats to the sport in Europe, which were emphasized in its 
policy documents.  The Commission’s Education and Culture DG (1999) viewed 
the rapid commercialization of sport at European level as a threat to the 
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European Model of Sport, and its grassroots structure. In particular, the 
commercially strengthened stakeholders within sport’s governance structures 
were deemed to be a specific threat due to the possibility of creating breakaway 
leagues which would effect harmonious development of European sport and its 
positive influence on society. 
 
The commercialization and internationalization of sport also contributed to the 
juridification of sport at European level, defined by Foster (1993) as the 
application of the EU’s free movement and competition rules to sport, and an 
increased the number of conflicts involving the EU law. Earlier decisions of the 
CJEU in Walrave (Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale 
[1974] ECR 1405, Case 36/74, hereafter referred as Walrave) and Bosman 
clearly illustrated the growing relationship between the EU and sport; yet, the 
relationship was confined within the narrow boundaries of regulating sport as 
an economic activity within the single market. Particularly following Bosman, the 
relationship between EU competition law and sport was considered to be 
confusing and involving a great uncertainty.  Parrish (2003a) considers the 
Bosman judgment of the CJEU as the confirmation of the EU’s market-based 
definition of sport at the expense of the social definition and inconsistent with 
the Adonnino agenda. As a result, Parrish argues that there was a danger for the 
socio-cultural functions of sport which became suppressed by the commercial 
and legal developments. This was something to be addressed at European level. 
 
These developments resulted in calls for a more coordinated approach to sport 
by the EU in order to protect the socio-cultural functions of sport from the 
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excessive commercialization. At the Amsterdam Summit in June 1997, the Heads 
of States and Government attached a non-binding Declaration on Sport to the 
Amsterdam Treaty that emphasized the social significance of sport, in particular 
its role in forging identity and bringing people together. The institutions of the 
EU were urged to recognize sports’ social significance.  However, Crolley et al. 
(2002) see the Nice Declaration, during the Nice summit in 2000, within which 
the Member States more fully appreciated the socio-cultural importance of sport 
for Europe. The declaration emphasized the need for the EU to become involved 
in the social, educational and cultural functions inherent in sport and urged sport 
federations to take actions to incorporate all communities into sport. Parrish 
(2000, 2003a) also considers the Parliament’s Committee on Culture and 
Education as an advocate for a more coordinated approach to sport involving the 
recognition of the socio-cultural qualities of sport along side its economic 
dimension. Parrish claims that both reports, the Larive Report and the Pack 
Report, underlined the socio-cultural qualities of sport and a desire to balance 
the single market regulation of sport with the promotion of those qualities. 
 
Finally, the result of the EU’s political interest in sport and the politicization of 
the single market regulation of sport has led to a distinctive sport policy position, 
which can be viewed as a regulatory mechanism, with a view to protecting and 
promoting the socio-cultural values of sport involving a more coordinated 
approach to reconcile the conflict between the single market and the socio-
cultural approach to sport  (Parrish 2000, 2003a; Takorski et al. 2004).  A more 
coordinated approach under the EU sports policy recognizes the socio-cultural 
qualities of sport and requires those qualities to be taken into account when EU 
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law is applied, albeit recognizing that sport is still subject to EU law which lies in 
the heart of the single market approach (Garcia and Weatherill 2012; Parrish 
2003a). Although the EU initially did not have a competence on sport under its 
founding Treaties to establish a common sport policy, the first attempt to 
develop a new approach to coordinate both the single market and the socio-
cultural approaches was made by the Commission’s Helsinki Report on Sport 
(European Commission 1999) which was prepared for submission to the 
Helsinki European Council with a view to safeguarding current sport structures 
and maintaining the social functions of sport. Viewed by Parrish (2002, 2003a) 
as the establishment of an embryonic EU sports policy, the document outlined 
the new approach involving preserving the traditional values of sport, while at 
the same time assimilating a changing economic and legal environment. The Nice 
Declaration in December 2000 reveals a similar tone to the Amsterdam 
Declaration and the member states called on the institutions to take account of 
the social, educational and cultural functions inherent in sport and making it 
special, in order that the code of ethics and the solidarity essential to the 
preservation of its social role may be respected and nurtured (emphasis added). 
Today, under the Lisbon Treaty, sport is brought within the explicit reach of the 
founding Treaties for the first time and its specificity and socio-cultural functions 
are constitutionally recognized. Article 165 of the Lisbon Treaty enables the EU 
to contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking into 
account the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity 
and its social and educational functions. The wording of the Article, according to 
Garcia and Weatherill (2012), represents a consolidation and the single market 
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regulation and the socio-cultural regulation of sport can exist alongside each 
other. 
The other distinctive feature of EU sports policy is a legal order, Weatherill 
(2006) claims, developed within the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the decisional 
practice of the Commission.  This legal order extends beyond a mere application 
of law to sport by dealing with sport disputes in a way that permits regulatory 
(single market) and political (socio-cultural) policy objectives to co-exist. Viewed 
by Parrish (2003a, 2003b) as a distinctive body of sports law, EU sports law, the 
legal order establishes and applies a discrete legal doctrine based upon the 
separate territories approach; the territory for sporting autonomy and a 
territory for legal intervention which provides the definition of respective 
territories for the EU institutions, namely the CJEU and the Commission, and the 
sport governing bodies (Parrish 2002, 2003a; Weatherill 2007). Established 
under its first ever sport ruling of the CJEU, Walrave judgment in 1974, and also 
evolved through subsequent judgments, sport falls within the scope of its 
Treaties if a sporting practice exerts economic effects (legal intervention), yet, it 
does not automatically render it incompatible with it. Then, it is responsibility of 
sport governing bodies to justification the measure or the practice by illustrating 
legitimate objectives, the so-called sporting exception as developed by Parrish 
and Miettinen (2008). The measure or practice also needs to be necessary and 
proportionate to achieve those objectives aimed (sporting autonomy). Through 
the separate territories approach, EU law is able to take into account specific 
characteristics of sport, including its socio-cultural functions, whilst a case by 
case analysis of sporting practices, confirmed in the Meca-Medina and Majcen 
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(Mecca Medina David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v. Commission of the 
European Communities Case C-519/04 P, [2006] ECR I- 6991, hereafter referred 
as Meca-Medina) ruling of the CJEU, is required rather than any general 
possibility of exemption for the sport governing bodies.  Weatherill (2007) 
defines the position as conditional autonomy within which the governing bodies 
still need to ensure that the restrictions imposed by their practices are limited to 
what is necessary to ensure the proper conduct of competitive sport.  
 
It seems that the EU’s socio-cultural regulation of sport sits comfortably in the 
conceptual framework developed within regulation literature.  In particular, the 
socio-cultural functions of sport for European policy can be considered to be in 
the public interest.  Therefore, the coordinated EU sport policy and an embedded 
distinctive legal order ensuring the co-existence of the EU’s single market and 
socio-cultural approach to sport could be seen as the right regulatory method in 
order to protect sport’s socio-cultural functions. Nonetheless, the flaw of 
conceptualizing the EU’s socio-cultural regulation through the insight within the 
regulation literature lies in its mainstream critique; a difficulty of 
comprehensively defining public interest and that renders it ill equipped to deal 
with the complexities of the EU’s socio-cultural regulation of sport for the 
purpose of the research.   
 
Feintuck (2012), in his attempt to understand and define the concept of public 
interest in regulation, claims that public interest often appears to be an empty 
vessel which is filled with different content at different times. Therefore, for 
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Feintuck, the problem in using public interest is that it can never be certain to 
what extent the use of the concept can fulfill the expectations of its content. For 
this reason, Feintuck observes that public interest sometimes defined as “goal, 
process or myth” or “that vague, impalpable but all-controlling consideration” and 
an apparent lack of agreement as to its meaning casts doubts as to whether its 
use can add anything meaningful to academic debate. Cave and Baldwin (1999) 
acknowledge the dominance of the economic approach to explain the emergence 
of regulation over the public interest approach for the underdevelopment of 
public interest concept and claim that “an agreed conception of the public interest 
may be hard to define” (Cave & Baldwin 1999, p.20). Ogus (2004) also 
emphasizes that “any attempt to formulate a comprehensive list of public interest 
goals which may be used to justify regulation is futile, since what constitutes the 
“public interest” will vary according to time, place, and the specific values held by a 
particular society” (Ogus 2004, p.29). As a result, the public interest theory of 
regulation is considered to be flawed and incomplete. 
 
Weatherill (2009b) and Garcia (2009) observe the difficulty of defining a single 
model of sport for Europe, the concept of a European model of sport, has been 
particularly problematic for the Commission which resonates with difficulties in 
defining public interest for regulation. Both, Weatherill and Garcia highlight the 
differences in the language used by the Commission in the Helsinki Report and 
the White Paper on Sport. Weatherill (2009b) particularly criticizes the 
Commission for assuming that there is a single phenomenon of sport at 
European level and claims that there are distinct features and distinct issues 
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requiring different regulatory responses. With regards to the Helsinki Report, 
Weatherill argues that the Commission was rather over ambitious in reconciling 
the economic dimension of sport with its socio-cultural dimension due to the fact 
that sport embraces such a wide range of phenomena, including leisure time of 
running in the park to a high-end Formula One Grand Prix. Weatherill further 
asserts that professional sport has nothing to do with the socio-cultural function 
of sport as outlined in the Helsinki Report and it is rather a tension within sport 
which involves two quite distinct types of activity, that both happening to fall 
under the very loose and wide label of sport.  
 
In contrast, Weatherill views the structure of the White Paper, in particularly the 
separation between the economic dimension and the societal role of sport, as an 
indication of a concern by the Education and Culture DG in relation to the varied 
nature of sport in Europe. Weatherill considers that the Commission re-assesses 
its position with regards to the European model sport by accepting the model 
cannot operate as one size fits all and avoid making remarks about the generality 
of its apparent common features. In his view, this is reflected with the 
Commission’s acceptance that promotion and relegation is limited to certain 
team sports, although this is one of the main characteristics of the model. Garcia 
(2009) supports the arguments developed by Weatherill and sees the White 
Paper on Sport as a demise of the European model. According to Garcia, the 
Commission’s admission of the unrealistic nature of trying to define a unified 
model of organization of sport represents a departure from its previous policy 
position under the Helsinki Report. Garcia considers that the Commission 
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acknowledges the transformation of the governance structure of European sport 
over the last two decades which in his view became more horizontal involving 
stakeholder network than the old pyramidal and vertical structure. As a result, 
Garcia argues, the position taken by the Commission is supervisory, offering 
governing bodies’ autonomy subject to behaving within the limits of EU law. 
Both arguments, by Weatherill and Garcia, recognize the difficulty in rigidly 
defining European sport in terms of its nature and as a model in order to justify 
regulatory intervention.  
 
The EU’s Regulation of Sport Under the EU Sports Policy 
Foster applied the theoretical insight developed with the literature on regulation 
to sport (Foster 2000a). Based upon the dichotomy between self-regulation, 
where the governing bodies may act in private interest, and statutory regulation, 
to protect a wider public interest, Foster examines five different models of sport 
regulation and proposes appropriate regulatory methods depending upon the 
adopted regulatory model. Within the pure market model, sport is seen as a pure 
business and the sport governing bodies have broad functions. However, in 
order to maximize the profits a loose regulatory framework is implemented and 
the public interest is ignored. The form of regulation is determined through the 
market and contract based legal instruments are predominant. In the defective 
market model, competition policy is the regulatory tool to ensure competitive 
balance. The consumer welfare model requires a protective legislation in order 
to protect weaker parties, such as fans, players, clubs or to allow a greater 
protection for a wider public interest. In the natural monopoly model, private 
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monopoly by single seller, it is a single governing body in sport, likely to ignore 
public interest and competition law is not the appropriate mechanism. Finally, in 
the socio-cultural model, sporting values are dominant and profits are 
secondary. The focus is on the socio-cultural significance of sport. The autonomy 
of sport is particularly important to maintain those specific characteristics that 
contribute to the socio-cultural values of sport.  In order to protect the best 
interest of sport and to tame the commercial interest to preserve the values of 
the model, Foster proposes supervised self-governance as a regulatory method. 
This model enables sports governing bodies to regulate their own sport without 
external interference, whilst ensuring the autonomy is supported by an internal 
constitutionalism, due process and good governance. 
 
The characteristics of the socio-cultural model and the proposed supervised self-
governance by Foster resemble to the EU’s socio-cultural regulation of sport and 
Foster also considers the ways sport could be regulated by the EU (Foster 
2000b). Although his analysis is confined only into the activities of the 
Commission and the application of competition law to sport, Foster argues that 
the assumption of a free market model, seen as the pure market model, by 
European competition law is not appropriate for sport. According to Foster, 
sport is not a free market but rather the sports governing bodies are natural 
monopolies and sports fans are also not normal consumers that operate in a free 
market as their behaviour is not economically motivated. Therefore, Foster 
proposes an alternative model that requires modification of EU competition law 
in such a way that those specific characteristics of sport and its socio-cultural 
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values are recognized.  Foster defines this as supervised autonomy under which 
the Commission is able to treat sport differently by drawing a distinction 
between sporting activity in strict sense performing socio-cultural functions that 
need protection and economic activities generated by sporting activity that are 
subject to the application of competition law. Foster’s concept of supervised 
autonomy has resonance with Weatherill’s conditional autonomy and the both 
concepts, more importantly, represents the current policy position of the EU on 
sport. 
 
Parrish (2003a) examines Foster’s analysis in relation to the EU sports policy 
and identifies a relevance as both policy strands, the single market regulation 
and the socio-cultural regulation of sport, could be located on Foster’s regulatory 
spectrum. According to Parrish, when the EU sports policy is placed towards the 
market end of the spectrum, the single market regulation of sport finds its 
explanation. The application of free movement and competition law to sport 
aiming to correct market failures and distortions resulting from the excessive 
commercialization of sport is a reasonable justification for the EU’s regulatory 
interest in sport. However, Parrish sees the more coordinated policy position 
towards the socio-cultural end of Foster’s regulatory spectrum ensuring sport’s 
specific characteristics and socio-cultural values are recognized and protected. 
In this connection, theoretical perspectives explaining the EU policy making and 
the EU sports policy may assist to conceptualize the EU’s socio-cultural 
regulation for this research. 
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Although there is no grand or unified theory of European policy making, the EU 
integration theories could be investigated as policy making at European level, 
particularly the EU sports policy, directly concerns the European integration 
(Parrish 2003a; Takorski et al. 2004; Garcia 2008; Meier 2009). After all, both 
the EU’s single market and the socio-cultural approach to sport have 
underpinned by negative and positive integration, defined as a twin engines of 
European integration. Negative integration, defined by Beunanno and Nugent 
(2013) as the removal of barriers to the internal market and its proper 
functioning in the pursuit of an economic unity, reinforced the EU institutions, 
especially the CJEU and the Commission’s Competition DG, to act as “agents of 
integration” supporting the application of EU law to sport. In particular, the CJEU 
did not agree to accept a general sporting exemption or the autonomy of sport 
and expanded its integrationist judicature into the sport domain by establishing 
the subjectivity of sport to EU law as long as it constituted an economic activity 
(Meier 2009; Van den Bogaer and Vermeersch 2006). Conversely, positive 
integration, motivated towards social unity as a polity, underpinned the socio-
cultural regulation of sport at European level as the EU sees sport possessing 
socio-cultural qualities that can be used to promote European integration 
(Parrish 2003a, 2003b; Takorski et al. 2004). 
  
When EU integration theories are considered, a good starting point for analysis 
is considering two main theories that shape the debate about the European 
integration; neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism. Firstly, from a neo-
functional perspective, Cram (1997) explains political integration as a process 
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initiated by political and economic elites who become aware that substantial 
policy problems can no longer be adequately dealt with at the national level and 
supranational actors are given authority to define policies. Upon transfer of 
competency, a spill-over mechanic is triggered. The functional spill-over is the 
pressure created by the integration of one sector for further sectoral integration 
due to the interdependent characteristics of modern economies.  The functional 
spill-over is later complemented with political spill-over, defined as convergence 
of the expectations and interests of political elites in response to the activities of 
supranational institutions. As a result of the process, supranational institutions 
become political arenas where political behaviours and policy outcomes are 
shaped.  Additionally, supranational institutions work as the agents of 
integration and create competency creep. In this connection, at the European 
level, the Commission, the CJEU and the European Parliament are deemed as the 
main actors that affect policy making through a process of supranational 
institutional creativity. 
 
From the neo-functionalist perspective, it is easier to explain the involvement of 
the EU with sport in terms of the single market. Meier (2009) characterizes it as 
almost a classical neo-functionalist tale of spill-over of EU law into a policy 
domain that the member states did not envisage. Meier argues that the conflict 
between the labour market regimes operated by the sport governing bodies and 
the EU law related to free movement was the factor that triggered the spill-over.  
The process was advanced by the fact that the supranational actors, namely the 
CJEU and the Commission, initially did not recognized the argument of specificity 
of sport by the governing bodies and did not hesitate to apply the EU law to their 
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rules and sporting practices.  According to Parrish (2003a), a number of closely 
related policy sectors where the EU is involved also increases the possibility that 
new policy sectors are also drawn into the integration process. For this reason, 
Parrish claims that the proximity of sport to many of the fundamental economic 
activities of the EU increased its potential to be caught within the scope of free 
movement rules. 
 
Nonetheless, in terms of the socio-cultural regulation of sport, the neo-
functionalist perspective fails to provide a convincing explanation. Firstly, the 
theory over-emphasizes the role of supranational actors in shaping the policies 
and fails to explain the role played by the member states. Parrish (2003a, 2003) 
emphasizes the instrumental role of the member states benefitting the socio-
cultural agenda under the EU sports policy by the adoption of the Amsterdam 
and the Nice Declarations and to Presidency decisions as soft-law instruments. 
Within both declarations, the member states urged the institutions to take into 
consideration the socio-cultural characteristics of sport when dealing with sport 
and also to clarify the legal framework applicable to it. Secondly, although the 
Lisbon Treaty provides a new competency for the EU on sport, it does not really 
reflect a functional spill-over in the true of resulting in a strong and 
encompassing competency towards the EU institutions. Garcia and Weatherill 
(2012) see the new competency rather as a compromise between the sport 
governing bodies and the supranational actors, yet claim that it does not in any 
way suggest a full authority transfer to the EU institutions.  The soft competency 
goes as far as to provide supporting and complementing authority, whereas 
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sport has still constitutionally remained within the regulatory remit of the 
member states and the sport governing bodies which contradicts the theoretical 
prepositions of the neo-functionalism. 
 
Marovcsik (1993, 1995) explains intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, as an 
alternative approach to neo-functionalism resulting from empirical observations 
about the member states’ constant efforts to protect their sovereignty and to 
prevent uncontrolled transfer of competency to the EU institutions. 
Furthermore, motivated by protecting national self-interest the 
intergovernmental meetings also echoed the dominance of national preferences. 
Therefore, intergovernmentalism sees the member states in control of the 
integration process and policy-making. The member states, deemed as 
‘principals’, only transfer limited powers to supranational actors, acting as 
‘agents’, with a view to ensuring that the commitments of all parties will be 
enforced. Supranational institutions are viewed as having little influence in 
shaping the policy outcomes and they are rather used to facilitate 
intergovernmental bargains and to improve the efficiency of decision making. 
 
Intergovernmentalism offers a better explanation in relation the socio-cultural 
regulation of sport, but fails to explain it fully.  For Meier (2009), although the 
member states failed to reverse spill-over of EU sports law, they managed to 
influence the development of the EU sports policy through soft law instruments 
which led to mediation between the single market and the socio-cultural 
approach. Parrish (2003a) also claims that intergovernmental interventions 
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inspired the EU institutions to develop a separate territories approach as a legal 
order when EU law is applied to sport. Nevertheless, Parrish also criticises 
intergovernmentalism for overestimating the role of member states within the 
EU and particularly in policy making.  He argues that the member states do not 
dominate the EU policy making and, due to the EU’s complex and multi-layered 
nature, the involvement of the member states in the development of the socio-
cultural regulation of the sport represents only the tip of the iceberg. According 
to Parrish, the European Parliament’s Committee on Education and Culture has 
been equally very influential in the development of a socio-cultural agenda 
which intergovernmentalism underestimates. Therefore, Parrish claims that 
intergovernmentalism has only some explanations in accounting for policy 
decisions and its scope is limited. 
 
In order to develop a theoretical framework to examine the development of EU 
sports policy and law, Parrish (2003a) identifies the features of an analytical 
toolkit required.  First of all, an approach has to be able to capture the real 
nature of EU governance. As EU is becoming a more flexible and multi-layered 
organization under which not only the member states and the supranational 
institutions but also a number of interest groups are able to shape policy 
development, the power of policy making is rather dispersed rather than 
monopolised as claimed by neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists. 
Moreover, the construction of policies is no longer confined into the traditional 
forums, but alternative forums have emerged. The development directly 
contradicts with the intergovermentlists’ claim that the role of 
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intergovernmental decisions is central to policy making. Overall, an approach, 
Parrish claims, must be able to encapsulate the role of these alternative policy 
and institutional venues and the part played by the policy actors within them. 
Secondly, an approach must also avoid the narrow analysis of purely state-
mindedness or institutional-mindedness which is portrayed under neo-
functionalism and intergovernmentalism. Parrish sees both state actors and non-
state actors to be important for policy development. Finally, an analytical tool kit 
has also to be able to capture a historical approach which is able to understand 
the discourse of policies and in particularly when a policy change occurs. For 
Parrish, both neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism attempt to explain 
the process of European integration but are ill equipped to deal with the modern 
complexities of EU governance in order to explain the policy making at European 
level. 
 
Parrish (2003a, 2003b) recognizes the limitations of a perspective based either 
on actor-based or institution-based approach for studying European integration 
and policy making at European level and develops a theoretical framework, 
actor-centred institutionalism, that cuts across the actor versus institutions 
dichotomy by drawing insights from both perspectives (Parrish 2003a, 2003b).  
In construction of the framework, Parrish uses the theoretical insights developed 
by the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) in order to analyze the role of key 
policy actors. Parrish takes an institutional turn within the ACF which he 
considers necessary in order to analyze the role of the institution in shaping 
policy evolution. Parrish adopts the theoretical perspective of new 
institutionalism which widens the definition of an institution in contrast to old 
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institutionalism, not limiting it to purely formal administrative, legal and 
political dimensions of institutions, but also incorporating the importance of 
informal arenas such as; informal rules, norms, symbols, beliefs and code of 
conducts. The framework enables Parrish to analyze actors and institutions in 
terms of how they relate to each other and in bringing down the boundaries 
between them. 
 
By applying the framework to the EU policy making, Parrish (2003a, 2003b) 
asserts that strategically minded policy actors within the EU’s multi-level 
governance system use the prevailing institutional structure in order to realize 
their policy preferences. In doing so, Parrish accepts the assumption that the EU 
has multi-level governance within which decision making and influencing 
capabilities are shared by a number of actors at different levels and neither 
member states nor the EU institutions are able to control policy development. 
Within this multi-level system, there are various policy subsystems in operation 
composed of a set of actors who are involved in dealing with a policy problem. 
Within these policy subsystems there are numbers of advocacy coalitions, 
consisting of a like-minded actors aiming to redirect policies in line with their 
particular belief systems by using different institutional venues. 
 
Parrish (2003a, 2003b), through the framework, develops a theoretical 
perspective on the EU sports policy and concludes that there was a change in the 
nature of the EU sport policy shifting the single market model regulation of 
sports toward a socio-cultural model. According to Parrish, the policy change is 
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the outcome of two competing advocacy coalitions, the single market advocacy 
coalition and the socio-cultural advocacy coalition, operating with the EU sport 
policy subsystem.  These coalitions possess different beliefs systems towards the 
regulation of sport at European level and try to stir the direction of the EU sports 
policy in line with their belief systems. The single market coalition is motivated 
with negative integration and views sport as an economic activity and subject to 
EU law.  For the coalition, the application of the EU law to sport should only take 
the specificity of sport into account as far as it does not undermine the 
fundamentals of the single market. Conversely, the socio-cultural coalition is 
motivated by positive integration and considers sports beyond economic activity 
and possessing socio-cultural characteristics. In order to translate these beliefs 
into policy outcomes, the coalitions exploit a number of institutional venues 
available within the governance system of the EU. Parrish (2003a) argues that 
both coalitions are evenly matched in terms of institutional venues within their 
disposal and the socio-cultural coalitions use those institutional venues in order 
to politicize the single market regulation of sport which is an essential pre-
requisite for policy change. In this connection, Parrish claims that the 
Commission’s right to initiate legislation and policy, the Parliament’s enhanced 
budgetary and legislative powers and the member states’ ability to amend the 
Treaties and to agree politically soft law instruments are the main venues 
facilitating policy change.  Parrish further asserts that the result of the 
competition between these two coalitions is mediation resulting in the 
construction of separate territories approach, as a distinct legal approach to 
sport, which Parrish views as an essential characteristic of the EU sport policy. 
Parrish claims that such construction also implies the birth of EU sports law and 
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represents the change within the EU sport policy from the dominant single 
market approach to the socio-cultural approach.  
 
Within the theoretical and empirical analysis of Parrish, there is a 
comprehensive conceptualization of the EU’s socio-cultural regulation of sport 
composed of a number of conceptual components including the socio-cultural 
advocacy coalition as policy actors, the socio-cultural characteristics of sport and 
corresponding socio-cultural model of sports regulation as the beliefs system, 
and the separate territories approach as the policy outcome. The research adopts 
this conceptualization and incorporates two key fundamental assumptions from 
Parrish’s analysis; the existence of the socio-cultural coalition within the EU sport 
policy subsystem and the socio-cultural regulation of sport as the policy core 
beliefs of the coalition actors.  With regard to the coalition, the research assumes 
that the socio-cultural coalition operates within the sport policy subsystem and 
particularly focuses on the analysis of the EU policy actors of the coalition, 
namely the European Commission, the Parliament and the Member States, 
related to the regulation of players’ agents. According to Parrish, they are the 
three key actors of the socio-cultural coalition, albeit there are a number of 
actors outside the governance structure of the EU operating within the sport 
policy subsystem as interest holders. Additionally, Parrish (2003a, 2003b) 
argues that the socio-cultural coalition is a coalition of convenience due to 
differences in the secondary aspects of the coalition’s belief systems and 
identifies three broad schools of thought; the maximalists, the moderates and the 
minimalists. Parrish (2003a) considers that the EU actors of the coalition, in 
particular the Committee on Culture and Education within the Parliament, the 
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Education and Culture DG within the Commission, and the Member States 
excluding Britain, Denmark, and Sweden, are the Maximalists believing in sport’s 
important socio-cultural functions in people’s lives and the requirement of 
harnessing those socio-cultural characteristics of sport for pro-integrative 
purposes.  According to Parrish (2003a), this belief also constitutes policy core 
beliefs of the maximalists that binds the coalition together and also shapes their 
perceptions towards policy issues and the policy outcomes. This research 
focuses on the maximalists within the socio-cultural advocacy coalition in order 
to analyze the EU’s intervention into the regulation of players’ agents. 
 
There are various reasons for the adoption of two assumptions in terms of this 
research. Firstly, the adoption of two assumptions enables to define the nature of 
the research as a policy analysis study with a particular focus on the EU sports 
policy. The research is also related to policy discourse analysis of the EU’s 
intervention into a specific policy issue, i.e. the regulation of players’ agents. In 
doing so, the research addresses a gap, depicted by Houlihan (2005) within the 
policy analysis studies, by extending analysis into sport which has been so far 
marginalized whilst other policy areas such as the environment or social welfare 
have historically been subject to extensive analysis. Houlihan criticizes the fact 
that there has not been a strong academic interest in the analysis of public policy 
for sport, albeit over the last two decades intervention into sport by public 
authorities has been increasing. In his empirical analysis, Houlihan identifies 
only 3% of the academic work published within the nine major English language 
journals from January 2001 to September 2003 used the extensive array of 
concepts, analytical framework and theories developed in mainstream policy 
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analysis to understand sport policy making and the role of public authorities 
(Houlihan 2005, p.164). Additionally, to date, Parrish’s study is deemed to be the 
only comprehensive attempt at theoretical examination of EU sports policy and 
law (Garcia 2008). Nonetheless, apart from Parrish himself (Parrish 2008, 2011), 
there has not been an academic work that advancing his analysis in the field of 
the EU sports policy which the research aims to carry out. Both, Houlihan (2005) 
and Parrish (2011), recognize the ACF’s ability in explaining policy stability in 
terms of dominant coalitions and the persistence of the belief systems, 
particularly deep core and policy core beliefs. Parrish (2011) even asserts that 
the EU sports policy subsystem is a maturing subsystem rather than nascent one 
and, after more than a decade after the publication of his seminal work, the 
research puts these claims to the test by considering the activities of the socio-
cultural coalition within the EU sport policy subsystem with regards to the 
regulation of players’ agents. 
 
Additionally, the adoption of the assumptions also informs the choice of the 
theoretical framework for the research. The research utilizes the ACF as a 
theoretical framework as the coalitions and the policy core beliefs are the key 
conceptual components within the ACF. Houlihan (2005) sees the ACF as the 
most promising framework for the analysis of sport policy. In comparing four 
meso-level frameworks for policy analysis, Houlihan claims that the ACF has a 
broader focus and the potential to explicate aspects of the policy process beyond 
the analysis of agenda setting. Houlihan is also convinced with the fact that the 
ACF has been widely applied across a number of different policy sectors in 
different countries and gone under a substantial refinement. Nonetheless, 
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Houlihan acknowledges that the ACF is rarely applied into the sports policy. The 
ADF’s application to sport is limited to the works of Parrish (2003a, 2003b) and 
Green and Houlihan (2004). The research also attempts to advance the 
application of the ACF into the sports policy area as all three studies see the ACF 
a valuable starting point for the development of analytical frameworks to 
consider the sport policy area. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the gaps within the existing literature on the 
regulation of players’ agents and the EU and also located conceptual meanings 
for the EU’s socio-cultural regulation of sport for the purposes of research. The 
purpose of the conceptualization is to justify the research design and 
methodology as well as to illustrate the theoretical link to the ACF. In doing so, 
the conceptual components within the regulation literature are analyzed, 
especially the conceptual framework under the public interest theories provided 
a useful tool. Nevertheless, the problematic nature of developing comprehensive 
meaning for public interest renders the concepts ill-equipped to be used for the 
purpose of the research. Therefore, a narrower literature on the regulation of 
sport is examined. Foster’s application of theoretical insights from regulation 
identified the socio-cultural model of regulation and the corresponding 
regulatory mechanism within the regulatory spectrum which have resemblances 
with the EU’s socio-cultural regulation of sport. Foster also investigated how the 
EU can regulate sport and for Parrish the question goes into the heart of debate 
about the European integration and policy making. Consequently, the conceptual 
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meaning for the purposes of the research is located within the analysis of Parrish 
related to the EU sports policy and law. 
 
The research adopts two key assumptions from Parrish’s work; the socio-
cultural advocacy coalition operating within the EU sports policy subsystem and 
the socio-cultural regulation of sport as the policy core beliefs of the coalition. 
Within the socio-cultural coalition, the research concentrates on the maximalists 
as they hold protectionist views about the socio-cultural functions of sport and 
aim to strengthen those functions through specific policy instruments available 
to them at European level. Furthermore, within the maximalists group those are 
the only EU actors providing a refined focus for the research.  The policy core 
beliefs of the coalition enable the research to develop sub-research questions 
incorporating some key functions performed by the policy core beliefs within the 
advocacy coalitions to investigate the extent of the EU involvement into the 
regulation of players’ agents. This also represents the actual theoretical link 
between the research and the ACF. Therefore, the thesis moves onto to analyze 
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CHAPTER 4 




Parrish’s empirical analysis of EU sports policy, in particular the socio-cultural 
advocacy coalition within the EU sports policy subsystem, the actors’ policy core 
beliefs and the change in the direction of the EU sports policy (Parrish 2001, 
2003a, 2003b), begs a number of questions that this research concerns. Has the 
socio-cultural coalition been maintained and stabilized within the subsystem?  
What are the actions of the socio-cultural advocacy coalition on policy issues 
since the Nice Declaration in 2000? How do the policy core beliefs of the 
coalition actors affect their behaviours? How does their policy analysis related to 
their identification of issues and problems operate? How are policy preferences 
and policy outcomes shaped by the coalition actors’ policy core beliefs and what 
exogenous factors create opportunity and constraints on the actors’ preferences 
in relation to policy instruments implemented within the subsystem? These 
questions directly relate to overall public policy processes and the research 
investigates these questions by focusing on the EU policy actors of the socio-
cultural coalition in the context of the regulation of players’ agents, as a policy 
issue, within the EU sports policy subsystem. 
 
In doing so, the research utilizes the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) as a 
theoretical framework for the analysis of the EU sports policy process. Two 
important premises of the research underpin this theoretical choice: the 
contextualization of the socio-cultural regulation of sport as the policy core 
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beliefs of the EU policy actors and two key assumptions adopted from the 
analysis of Parrish, as outlined in chapter 3. Policy core beliefs, as a theoretical 
concept, find a conceptual meaning with the ACF. The research focuses on the 
aspects of that meaning in order to guide some of the core theoretical 
assumptions and concepts to base upon its sub-research questions.  
 
Moreover, the two key assumptions adopted from the work of Parrish are that: 
the socio-cultural advocacy coalition operates within the EU sports policy 
subsystem and the socio-cultural regulation of sport is the policy core beliefs of 
the EU policy actors that this research focuses on.  On these assumptions, there 
are three sub-research questions developed by the research in investigating the 
EU’s involvement into the regulations of players’ agents within the EU sports 
policy subsystem. These questions are derived from the theoretical hypothesis of 
the ACF and relate to the role of policy core beliefs (i) as endogenous drivers in 
guiding actors’ actions in relation to coordinated activity within the socio-
cultural advocacy coalition (Chapter 5), (ii) as perceptual filters performing 
selective perception in relation to information and policy analysis in the process 
of policy-oriented learning (Chapter 6), and (iii) as a motivator for shaping the 
policy preferences of the EU actors in relation to policy instruments, who are 
driven to translate those policy core beliefs into policies (Chapter 7).  
 
This chapter, therefore, analyzes some of the core concepts used within this 
research whilst underlining the theoretical contribution of the research in 
advancing the ACF. It commences with a conceptual background of the ACF, with 
particular emphasis on the ACF’s model of individual and policy core beliefs 
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within the ACF’s belief systems. It then proceeds to examine those core concepts 
of the ACF that the research investigates in the context of the EU sports policy 
subsystem and in relation to the regulation of players’ agents, namely 
coordinated activity amongst actors of advocacy coalitions, selective perception 
by policy core beliefs in acquiring information and policy analysis, and policy 
preferences and exogenous factors affecting them. 
 
The Conceptual Background and Theoretical Assumptions 
The overall objective of this research is to analyze the process of the EU sports 
policy.  There have been a number of theories developed by public policy 
scholars over the years to improve our understanding of public policy making 
(Sabatier and Weible 2014).10 In particular, during the 1980s there was a shift in 
understanding policy process from a linear progression involving a set of 
rational, separated and functionally sequential stages, defined as the stages 
heuristics model by Jones (1977), to a dynamic process incorporating several 
policy actors, actions, ideas within which policy outcomes are primarily the 
result of an interconnected process of negotiation, coordination and resource 
mobilization amongst a number of actors from different organizations (Matti and 
Sandstrom 2013). The development was the result of the growing discontent 
with the stages heuristic’s explanatory powers related to public policy making 
(Fenger and Klok 2001) and was seen as a shift from government to governance 
and broadly described as the policy network approach. The approach brings 
                                                        
10 Some of the predominant theories of public policy analysis include the Institutional Analysis 
and Development (IAD) Framework by Kiser and Ostrom, the Multiple Streams Approach by 
Kingdon, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory by Baumgartner and Jones, as well as the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (ACF) by Sabatier. For more on these theories see Sabatier and Weible 
(2014). 
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together a range of interlinked concepts for illuminating negotiation, facilitating 
resources and coalition building amongst actors within a policy subsystem 
(Weible and Sabatier 2005). 
 
Amongst those theories, the ACF has became one of the most utilized theoretical 
frameworks for the analysis of the public policy process (Jenkins-Smith et al. 
2014; Capano 2009; Sotirov and Memmler, 2012), considered to be the most 
promising (Fenger and Klok 2001; Matti and Sandstorm 2013) and the most 
successful (Nedergaard 2008) in explicating the public policy process. Sabatier, 
the founder of the framework, recognized the shortcomings of the stages 
heuristic and claimed that the model had outlived its use (Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier 1994, p.197). The ACF was developed to overcome the limitations of the 
stages heuristic by Sabatier and colleagues  (Sabatier 1988, 1998; Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993, 1999; Sabatier and Weible 2007; Jenkins-Smith et. al. 2014) 
with the aim of providing a coherent understanding of the major factors and 
processes affecting overall public policy processes involving problem definition, 
policy formulation, implementation and revision in a specific policy domain, over 
period of a decade or more (Sabatier 1998). Additionally, Sabatier and colleagues 
were motivated to develop theoretical insights about the role of scientific and 
technical information in the process. They also aimed to understand policy 
change over time that went beyond traditional analysis of government 
institutions, historically defined as “the iron triangle” of executive, legislative and 
judiciary, and a limited form of political behaviors, namely voting and lobbying 
(Sabatier, 1998; Jenkins-Smith et. al., 2014). The research also aims to benefit 
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from the explanatory powers of the ACF in illuminating the EU’s intervention 
into the regulations of players’ agents. 
 
The ACF sees policy subsystems as the primary unit of analysis for 
understanding the public policy process (Sabatier 1988, 1999; Sabatier and 
Weible 2007; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014).  The nature of policymaking in modern 
societies is complex, both substantially and legally, and it necessitates that the 
participants specialize in a specific policy area. The specialization takes place 
within policy subsystems that are characterized by a policy topic (e.g., sport), 
territorial scope (e.g., the EU) and the actors who regularly seek to influence 
policy within a subsystem (Sabatier 1998, p.130). The set of relevant subsystem 
actors is not limited to the traditional notion of iron triangles and extends to 
include a variety of public and private organizations, including actors at various 
levels including governments, interest groups, nongovernmental organizations, 
journalists, researches and policy analysts (Sabatier 1988; Sabatier and Weible 
2007). All of these actors play important roles in policy formulation, 
implementation and evaluation. Although the extent and consistency of 
participation in the subsystem and influence of the actors differs, the actors are 
actively concerned with policy problems within a specific policy subsystem. 
Policy subsystems could be operational at local, national or supranational level 
(Weible et al, 2012). The focus of this research is the EU sports policy subsystem. 
 
The ACF adopts a model of the individual with characteristics that are key factors 
that shape the public policy process (Heclo, 1974; Sabatier 1988; Sabatier and 
Weible 2007). The model of the individual draws heavily on work in cognitive 
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and social psychology rather than on work in economics (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1999; Rozbicka 2013; Sotirov and Memmler 2012). Although the ACF 
assumes that actors are instrumentally rational, that is that they are motivated to 
use information and other sources in pursuit of realizing their goals, their goals 
are usually complex (Weible et. al. 2012, p.5). Actors have bounded rationality 
(Simon 1985) meaning that they are limited in their cognitive abilities to process 
stimuli, such as information and experience (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; 
Weible at al. 2012; Jenkins-Smith et. al. 2014). As a result, actors use a heuristic, 
defined as any methodological approach to problem solving (Sabatier 1986a, 
1986b), to overcome the limitations of their cognitive abilities so as to assist 
them in their reasoning, allocating attention and understanding the complexities 
of the world. A heuristic enables actors to focus on some information and ignore 
others and allocate their attention efficiently (Weible et al. 2009; Weible et al. 
2012; Schlager 1994).  
 
A common heuristic used by the ACF is belief systems that are organized into a 
hierarchical tripartite structure (Sabatier 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1999; Sabatier and Weible 2007; Weible et al. 2012; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). 
Deep core beliefs sit at the highest/broadest level and operate across most policy 
subsystems as they are not policy specific. They involve general normative and 
ontological assumptions about human nature, fundamental values such as liberty 
and equality, welfare of different groups, and the role of governments versus 
markets. Deep core beliefs are deemed to be the product of childhood 
socialization and, hence, very resistant to change, almost akin to a religious 
conversion (Sabatier, 1988). Policy core beliefs are at the next level and 
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represent basic normative commitments and casual perceptions. They are bound 
by scope and topic to an entire policy subsystem and hence have territorial and 
topical components. Policy core beliefs can be normative or empirical. Normative 
policy core beliefs may involve basic orientation and value priorities for the 
policy subsystem. Empirically, they include basic perceptions concerning the 
general seriousness of the problem and its primary causes, strategies for 
materializing core values within the subsystem and basic policy instruments to 
be used, termed as policy core preferences (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; 
Sabatier and Weible 2007; Jenkins-Smith et. al. 2014). Policy core beliefs are less 
rigidly held than deep core beliefs. Although particularly normative ones are also 
resistant to change over time, because most policy core beliefs comprise 
empirical elements that may change over a period of time with the accumulation 
of evidence. Finally, there are secondary beliefs that are relatively narrow in 
scope. They are empirical beliefs that relate to a subcomponent of a policy 
subsystems or specific instrumental means to achieve preferred outcomes in 
policy core beliefs, such as the seriousness and cause of problem in specific 
locales, information concerning programme performance and most decisions 
concerning administrative rules, budgetary allocations, statutory interpretations 
and even statutory revisions. Due to their narrower scope, less evidence is 
required to change secondary beliefs making them most susceptible to change in 
the light of new information or evidence (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999).  
 
The ACF combines the cognitive characteristics of actors with network structure 
analysis to simplify the analysis within subsystems for behaviours of the policy 
actors (Sabatier and Weible 2007; Ingold 2011; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014) and 
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develops the concept of  “advocacy coalitions”.  The ACF sees the unit of 
advocacy coalitions as the most useful for analyzing the behavior of a number of 
actors (Sabatier 1993). The ACF organizes policy actors within policy 
subsystems into one or more advocacy coalitions based on shared beliefs and a 
nontrivial degree of coordinated activity (Sabatier and Weible 2007). The ACF 
argues that actors seek their allies with people who share congruent policy core 
beliefs and also engage in a nontrivial degree of coordination to form advocacy 
coalitions to translate those beliefs into policies. Hence, Sabatier (1993, p.25) 
defines these coalitions as consisting of “people from a variety of positions 
(elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers, etc.) who share a 
particular belief system – that is, a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and 
problem perceptions-  and who show a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity 
overtime”. 
 
In the context of this conceptual background, some of the key concepts used 
throughout the research find their theoretical meanings which also justifies the 
choice of the ACF as a theoretical framework. After all, this research is about the 
EU sports policy and its focuses are the EU sports policy subsystem, the socio-
cultural advocacy coalition operates with the subsystem and the EU policy actors 
within the coalition (the Education and Culture DG, the Parliamentary 
Committee on Culture and Education and the Member States). 
 
Additionally, the characteristics and functions of policy core beliefs in the 
context of ACF enables us to draw hypotheses that the sub-research questions 
are constructed upon and also underlines the importance of conceptualization of 
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the socio-cultural regulation of sport as policy core beliefs of the EU policy 
actors.  Firstly, given limited cognitive abilities, the ACF assumes that actors use 
selective perception understood through their core beliefs, particularly policy 
core beliefs that function as a set of perceptual filters, to screen their belief 
system from challenge (Sabatier 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; 
Freudenburg and Gramling 2002). Selective perception makes actors prone to 
biased assimilation of stimuli: actors are more likely to select stimuli that 
confirm their beliefs and less likely to select stimuli that disconfirm their beliefs.  
Based upon these assumptions, the research also assumes that the EU policy 
actors are likely to select stimuli that confirm their policy core beliefs and the 
relevant sub-research question is developed (RQ2). 11 
 
Secondly, policy core beliefs also have implications for coalition dynamics. They 
impact on the formation and stability of coalitions within subsystems (Sabatier 
1988, 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier and Weible 2007). 
Actors’ interpretation of stimuli in a way that support their policy core beliefs 
leads to the same information to be perceived in very different ways by actors 
holding different beliefs (Munro et al. 2002; Norhstedt and Weible 2010; Henry 
2011). Different interpretations of information cause distrust amongst actors 
(Sabatier 1999; Weible and Sabatier 2005).  The ACF also assumes that, 
borrowing from prospect theory (Quattrone and Tversky 1988), actors also 
value losses more than gains which implies that defeats are remembered more 
                                                        
11 The sub-research question (RQ2) is “Do policy core beliefs of the EU policy actors perform 
selective perception in the process of policy-oriented learning, in particular to policy analysis and 
information, related to the regulation of players’ agents?”.  It is based upon the hypothesis that 
“the EU policy actors likely to select information in their policy analysis that confirming their 
policy core beliefs (the socio-cultural regulation of sport)”. 
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than victories. The interaction of the state of distrust with a tendency to 
remember losses leads to the production of a devil shift: a tendency to see the 
opponents more powerful than they are, less trustworthy and more evil. As a 
result, actors form coalitions with others that they share congruent policy core 
beliefs. 
 
In addition, policy core beliefs’ resilience to change also affects the stability of 
coalitions within the subsystem.  The instrumentally rational actors seek to use 
information and other sources to achieve their goals (Sabatier 1998, p.108) 
whilst considering their ultimate goals to be more important than the contingent 
means to achieve those goals.  For this reason, the ACF implies that policy actors 
make concessions on secondary beliefs, as their instrumental beliefs, prior to 
altering their policy core beliefs as ultimate ends. As a result, policy core beliefs 
remain stable over time providing stability to the coalitions (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1999). A number of studies that applied the ACF in natural 
resources policies identified the correlation between the coalition stability with 
policy core beliefs stability (Burnett and Davies 2002; Meijerink 2005). 
Moreover, selective perception performed by policy core beliefs in screening out 
dissonant information and interpretation of information differently also creates 
group cohesion and group thinking contributing to the stability of coalition. The 
‘devil shift’ makes conflict resolution amongst advocacy coalitions within the 
policy subsystem harder and coalitions have a tendency to remain differentiated 
and stable in composition over time. Zafonte and Sabatier (1998) view, for these 
reasons, policy core beliefs as the principle “glue” of the coalitions that holds 
them together within the policy subsystem (Zafonte and Sabatier 1998; Sabatier 
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and Jenkins-Smith 1999). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999, p.123) also 
conclude that “the three hypothesis concerning coalitions are based on the premise 
that the principal glue holding a coalition together is agreement over policy core 
beliefs”. In the context of these theoretical insights, consequently, the research’s 
assumptions, adopted from the analysis of Parrish, related to the existence of the 
socio-cultural coalition within the EU sport policy subsystem and the hypothesis 
of coordinated activity under the sub-research question (RQ1) find their 
theoretical underpinning.12  
 
Finally, the ACF sees public policies as the translation of the belief system of 
actors and conceptualizes them the same way as beliefs system. Public policies 
incorporate implicit theories about achieving their particular objective (Majone 
1980; Sabatier 1988), even though they can be defined and conceptualized in a 
number of ways (Birkland 2010). In doing so, these policies incorporate value 
priorities, perceptions of causal relationships, perceptions related to the 
magnitude of the problem and also perceptions of the efficacy of policy 
outcomes.  According to Jenkins-Smith et al. (2014, p.192), “this interpretation of 
policy provides insight into why coalition actors advocate so intently over time and 
how they interpret public policies as bolstering or being antithetical to their belief 
system”.  On the assumption that policy actors are motivated to translate their 
beliefs into policies, the ACF is then able to map beliefs and policies on the same 
canvas providing a vehicle to assess the influence of those actors on policies over 
                                                        
12 The sub-research question (RQ1) is “Is there a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity 
amongst the EU policy actors of the socio-cultural advocacy coalition in relation to the regulation 
of player`s agents within the subsystem?”.  It is based upon the hypothesis that “the EU policy 
actors are likely to coordinate their activities in relation to the regulation of players’ agents with 
each others as a result of their shared policy core beliefs (the socio-cultural regulation of sport)”. 
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time (Sabatier 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). In this connection, the 
ACF assumes that policy preferences and policy outcomes are shaped by policy 
core beliefs and can be conceptualized and measured hierarchically like belief 
systems (Sabatier 1988, 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, Sabatier and 
Weible 2007, Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). This theoretical insight underpins the 
hypothesis related to policy preferences of the EU policy actors in relation to 
policy instruments for the regulation of players’ agents and enables to develop 
related sub-research question (RQ3).13 
 
The conceptual background of the ACF and the key theoretical assumption 
outlined are fundamental for the research in making the choice of the ACF as a 
theoretical framework where the crucial concepts find their theoretical 
meanings. There are three research dimensions that are taken into account for 
the deduction of the EU actors’ policy core beliefs. The first dimension concerns 
the study of coordinated activity. The second dimension is selective perception 
performed by policy core beliefs in policy analysis and the acquisition of 
information related to players’ agents in the context of policy oriented learning. 
The third dimension is the EU policy actors’ policy preferences related to policy 
instruments at European level to regulate players agents. This chapter now 
proceeds to analyze these concepts (coordinated activity, selective perception 
and policy preferences) with the theoretical literature of ACF.  
 
                                                        
13 The sub-research question (RQ3) is “What are the policy preferences of the EU policy actors in 
relation to policy instruments to regulate players’ agents at European level and to what extent 
the policy preferences reflect the policy core beliefs of the actors?”. It is based upon the 
hypothesis that ““the EU policy actors’ policy preferences in relation to policy instruments to 
regulate players’ agents are likely to reflect their policy core beliefs (the socio-cultural regulation 
of sort) or to be in accordance with their policy core beliefs”. 
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 Coordinated Activity: Policy actors’ Behaviour 
Coordinated activity is the important component of advocacy coalitions, along 
side shared policy core beliefs, and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) consider 
coordination as a necessary condition to identify coalitions within subsystems. 
On the assumption that policy core beliefs are the most important type of beliefs 
in shaping the political behaviour of actors in policy subsystems, the ACF 
assumes that actors, who are concerned with a policy issue and share congruent 
policy core beliefs, engage in a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity in order 
to develop and implement a common strategy to translate their beliefs into 
policies (Sabatier 1988; Weible and Sabatier 2005; Matti and Sandstrom 2011, 
2013; Calanni et al. 2014). In other words, coordinated activity occurs between 
actors with similar policy core beliefs in a coalition (Sabatier 1999; Fenger and 
Klok 2001; Weible and Sabatier 2005).  Calanni et al. (2014, p.904) emphasize 
the fact that “policy core beliefs are the foundation for forming coalitions, 
establishing alliances and coordinating activities among subsystem members” 
(Calanni et. al. 2014, p.904), whilst Sabatier (1993, p.155) argues that “due to the 
nature of these beliefs, they can help to unite allies and divide opponents”. 
Therefore, on the assumption that the EU policy actors hold strong policy core 
beliefs and as they are part of the socio-cultural advocacy coalition, the research 
aims to identify the pattern of coordinated activity amongst the actors in relation 
to the regulation of players’ agents within the EU policy subsystem. 
 
The ACF scholars have attempted to develop and refine the concept of 
coordinated activity over the years (Zafonte and Sabatier 1998, 2004; Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier and Weible 2005; Matti and Sandstrom 2011, 
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2013). Zafonte and Sabatier (1998, p.480) define coordinated activity as “the 
spectrum of activity in which one party alters its own political strategies to 
accommodate the activity of others in pursuit of similar goals”.  This definition 
could include a number of interactions involving information exchange, 
monitoring and aligning political behavior alongside developing, communicating 
and implementing a common strategy of actions. Weible and Sabatier (2005, 
p.185) consider “coordinated activity implying some degree of working together 
such as; developing joint strategy or synchronizing shared action to influence 
policy process”. In addition, Zafonte and Sabatier (1998) differentiate between 
strong and weak coordination. Strong coordination involves frequent 
interactions, the development of a common plan of action, the communication of 
the plan to relevant coalition members, and the monitoring acceptance and 
implementation of the plan combined with sanctioning for noncompliance. In 
contrast, weak coordination simply involves the monitoring of each other’s 
political behaviour and then altering individual actions in order to achieve 
complimentary political strategies related to a common goal.  On the assumption 
that the actors share policy core beliefs and the existence of an element of trust, 
such alteration of behaviour by the actors should not be very difficult. Any 
elaborated decision making or monitoring is not required for weak coordination 
(Zafonte and Sabatier, p.480). 
 
Nonetheless, the ACF’s hypothesis, an implicit assumption that shared policy 
core beliefs are sufficient for coordinated activity which termed as belief 
homophily hypothesis (Calanni et al. 2014; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014), has been a 
long lasting and most criticized aspect of the ACF (Schlager 1995; Schlager and 
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Blomquist 1996; Kubler 2001; Fenger and Klok 2001; Henry 2011; Sotirov and 
Memmler 2012). Both Schlager (1995) and Kubler (2001) argue that the ACF 
scholars focus too much on explaining the structure, content, stability and 
evolution of belief systems, whilst failing to explain how collective action 
problems are eliminated by the coalition actors. In particular, Schlager (1995) 
emphasizes the problematic nature of collective action and questions how 
shared policy core beliefs overcome information cost, distributional problems 
and the temptation of free-ride.  According to Schlager (1995, p. 262), “actors’ 
success in resolving these problems affects the level of coordination they achieve, 
the level of influence they exert on policy decisions, and their ability to realize 
(from their perspective) policy outcomes”. Therefore, Schlager argues that the ACF 
scholar should pay more attention to collective action problems and coordinated 
activity within the framework. 
 
Additionally, Schlager (1995) also points out the necessity of considering 
characteristics of an issue or problem situation that is supportive of cooperation 
and coordination in order to overcome some of these collective action problems. 
Borrowing from the theoretical insight developed by the Institutional Analysis 
and Development Framework (IAD) (Kiser and Ostrom 1982; Ostrom 1990, 
2005, 2007), Schlager suggests that repeated interactions, experience of 
relatively low information costs, and belief that coalition actors treat each other 
at least fairly likely to affect the development of minimal level of coordination 
amongst coalition actors.  Schlager argues that consensus on a common 
definition of a policy problem and the policies to address the problem only 
represent a minimal level of coordination. In particular, repeated interactions 
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enable the acquisition of information, which at the same time lowers the 
information cost, and the context within which actors can change or alter each 
other’s preferences. Alterations of preferences lead to congruent goals of actors 
that support the emergence of coordination. In conjunction with the possibility 
of alteration of policy preferences, repeated interaction also elevates shared 
understanding of the problem and agreeable policies to address it.  Schlager 
(1995) also adds that, for a greater level of coordination, strategies to coordinate 
the actions and activities of the coalition actors must be agreed and adopted. The 
importance of identification of factors affecting coordinated activity and also 
definitional elements related to the level of coordinated activity guide the 
research’s analysis in investigating coordinated activity amongst the EU policy 
actors in chapter 5. 
  
In response to criticism of the belief homophily hypothesis and collective action 
dilemmas, the ACF scholars have made efforts in terms of empirical and 
theoretical work to clarify and elaborate on the issues (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1999; Weible and Sabatier, 2007) which the research also aims to 
contribute. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999, p. 139) acknowledge the fact that 
“repeated interaction and low information cost are important for developing a 
shared perspective on the policy problem, for developing a coordinated lobbying 
strategy, and enforcing that strategy, and fair policies are necessary to resolve 
distributional conflicts amongst members”. Nevertheless, they also argue that 
Schlager’s analyses are based upon the IAD’s rational choice individual model, 
rational and self-interested with limited information capabilities, and hence, 
overestimates the impediments to coordinated activity. In contrast, the ACF’s 
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model of individual is not preoccupied with enhancing their self-interest and 
behaviors are guided through policy core beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1999, pp.138-141). Due to shared policy core beliefs, high trust and willingness 
to distribute cost fairly, the ACF assumes that the cost of involvement in 
coalitions is relatively low (Sabatier and Weible 2007). In addition, devil shift 
exaggerates the perceived benefits of participating in coalitions and leads 
coalitions’ actors to overestimate the cost incurred by their opponents for 
success which reduces the threshold for coordination (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1999). Zafonte and Sabatier (1998) argue that in the context of frequent 
interaction within the organizational structures of the policy subsystem the 
obstacles to collective action are lowered which also fosters coordination 
amongst the actors sharing congruent policy core beliefs. The characteristics of 
the ACF’s model of individual and shared policy core beliefs also underpin the 
research’s investigation of coordinated activity amongst the EU policy actors. 
 
A number of scholars also attempt to empirically assess the role of policy core 
beliefs in determining policy network structures and coordinated activity within 
coalitions (Zafonte and Sabatier 1998, 2004; Weible 2005; Weible and Sabatier 
2005; Matti and Sandtrom 2011, 2013; Henry 2011; Ingold 2011). Zafonte and 
Sabatier (1998) identified, in analysis of San Francisco Bay/Delta Water policy 
subsystem, subsystem wide scope, salience and source of long-term conflicts are 
the critical attributes of the policy core beliefs that make them the glue of 
coalitions and they are beliefs that are most strongly related to indicators of 
coordinated activity. Zafonte and Sabatier (2004) examined the automotive 
pollution control subsystem. Although the study has produced no evidence for 
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support of belief homophily hypothesis, Zafonte and Sabatier (2004) concluded 
“the core members of each coalition (environmental groups and Big 3 automaker) 
clearly coordinated their strategies when not prohibited by law” (Zafonte and 
Sabatier 2004, p.100).  
 
Weible (2005) analyzed the California Marine Life Protection Act (MLPA) policy 
subsystem to assess whether congruent policy core beliefs or perceived 
influence, developed under the Resource Dependency Theory (RDT), are the best 
indicators for policy network structures, with a particular focus on coordination, 
within the subsystem. Weible (2005, p.470) concluded that “beliefs are more 
important than perceived influence in explaining coordination” and “stakeholders 
coordinate with affiliations of similar policy core beliefs than with affiliations of 
dissimilar beliefs”. Weible and Sabatier (2005) also analyzed the MLPA policy 
subsystem, but examined the extent to which policy core beliefs predict network 
structures. They also differentiated between ally networks, coordination 
networks and advice/information networks. The coordination networks were 
defined to be “consisted of actors who periodically coordinate their behavior in 
pursuit of common objectives” (Weible and Sabatier 2005, p.182). Weible and 
Sabatier (2015, p. 193) also concluded that especially the structure of 
coordination and ally networks is extremely close to the predictions of policy 
core beliefs. They also proposed a good test of coordination which “would involve 
corroborating evidence of joint behavior between stakeholders”(p.195).  
 
Matti and Sandstrom (2011 & 2013) investigated the correlation between beliefs 
and coordination within the Swedish Carnivore Management subsystem. Matti 
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and Sandstrom (2011) also based their analysis on two variable rationales of 
coordination; shared beliefs of the ACF and perceived influence of the RDT. Matti 
and Sandstrom (2011) additionally tested the predictability of shared beliefs, 
that is without specifying any level of abstraction, and the policy core beliefs for 
coordination. Their analysis also confirmed “perceived belief correspondence, and 
not perceived influence has significant affect on the coalition structure” and 
corresponding policy core beliefs drive coordination amongst coalition actors 
(Matti and Sandstrom 2011, p.402-403). They also concluded that deep core 
beliefs seemingly have no effect on the structure of coalitions. Inspired by their 
findings, Matti and Sandstroms (2013) differentiated between normative and 
empirical policy core beliefs and investigated to what extent normative policy 
core beliefs rather than an empirical one and secondary beliefs determine 
coordination. Matti and Sandstrom (2013, p.253) concluded that “policy core 
beliefs in general, and normative policy core beliefs in particular, constitutes 
defining element of coalitions”. Secondary element requires further testing and 
refinement and findings are not conclusive. 
 
These findings by the ACF scholars (Zafonte and Sabatier 1998, 2004; Weible 
2005; Weible and Sabatier 2005; Matti and Sandtrom 2011, 2013) are significant 
for the research. Firstly, they are the empirical evidence basis that supports the 
ACF’s belief homophily hypothesis, i.e. the actors coordinate their activities with 
those they shared congruent policy core beliefs, which also underpins the sub-
research question (RQ1). The findings underline the importance of shared policy 
core beliefs in relation to coordinated activity which the research aims to 
investigate within the EU sports policy subsystem. Secondly, especially Zafonte 
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and Sabatier’s (2004) finding with regards to the core actors of the coalition and 
coordinated activity provides empirical imputes for the research. The EU policy 
actors are the focus of the research and core members of the socio-cultural 
advocacy coalition and the investigation of coordinated activity amongst these 
actors with regards to the regulation of players’ agents with the EU policy aims 
to build upon Zafonte and Sabatier’s theoretical analysis. Finally, although these 
studies focused on the role of policy core beliefs in relation to coordinated 
activity, this research investigates coordinated activity on the basis of explicit 
assumption of policy core beliefs of the EU policy actors which represents the 
originality of the research. The research aims to deduce policy core beliefs by 
identifying coordinated activity which based upon the existing empirical 
evidence within the exiting ACF literature should be present amongst the EU 
policy actors with regards to the regulation of players’ agents. 
 
Moreover, the research addresses the gap within the ACF literature related to 
coordinated activity and represents a contribution to the theoretical 
advancement of the ACF as the public policy process framework. Despite the 
efforts of the ACF scholars in developing and refining the notion of coordinated 
activity, the concept still remains one of the underdeveloped areas within 
theoretical emphasis of the ACF and requires attention (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1999; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). Through examining the applications of 
the ACF between 1987 to 2006 Weible et al. (2009) illustrates the gap in the 
literature as none of the studies tested at all hypothesis that deal with 
coordination and collective actions of coalitions. The research, in Chapter 5, 
investigates coordinated activity amongst the core members of the socio-cultural 
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advocacy coalition, i.e. the EU policy actors, within the EU sports policy 
subsystem. This analysis will not only contribute by determining the causal 
drivers behind the EU’s involvement into the regulations of players’ agents, but 
also advance one of the key hypothesis for the ACF: the belief homophily 
hypothesis.  
 
Selective Perception: Perceptual Filtering by Policy Core Beliefs 
Policy-oriented learning is another important concept under the ACF which is 
affected by policy core beliefs. The framework has particular interest in 
understanding the learning within the process of policy development, especially 
in relation to policy change (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; 
1999).  Influenced by the analysis of Heclo (1974), Sabatier and Jenkins-Smiths 
(1999, p.123) defines policy-oriented learning as “relatively enduring 
alternations of thought or behavioral intentions that result from experience and/or 
new information and that are concerned with the attainment or revision of policy 
objectives.” Considering learning is about knowledge, that is processed 
information and not the same as information, and meaningful to knowledgeable 
agents, this definition of policy oriented-learning transcends an information-
based view of learning and incorporates values, meaning and frames and it is 
also more conducive to analysis.  Within the ACF, policy-oriented learning rather 
relates to substantive learning involving increased knowledge of problem 
parameters including the severity of the problem, its causes and effective factors, 
and changing perceptions related to policy effectiveness and the possible 
impacts of alternative policies (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Policy-
oriented learning is also deemed to be adaptive learning involving the 
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interpretation of mistakes, making strategic adjustments and testing new 
strategies for related policy goals (Weible, 2008). Policy actors experiment with 
a variety of instruments and other mechanisms to achieve their policy goals and 
dissatisfaction of a specific mechanism’s ability to achieve strategic objectives 
generally leads to reexamination of the strategy (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 
1993). 
 
In the real world, however, knowledge does not suddenly appear and become 
universally accepted (Weible et al., 2012; Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013). Hence, 
policy-oriented learning involves policy analysis and information concerning the 
seriousness and primary causes of the problem that used by actors in advocacy 
fashion (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994). 
Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993, p.45) identify four principles that govern the 
role of information and formal policy analysis in the process of policy-oriented 
learning. Firstly, analysis usually results from either threats to core values or 
perceived opportunities to realize core values. Secondly, information about the 
problem plays an important role for policy actors about the extent of a given 
situation affecting their values and interests. Thirdly, once actors develop a 
perspective on a policy issue, analysis is used in an advocacy fashion, i.e; to 
justify and elaborate that policy position. Finally, it is a prerequisite for actors to 
engage in analytical debate to translate their beliefs into policy. This involves 
efforts to convince other actors about the soundness of their perspectives on the 
problem and mechanisms as policy alternatives. 
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Sabatier (1988) and Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993) also depict a scenario for 
the process of policy-oriented learning involving policy analysis, information and 
consequential analytical engagement. The process commences once some actors 
perceive a problem that affects their core values and initiates an analysis of 
information concerning the seriousness of the problem and its causes. Learning 
about causal factors affecting the problem and acquired knowledge leads actors 
to propose their policy preferences to accomplish their policy objectives related 
to the problem in line with their policy core beliefs. Actors who feel aggrieved by 
the proposed policy preferences tend to challenge either the validity of data 
concerning the seriousness of the problem or the causal assumption about the 
validity of technical information or the efficacy of policy preferences to overcome 
the problem. A response by the original actors to those challenges initiates a 
political and analytical debate. Policy brokers mediate the process to keep the 
level of conflict low and the result tends to be the adoption of a policy 
preference.  If policy analysis provides reasonable evidence about the 
seriousness of the problem, identifies likely causes and convinces actors that that 
the proposed policy preferences could address the problem, a more substantial 
policy preference will emerge. Nevertheless, in a new policy area, knowledge 
about the seriousness of the problem and causal factors tend to be uncertain and 
political sources of actors are sufficiently modest that the initial policy response 
would involve “significant research component, but little coercion” (Jenkins-Smith 
and Sabatier 1993, p.47). 
 
The principles governing the role of policy analysis and information and the 
scenario of the process of policy-oriented learning underpin the analysis of the 
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research in chapter 6. The scenario provides the contextual framework of 
analysis within which the research examines the EU policy actors’ policy analysis 
and the acquisition of information related to the regulation of players’ agents. In 
this context, the research also investigates the role of policy analysis and 
information in shaping the policy position of the EU policy actors on players’ 
agents. Additionally, the research within this context aims to identify selective 
perception performed by policy core beliefs of the EU policy actors in influencing 
policy analysis, the acquisition of information and subsequent policy 
development with an objective of deducing policy core beliefs from their 
observed performance as perceptual filters. 
 
Selective perception performed by policy core beliefs is important for the 
process of policy-oriented learning in the ACF.  Although the ACF assumes that 
policy-oriented learning is instrumental, that is policy actors seek to better 
understand the world in pursuit of further advancing their policy objectives 
(Sabatier 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 
1999), learning is also a cognitive activity and shaped by policy actors’ cognitive 
biases and constraints within which policy core beliefs become perceptual filters 
performing selective perception (Sabatier 1988; Freudenburg and Gramling 
2002; Sabatier and Weible 2007; Weible 2008; Matti and Sandtrom 2013; 
Jenkins-Smith et al 2014).  Policy core beliefs perform perceptual filtering in the 
acceptance and processing of information acquired by actors (Sabatier 1999) 
and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999,p. 145) argue that “this is even more true of 
policy core beliefs than of secondary aspects”. In this connection, such cognitive 
limitations manifest themselves in cases of selective perception that 
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underpinned by policy core beliefs. Firstly, actors are more likely to select 
information that confirms their policy core beliefs leading to the biased 
assimilation of actors, the tendency to accept information confirming their 
existing core beliefs and screen out dissonant information suggesting invalidity 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier 1999). Secondly, actors also interpret 
information that confirms their policy core beliefs (Nohrstedt and Weible 2010). 
Thirdly, the selection and interpretation of information in a way that inline with 
the actors’ policy core beliefs also cause distrust and subsequent devil shift 
leading to the polarization of actors and coalitions (Nohrstedt and Weible 2010). 
Selective perception, performed by policy core beliefs, is a fundamental 
characteristic of the ACF’s model of the individual and has significant 
repercussions for the dynamics of coalitions with subsystems. Policy-oriented 
learning is not problematic within a coalition. Policy actors are more willing and 
open towards information and knowledge exchange with the others in the same 
coalition than the other in rival coalitions (Sabatier 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1999; Weible 2008; Rozbicka 2013). This process of cognitive analysis 
creates an in-group coherency and when combined with the distrust of 
opponents contributes to the stability of the coalition (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1993). In addition, the advocacy style of formal policy analysis and 
information used against opponents creates an analytical debate which can 
result in conflict. This conflict might lead to isolation for divergent coalitions and 
prevents member defections across coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1999). The combined impact of in-group coherency and lack of member 
defection cause an enhanced stability of the coalitions within subsystems. 
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Selective perception also impacts on learning by policy actors and consequential 
policy change. Learning is more frequent in secondary beliefs than in policy core 
beliefs due to combined effect of selective perception and biased assimilation 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith; 1993; Sabatier 1998; Weible at al. 2008).  Due to 
selective perception, as information remains dissonant to policy core beliefs, 
policy core beliefs also are resistant to change, especially normative ones, and 
the time period of a decade or more (the enlightenment function) is required to 
accumulate evidence to change them. Conversely, due to their empirical nature, 
secondary beliefs are more easily changed in the face of evidence, which also 
enables the ACF to differentiate between minor change (secondary beliefs) and 
major change (policy core beliefs)(Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993; 
Nedergaard, 2008; Sotirov and Memmler, 2012).   
This research takes into consideration the analysis of selective perception within 
the existing ACF literature and facilitates them to develop the hypothesis to 
construct the sub-research question (RQ2) and also investigates selective 
perception to deduce policy core beliefs of the EU policy actors in the socio-
cultural advocacy coalition. 
There is a rich literature that examines the process of policy-oriented learning. 
In contrast, the literature on selective perception is very limited and the research 
aims to fill this gap. The existing literature on policy-oriented learning is based 
upon the assumption that learning is not problematic within coalitions. 
Therefore, their focus is on across coalition learning and, in particular 
investigating the conditions conducive for that learning, (Barke 1993; Olson et al. 
1999; Elliott and Schlaepfer 2001; Meijerink 2005; Larsen et al. 2006) and also 
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on learning in secondary and policy core beliefs (Sabatier and Brasher 1993; 
Elliot and Schlaepfer 2001). The ACF identifies at least three conditions that 
affect learning across coalitions; level of conflict (Meijerink 2005), analytical 
tractability of the issue (Elliott and Schlaepfer 2001), the existence of a 
professional forum (Sabatier 1988; Barke 1993; Olson et al. 1999; Jenkins-Smith 
and Sabatier 1993). The findings of research are rather mixed with regards to 
support for conditions conducive for across coalition learning.  Some research 
concludes that across coalition learning is likely to occur when there is 
intermediate level of conflict (2005), with tractable issues (Elliott and Schlaepfer 
2001), and in professional forums (Barke 1993, Olson et al. 1999). Conversely, 
other research shows that forums do not always facilitate across coalition 
learning (Munro 1993). The analysis of learning within secondary and policy 
core beliefs also produces mixed results (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993; 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier 1999). The nature of policy core 
beliefs, being primarily normative and largely beyond direct empirical challenge, 
and their resistance to change, which will require accumulation of considerable 
evidence over a decade or more (the enlightenment function), are two primary 
reasons that learning takes place in secondary beliefs which are more 
susceptible to change on the basis of empirical evidence (Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier 1993).  A good number of studies have identified learning at both 
secondary and policy core beliefs (Sabatier and Brasher 1993; Elliot and 
Schlaepfer 2001). Despite the focus on policy-oriented learning, literature 
analyzing selective perception by policy core beliefs is very limited and 
addressing this gap in the literature is the one of the objective of this research.  
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Additionally, there is only one study analyzing policy core beliefs as perceptual 
filters performing selective perception by Freudenburg and Gramling  (2002) 
and the study’s findings illustrate the importance of developing a better 
understanding of selective perception within the ACF. Dramatic impacts of 
selective perception on policy process are highlighted within the analysis of the 
study.  Through examining the federal outer continental drilling program in the 
US over a period of 35 years Freudenburg and Grambling (2002) identified that 
it was actually selective perception performed by the policy core beliefs of 
dominant pro-development advocacy coalition led to the demise of their policy 
output.  The actors of the pro-development advocacy coalition had screened out 
information challenging their policy core, and combined with their shared 
commitment to policy core beliefs too, virtually resulted in an unwillingness to 
accept very relevant scientific information. Defined as self-negating belief by 
Freudenburg and Grambling (2002), eventually President Bush, who was 
considered to be an actor within the pre-development advocacy coalition, called 
for the National Academy review of the scientific information. The review 
ultimately undermined the coalition’s policy core beliefs and the result was a 
divergent policy outcome from policy core beliefs. Freudenburg and Grambling 
(2012, p. 38) even claim that “there is a need to recognize that a shared (policy 
core belief) belief may provide not just glue that holds a coalition together, but all 
the substance that keeps the members’ eyes shut”. Additionally, Freudenburg and 
Grambling (2002) consider that the self-negating beliefs may likely become 
evident when a dominant advocacy coalition appears to be most firmly in control 
and seems to be acting in accordance with their policy core beliefs. Therefore, 
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the findings of this research related to selective perception improve the 
theoretical understanding of selective perception as a concept within the ACF. 
 
Furthermore, the analysis of the research on selective perception contributes an 
explicit gap within the ACF’s literature that is also acknowledged by the ACF 
scholars. Jenkins-Smith et al. (2014, p.205) recognize the area of policy-oriented 
learning as an understudied area in the ACF and urge scholars to undertake re-
examination of the concept and its theoretical implications. Moreover, Jenkins-
Smith et al. (2014, p.207) also emphasize the importance of expanding the 
understanding of science and policy analysis in the policy process. Henry (2011, 
p.379) views “understanding which types of beliefs are more or less prone to 
biaised assimilation is an important area for future research”.  Therefore, this 
research aims to contribute the development of understanding primarily related 
to selective perception, but also policy analysis and the wider concept of policy-
oriented learning.  
 
Policy Preferences: The Reflection of Policy Core Beliefs  
The theoretical means of policy preferences in relation to policy instruments, as 
policy outcomes at operation level, in reflecting policy core beliefs are based 
upon some of the key theoretical assumptions of the ACF. The ACF assumes that 
those preferences are a translation of policy core beliefs and can be 
conceptualized and measured hierarchically like belief systems (Sabatier 1988, 
1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier and Weible 2007; Jenkins-
Smith et al. 2014). Additionally, there is an assumption that policy actors engage 
in coordinated activity, who are concerned with a policy issue and share 
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congruent policy core beliefs, in order to develop and implement a common 
strategy to translate their policy core beliefs into policies (Sabatier 1988; Weible 
and Sabatier 2005; Matti and Sandstrom 2011, 2013; Calanni et al. 2014). In the 
context of on-going policy process, Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993, p.44) 
claims that  “policy-oriented learning is an ongoing process of search and 
adaptation motivated by the desire to realize core policy beliefs”. Therefore, these 
assumptions are the spine of the hypothesis that underpins the sub-research 
question (RQ3) and the research aims to examine the policy preferences of the 
EU policy actors related to the instruments at European Union level to regulate 
agents in order to deduce their policy core beliefs. 
 
Policy preferences generally represent the secondary aspects of actors’ belief 
system, although the ACF differentiates subsystem-wide policy proposals, 
defined as policy core policy preferences (Sabatier 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1999). Policy core policy preferences are beliefs that “ (i) are subsystem-
wide in scope, (ii) are highly salient, and (iii) have been major source of cleavage 
for some time” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, p.134). Policy core policy 
preferences are normative beliefs. When translated to secondary beliefs, these 
preferences become narrower in scope and relate to specific instruments or 
proposals dealing with only a territorial or substantive subcomponent of a policy 
subsystem (Sabatier and Weible 2007, p.195). The EU policy actors’ policy 
preferences related to policy instruments in regulating players’ agents are not 
subsystem-wide and rather issue specific (players’ agents). Therefore, they have 
a nature of secondary beliefs. However, the translation of policy core policy 
preferences into secondary beliefs clearly underlines the importance of those 
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preferences in reflecting policy core beliefs and this is what the research aims to 
deduce through analysis in chapter 7. 
 
Policy preferences are also important to explain policy change with a subsystem. 
As preferences relate to the secondary aspects of the belief systems of policy 
actors, they enable the ACF to make a clear distinction between minor and major 
policy change (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier and Weible 2007; 
Capano 2009). According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999, p.147) “major 
change is change in the policy core aspects of a governmental program, whereas 
minor change is change in the secondary aspects”.  Jenkins-Smith et al. (2014) see 
change in policy core beliefs indicating a major change in the directions or goals 
of the subsystem, as a major policy change, whereas change in secondary 
aspects, ie; change in means for achieving policy goals, is evidenced for a minor 
change (p.201). Additionally, the hierarchical structuring of beliefs also grounds 
on their susceptibility to change and minor policy change is likely to be not as 
difficult as major policy change (Sabatier, 1998). Gathering empirical evidence 
over a period of time on specific policy issue may lead to change in secondary 
aspects of beliefs system, conversely policy core beliefs are rigidly held and 
selective perception screens out dissonant information making a major policy 
change very unlikely (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). Therefore, policy-oriented 
learning, which may take ten years or more (enlightenment function), may not 
be sufficient to change the policy core beliefs of the actors and it necessitates 
external perturbations or shocks affecting the subsystem to generate a major 
policy change (Nohrstedt 2009: Nohrstedt and Weible 2010: Albright 2011).  
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The research aims to deduce policy core beliefs from the EU policy actors’ policy 
preferences rather than investigating policy change within the EU sports policy 
subsystem. Yet, the change in preferences of the EU policy actors may represent 
a minor policy change within the wider context of EU sports policy subsystem. 
The emergence of FIFA’s new regulatory framework (the concept of 
intermediaries) also represents a plausible question in the context of theoretical 
analysis: whether the new framework represents the policy core beliefs of the 
EU policy actors and constitutes a form of policy change or whether it represents 
the maintenance of the status quo by football governing bodies in regulating 
players’ agents which may undermine the EU policy actors’ policy core beliefs. 
These questions are also examined in chapter 7 as they are interlinked to the 
explanatory power of policy preferences for policy core beliefs.  
 
The focus on policy preferences also necessitates an analysis of the factors 
affecting overall policy making within subsystem, in particular to explain the 
change in preferences and the emergence of alternative instruments. In this 
connection, the ACF identifies to two exogenous factors, one relatively stable and 
the other more dynamic, that impact on policy making in policy subsystems by 
creating the constraints and opportunities of subsystem actors (Sabatier, 1998; 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, Sabatier and Weible, 2007). The stable 
exogenous factors rarely change over a period of decade or so, thus they are 
seldom the subject of coalitions’ strategies and provide impetus for behavioral 
and policy change within the subsystem. Yet, “these factors can certainly limit the 
range of feasible alternatives or otherwise affect the resources and beliefs of 
subsystem actors” (Sabatier, 1988, p.135).  These relatively stable parameters 
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include the basic constitutional structure, socio-cultural values and structures, 
natural resources of a political system, and basic attributes of the problem area. 
In this connection, the research examines the stable parameters affecting the EU 
sports policy subsystem so as to illuminate the reasons behind the specific policy 
preferences of the EU policy actors.  
 
On the other hand, the dynamic exogenous factors, on the other hand, are more 
likely to change over the course of a decade or so. They include changes in socio-
economic conditions, changes in systematic governing coalitions, and policy 
decisions from other subsystems. Their susceptibility to change makes these 
dynamic factors critical in affecting major policy change. In fact, the ACF 
hypothesizes that for major policy change, a change in one of these exogenous 
dynamic factors is a necessary condition.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the theoretical framework that underpins this 
research. There are a number of reasons justifying the choice of ACF as a 
theoretical framework by this research.  Firstly, the assumptions adopted from 
the analysis of Parrish (2003a, 2003b) on the EU sports policy led to the ACF as 
the socio-cultural advocacy coalition and the socio-cultural regulation of sport as 
policy core beliefs have their conceptual meanings within the framework.  
Secondly, the theoretical assumptions of the ACF also led to the development of 
hypotheses that underline three research dimensions in deducing policy core 
beliefs in the context of the EU sports policy subsytem: coordinated activity, 
selective perception and policy preferences. Thirdly, the ACF is considered to be 
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the one of the most promising, elaborated and useful theoretical lenses to 
analyze the public policy process. Additionally, he ACF is also deemed to be a 
promising framework to analyze the EU policy process (Zahariadis 2013, p.809; 
Rozbicka 2013, p.849), which is in general terms, what this research is doing. For 
these reasons, the research utilizes the ACF as its theoretical framework. 
 
The research’s sub research questions are aiming to deduce policy core beliefs of 
the EU policy actors, defined as the maximalists by Parrish (2003a) of the socio-
cultural advocacy coalition within the EU sports policy by analyzing theoretical 
concepts of the ACF where policy core beliefs perform an important role.  In 
relation to coordinated activity, it is the necessary condition of advocacy 
coalitions and actors coordinate their activities with the actors on the basis of 
shared congruent policy core beliefs. Policy core beliefs perform selective 
perception, acting as perceptual filters, in processing and interpreting 
information within policy analysis of policy-oriented learning process. Actors are 
also motivated to translate their policy core beliefs into policies and, for this 
reason, policy preferences correlate with policy core beliefs. These propositions 
are investigated in the context of the regulation of players’ agents within the EU 
sports policy subsystem. The initial analysis of the coordinated activity of the 
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Chapter 5 
The EU Policy Actors and Coordinated Activity  
 
Introduction 
The regulation of players’ agents, as a policy issue, was initially confined to the 
activities of the single market advocacy coalition within the EU sports policy 
subsystem. The complaint by Laurent Piau to the Commission was the catalyst 
for the activities at European level and eventually led to a decision by the 
Competition DG, FIFA’s amendments to its regulations and the judgment by the 
General Court. Particularly, following the amendments by FIFA, the Competition 
DG was satisfied that the restrictive aspects of the regulations were eliminated 
and declared that continuing with proceedings represented no community 
interest (Piau, para 22). The Working Group on the follow-up to the Nice 
Declaration, established in the tenth European Sport Forum in 2001 to carry out 
the work on the implementation of the Nice Declaration, even expressed their 
satisfaction of the fact that the issue of players’ agents “have been dealt with in a 
way which respects Community Law, and uniqueness of sport and in line with the 
spirit advocated by the Nice Declaration” (European Council 2001, p.1). 
Therefore, why the socio-cultural advocacy coalition, particularly the Education 
and Culture DG, the Committee on Culture and Education and the Member States 
(hereafter together they are referred as “the EU policy actors”) became involved 
with the issue at European level requires an explanation from the perspective of 
EU sports policy. How did the issue move onto their policy agenda? What have 
been the activities of these actors over the years that ensured the regulation of 
players’ agent is dealt with within the subsystem in accordance with their policy 
core beliefs? 
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This chapter analyses those activities of the EU policy actors of the socio cultural 
advocacy coalition related to the regulations of players’ agents in the period of 
over a decade after the Nice Declaration and particularly investigates how the 
policy actors coordinated their activities in order to develop a policy position 
that corresponds with their policy core beliefs (The chronological outline of 
activities are in Table 3). Based upon the assumption that the EU policy actors 
hold strong policy core beliefs related to the socio-cultural regulation of sport 
(Parrish, 2003a and 2003b) and the ACF’s theoretical assumption that actors 
with congruent policy core beliefs coordinate their activities (Zafonte and 
Sabatier 1998, 2004; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; Weible and Sabatier 
2005; Matti and Sandstrom 2011, 2013), firstly, the period from the Nice 
Declaration to the White Paper on Sport (European Commission 2007a) is 
examined. During this period, the research identifies that there is a minimal 
degree of coordinated activity amongst the EU policy actors related to players’ 
agents involving interactions and policy analysis which shaped their issue 
preferences for the White Paper. Secondly, the aftermath of the White Paper is 
examined and a strong coordination (Zafonte and Sabatier 1998; Schlager, 1995) 
involving not just repeated interactions and policy analysis but also a common 
plan of action, in form of impact assessment, is identified. Finally, the actors’ 
activities in the post-Lisbon era are considered. 
 
From the Nice Declaration to the White Paper on Sport 
 
Coordinated activity at European level is rather complex and there are a number 
of characteristics of EU policy making that affect the level of coordination. 
Schlager (1995) argues that those characteristics of the situation could be either 
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supportive or detrimental to the coordination amongst the members of the 
advocacy coalition and need to be carefully analyzed.  A dispersed power of 
policy making between the EU institutions and the Member States (Parrish 
2003a) influences policies impacting upon the activities and the context of 
coordination within which policy actors develop strategies for coordinating or 
synchronizing their activities to affect the policy (Sabatier 1998). Additionally, 
resources at the disposal of policy actors are the basis of their activities and 
provide the platform for frequent analytical interactions on policy issues 
involving information exchange and analytical debates that are critical 
components of coordinated activity (Zafonte and Sabatier 1998; Schlager 1995). 
With regards to sport, the Education and Culture DG has a privileged position in 
relation to policy initiative as it holds the sole right of legislative initiative 
meaning that policy must be drafted by the Education and Culture DG with the 
associated right to amend or withdraw its policy proposal (Wallace et al. 2005). 
Policy documents (Communications), consultations, conferences and studies are 
sources available the Education and Culture DG to develop the EU sports policy. 
The Member States influence EU policy making by providing the basis of legal 
context for EU action on sport through Declarations and Treaty Articles. Prior to 
the new competency on sport under the Lisbon Treaty, the Amsterdam 
Declaration and the Nice Declaration were important soft law measures 
providing legal context for guiding the EU activities on sport. Additionally, the 
institutional framework in the context of political cooperation between the 
Member States and with the EU institutions is important as it provides the 
framework to coordinate their activities on policy issues. Prior to the Lisbon 
Treaty, political cooperation was confined within an informal framework outside 
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the formal Council structure. After the new competency, there is a formal setting 
under the new Council configuration related to sport. The key sources of the 
Member States at their disposal are Ministerial and Sports Directors meetings, 
Presidency Conclusions, Rolling Agendas and resolutions of the Council. The 
Committee on Culture and Education influences the EU sport policy through its 
legislative, scrutiny and budgetary powers. In particular, the Committee provides 
input through parliamentary debates, questions and resolutions and those affect 
its activities. The Committee’s key resources are, therefore, resolutions and 
parliamentary reports (Parrish 2003a). 
 
The EU policy actors developed a minimum level of coordinated activity 
(Schlager 1995; Zafonte & Sabatier 1998), involving repeated interactions and 
policy analysis, particularly involving information exchange, in relation to the 
regulation of players’ agents during the period from the Nice Declaration in 2000 
to the White Paper on Sport in 2007. The Nice Declaration was the basis of legal 
context for EU action on sport due to the lack of an explicit competency for sport 
under the Treaties. The Declaration provided orientation for addressing sport’s 
specific characteristics and its social function at European level (Parrish 2003a; 
Takorski et al. 2004; Van den Bogaert and Vermeersch 2006).14 Motivated to 
embrace the full potential of sport and develop more coordinated and effective 
EU action concerning the implementation of principles and values under the Nice 
Declaration, particularly relating to the protection and promotion of its socio-
                                                        
14The relevant part of the Decleration reads “... Even though not having any direct powers in this 
area, the Community must, in its action under the various Treaty provisions, take account of the 
social, educational and cultural functions inherent in sport and making it special, in order that 
the code of ethics and solidarity essential to the preservation of its social role may be respected 
and nurtured.” 
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cultural role (European Commission 2007b, p. 58-59), there was a decision by 
the EU policy actors on the development of EU policy initiative, in the form of a 
white paper, at European level (European Commission 2007b). The Education 
and Culture DG developed a framework to identify the topics to be addressed 
under the policy initiative which became a consultation exercise involving 
interactions not only between the EU policy actors but also the wider EU sport 
movement through consultations, meetings, and conferences. The interaction 
with the EU sport movement, particularly with sport governing federations, the 
issue of players’ agents was mooted as a topic where European level action 
might be necessary. The Member States also adopted, upon a proposal by the 
Education and Culture DG, a Rolling Agenda for sport defining their priority 
themes for the EU policy initiative on sport. The context of the Member States’ 
input was further developed through the informal meetings of EU Sports 
Ministers and EU Sports Directors under EU Presidencies and the Independent 
European Sport Review, the report initiated under the UK Presidency, was an 
important contribution to the process. The Committee of Culture and Education 
contributed to the process by adopting its own report in the future of football on 
Europe. The result of coordinated activity by the EU policy actors for the period 
leading to the White Paper on Sport was that repeated interactions and 
information exchange enabled them develop a shared understanding around the 
issue of players’ agents as a policy problem (Schlager 1995). Repeated 
interactions and the development of shared understandings also shaped their 
issue preferences for the White Paper (Schlager 1995) and the regulation of 
players’ agents and assessing the necessity of European level action became a 
policy issue for the EU policy actors under the policy document. 
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In the process of preparing the White Paper on Sport, the Education and Culture 
DG launched a consultation exercise, titled the EU & Sport: Matching 
Expectations, involving the broader European sport movement (European 
Commission 2007b, p.111-112). The objective of the framework was to identify 
concrete topics of direct practical relevance to the stakeholders and where the 
EU involvement could have added value to their existing activities. The topic of 
the debate within the framework was related to the priority items of the political 
Rolling Agenda for Sport, adopted by EU Sports Ministers in 2004. This ensured a 
parallelism of discussions on sport between governmental (the Member States) 
and non-governmental stakeholders. In this context, there were a number of 
activities organized by the Education and Culture DG. Two consultation 
conferences took place in June 2005 and 2006 with the representatives of the 
European sport movement.15 Recognizing the need to meet with European sport 
federations at the highest level, there was a meeting took place in September 
2006 focusing purely on governance issues in European sports.16 There were 
also bilateral consultations on the issues related to the White Paper involving 
meetings and contacts with a large number of organizations that attended at the 
consultation conferences (European Commission 2007b, p.113-115). 17 The 
Education and Culture DG also ran an eight week on-line consultation process 
                                                        
15The first conference was organized on 14-15 June 2005 and there were three workshops 
focusing on the social function of sport, volunteering in sport and the fight against doping. The 
second consultation conference was placed under a broader title of “the role of sport in Europe” 
and took place on 29-30 June 2006. There were also three workshops on the thematic structure 
of the White Paper on Sport: the societal role of sport, the economic impact of sport, the 
organization of sport. 
16There were representatives of more than 30 sports federations in Europe attended the 
meeting, including UEFA and FIFA. 
17Football stakeholders involved in these bilateral consultations included FIFA, UEFA, the 
European Professional Football Leagues (EPFL), FIFPro, G-14 and Premier League. 
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open to interested organizations and individuals in Europe between February 
and April 2007 (European Commission 2007b, p.115-124). 
 
The meeting with European sport federations, titled Sport Governance in 
Europe, and the online consultation were particularly instrumental in putting the 
regulation of players’ agents within the agenda of the Education and Culture DG 
(European Commission 2006). In the meeting with sports federations the 
Commissioner responsible for sport, Jan Figel, was present and the chair was the 
Director General of the Education and Culture DG and the Director responsible 
for sport (European Commission 2006, p.1). Focusing purely on governance 
issues and providing a direct opportunity to discuss one of the core themes of 
the White Paper, the federations particularly emphasized the specificities of their 
respective sport and outlined the ways in which the EU could help in promoting 
good governance in sport whilst respecting their autonomy (European 
Commission 2006, p.2). Football federations particularly insisted upon the 
specificities of football and its problems compared to the other sports. Within 
this context, some sport federations identified the issue of players’ agents as an 
area where possible EU action could promote good governance in European 
sport (European Commission 2006, p.3).18 The online consultation targeted all 
interested organizations and individuals on sport and sport organizations 
accounted for 59.2% of the overall respondents and included being either a sport 
club or sport federation (European Commission 2007b, p.115). Many 
respondents mentioned that the EU and sport share a number of common 
                                                        
18The other areas identified were the protection of minors in sport, betting in sport, doping, 
preservation of the rights of sportspeople and of equal access to sport practice  and the 
promotion of sport in schools and for young people. 
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concerns, such as the exploitation ("trafficking") of young players, the activities 
of players' agents, corruption and money laundering, violence at sporting events, 
racism and other discrimination, and doping (European Commission 2007b, 
p.124). 67.7% agreed that the EU should explore the need for action as regards 
the profession of agents in the field of sport (European Commission 2007b, 
p.123).  
 
The Member States developed a close cooperation with the Education and 
Culture DG in the preparatory process of the White Paper in the context of 
informal framework and aligned their activities (European Commission 2007b, 
p.125 and p.58). The Member States desired to give sport a high profile within 
European policy making and especially to enhance its specific characteristics and 
the social function of sport in Europe as per the Nice Declaration. The Rolling 
Agenda for Sport, adopted upon a proposal by the Education and Culture DG in 
2004, provided a better focus for the debates and allowed for continuity and 
progress by identifying the priority themes of the Member States for the White 
Paper (European Commission 2007b, p.58 and p.122).  The discussions and 
debates took place during informal meetings of EU Sports Ministers and EU 
Sports Directors. There were ministerial meetings organized by the Presidencies 
of Luxembourg (Luxembourg, April 2005), the United Kingdom (Liverpool, 
September 2005) and Germany (Stuttgart, March 2007). There was also a 
Ministerial Conference organized jointly by the Finnish Presidency and the 
Education and Culture DG within the framework of the EU & Sport: Matching 
Expectations and took place in Brussels on 27-28 November 2006. During the 
conference the ministers endorsed their support for the White Paper by the 
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Education and Culture DG and expressed their desire to remain closely involved 
in the preparatory process. 
 
In addition, EU Sports Ministers at the Ministerial Conference decided to set up 
an ad-hoc Member States Working Group on the White Paper during the German 
Presidency. The Group had a meeting on 7th March 2007 and discussed concrete, 
practical topics interest to the Member States, thus providing informal input and 
concrete ideas for the White Paper (European Commission 2007e, p.127). 
 
The Independent European Sport Review (Arnaut, 2006), also known as the 
Arnaut Report, was the most important work originating from the activities of 
the Member States within which the policy analysis related to the regulation of 
players’ agents within the context of the Nice Declaration was carried out. The 
Review was the part of the Member States’ ongoing works in the field of sport 
with a particular objective of supporting practical effects of the principles set out 
in the Nice Declaration (Arnaut 2006, p. 21). In this context, the regulation of 
players’ agents in Europe was also examined. The decision to commission the 
Review was taken during the meeting, arranged by the UK Sport Minister 
Richard Caborn and attended by the Ministers of France, Germany, Spain and 
Italy and football governing bodies19 in Leipzig on 8 December 2005. The 
meeting particularly focused on exploring how the principles related to the 
specific characteristics of sport could be effectively implemented by the football 
governing bodies, the EU institutions and the Member States, so that its social 
                                                        
19 Football governing bodies represented by Messrs. Blatter (FIFA President), Johansson (UEFA 
President), Grondona(FIFA Senior Vice-President, CONMEBOL) and Hayatou (CAF President). 
  132 
and cultural functions were protected and promoted. With reference to players’ 
agents, it was conceived that the issue is amongst a range of problems faced by 
European football that are generally harmful to sport and recognized that only a 
holistic approach involving football governing bodies, the EU and the Member 
States would be truly effective (Arnaut 2006, p.147).  In this connection, the 
decision for the Review was taken and the terms of reference of the Review 
agreed (Arnaut 2006, p.149-154). With regards to the regulation of players’ 
agents, the authors were mandated to look into “the arrangements by which the 
football authorities oversee (i) the activity of agents and intermediaries in respect 
of both the transfer of players’ registrations and player contract arrangements; 
and (ii) the system of player registration and movement” (Arnaut 2006, p.152). 
The former Portuguese Sport Minister, Jose Louise Arnaut, was appointed the 
chairman of the Review on 8 September 2006 to produce the report on these 
specific terms of reference. 
 
The Review was another consultation platform providing an opportunity for the 
stakeholders, the Education and Culture DG and the Parliament to interact on the 
issue of players’ agents and to exchange information. During the preparation 
phase of the Review, a consultation meeting took place, in form of a public 
hearing, in Brussels on 29th March 2006 which attended by a number of football 
stakeholders20, the members of the Parliament and the Education and Culture 
DG’s Sport Unit. In addition, the Chairman of the Review also held one to one 
                                                        
20Stakeholders attended the meeting include Independent Football Commission (UK), Deputy 
Chief Executive of the English Players Association and FIFPro, the English Football Association, 
Sapanish Professional Football Leagues, European Professional Football Leagues, G-14 EU Affairs 
External Advisor, UEFA Vice President, Celtic Chief Executive and Licensed Players’ Agents. 
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meetings with the representatives of the football family 21 , specific key 
stakeholders groups 22 , the representative of the Presidencies 23 , the 
Commissioners and the members of the Parliament.  
 
The Review analyzed players’ agents in the context of the specificity of sport and 
governance issues. It also made a recommendation in relation to an alternative 
European level instrument to regulate their activities which represented the 
policy preference of the Member States.  The regulation of players’ agents was 
considered to be inherent to the proper regulation of sport and compatible with 
the EU law (Arnaut 2006, p.47). Noting the problematic nature of regulation and 
supervision of players’ agents and ongoing challenges in connection with their 
activities (Arnaut 2006, p. 46), the Review specifically urged the football 
governing bodies to reinforce the control and examination of players’ agents 
aiming for transparency in their dealings (Arnaut 2006, p.88). In this connection, 
it was recommended that a regulatory system be administered by the UEFA and 
amendments to the existing system be agreed in consultation with the European 
Commission (Arnaut 2006, p.89). The Review also acknowledged a possible 
necessity of legislation at European level, potentially in form of a directive to 
achieve an effective regulation for players’ agents (Arnaut 2006, p.120). The 
analysis and recommendations under the Review also made available to the FIFA 
Task Force for the Good of the Game, the group that commissioned by FIFA to 
work on the improvements to the governance of football. The Member States 
                                                        
21 They were the FIFA President, UEFA Executive Committee and CEO, and National Associations. 
22European Club Forum involving 102 Clubs from all 52 members of UEFA, European 
Professional Football League with 14 Professional European League, FIFPro and G14 were the 
stakeholders that meetings were held with. 
23The representative of Presidencies included the UK Presidency, Austrian Presidency, Finland 
Presidency as well the European Commission and the members of the European Parliament. 
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Working Group on White Paper also took into the consideration the analysis and 
the recommendations under the Review. The regulation of players’ agents was a 
policy issue that put forward by the Group for the inclusion into the White Paper 
during the group meeting in March 2007 (Arnaut 2006, p.4). 
 
The resolution on the future of European football adopted by The Committee on 
Culture and Education (European Parliament 2007a), as its own initiative, was 
the input of the Committee into the White Paper and outlined the policy 
preference of the Committee with regards to regulation of players’ agents.  The 
procedural context of the resolution led to a close interaction between the 
Committee and the Education and Culture DG involving a parliamentary debate 
and follow up report by the Education and Culture DG on the issues addressed 
under the resolution. The report prepared by the Committee’s members, Ivo 
Belet acting as a rapporteur, had an overall objective of indicating the policy 
areas where action at European level could provide added value for Europe’s 
most popular sport, football. The Committee asked the Education and Culture DG 
to establish an action plan for European sport in general and football in 
particular setting out issues for the Commission to deal with and the instruments 
to be adopted (European Parliament 2007a, para. 9). The regulation of players’ 
agents was identified as a pressing policy issue to be addressed at European 
level and the Committee required football governing bodies at all levels in 
conjunction with the Commission to improve the regulatory framework 
governing their activities. The Committee also urged the Education and Culture 
DG to support the efforts of UEFA in the regulation of players’ agents and if 
necessary to propose a directive regarding to players’ agents which would set 
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out strict standards and examination criteria for anyone wanting to enter to the 
profession, transparency in transactions, and minimum harmonized standards 
for agents’ contracts. The Committee even considered a potential directive to 
introduce players’ agents licensing system and register at European level 
(European Parliament 2007a, para.41). 
 
The result of an intensive consultation exercise was the White Paper on Sport, 
the first comprehensive policy initiative on sport by the Education and Culture 
DG, adopted on 11 July 2007 (European Commission 2007a).24 The document 
aimed to give strategic direction on the role of sport in Europe, to elevate the 
visibility of sport in EU policy making, to encourage debate on the specific 
problems of sport and to increase the public awareness in relation to the needs 
and specificities of the sport sector (European Commission 2007a, p.2). 
Structured around three thematic sections, the White Paper covers a number of 
policy issues. The “social role of sport” focuses on the topics around what sport 
represents as a social phenomenon and particular attention is given to the issues 
of health and exercise, coordinating action in supporting anti-doping measures, 
developing the role of sport in education and training, promoting volunteering 
and citizenship, using sport as a tool for social inclusion and integration, and 
combating racism and violence. The “economic dimension of sport” considering 
the contribution of sport to the growth and creation of jobs in Europe and the 
document proposed moving towards evidence based policy on sport, in 
particular by seeking specific information and studies on its impact. The 
                                                        
24The White Paper on Sport was a communication by the Education and Culture DG and 
accompanied by the Staff Working Document, the Action Plan, the Executive Summary for Impact 
Assessment and the Impact Assessment. 
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“organization of sport” analyzes the role of each stakeholder (public or private) 
in the governance of the sport movement in Europe, with particular focus on the 
question of good governance and the relationship between EU law and the 
regulatory autonomy of the sport governing bodies. In relation to those policy 
issues, the Education and Culture DG also incorporated a detailed Action Plan, 
named after Pierre de Coubertin, containing a number of concrete actions to be 
implemented and supported in the field of sport (European Commission 2007c). 
The Action Plan was to guide the Education and Culture DG in its sport related 
activities over the years. 
 
The Education and Culture DG considered the issue of players’ agents under the 
“organization of sport” in the White Paper and decided to carry out an impact 
assessment in order to provide a clear overview of the activities of players’ 
agents in the EU and to evaluate whether EU-level action was necessary (Action 
41) (European Commission 2007a, p.14). Noting the increased activities of 
players’ agents over the years as a result of the development of a truly European 
player market and increase in players` salaries, the Education and Culture DG 
underlined in the reports the bad practices within the activities of players’ 
agents involving the instances of corruption, money laundering and trafficking 
underage players. On the other hand, it was also observed that the activities of 
players’ agents are almost always of a cross-border nature due to the integrated 
nature of the European players’ market, thus creating a difficulty for regulation. 
Hence, players’ agents were subject to different regulations in different Member 
States, whilst international federations also introduced their own regulations 
(European Commission 2007a, p.15; European Commission 2007b, p.49). 
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Acknowledging the repeated calls made, particularly by the Committee on 
Culture and Education and the stakeholders, on the EU to regulate players’ 
agents by adopting an EU legal instrument, the Education and Culture DG 
committed to carry out an impact assessment to evaluate the situation 
(European Commission 2007a, p.15; European Commission 2007b, p.5). 
 
The Aftermath of the White Paper on Sport 
The impact of the White Paper on Sport was that it provided the right context for 
a strong coordination, as defined by Zafonte and Sabatier (1998) or a greater 
level of coordination by Schlager (1995), amongst the EU policy actors on 
players’ agents. In particular, the document not only led to a coordinated 
approach to sport at European level by the Member States, the Commission, the 
Parliament and stakeholders, but also the Action Plan provided a common plan 
of action that guided their activities. According to Zafonte and Sabatier (1998), 
the development of a common plan of action to pursue their policy objectives 
and communication of it to coalition members are prerequisites for a strong 
coordination and goes beyond a weak coordination.  Schlager (1995, p.261) 
views the plan of action as a strategy used by the coalition members to 
coordinate their activities which also must be agreed and adopted for a greater 
level of coordination. A common plan of action for players’ agents was agreed 
upon by the Education and Culture DG, in the form of impact assessment, and 
communicated to policy actors. The Education and Culture DG presented the 
White Paper to the Member States and the European Parliament (European 
Commission 2007a, p.19). 
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Additionally, the White Paper also strengthened political cooperation between 
the EU policy actors, in particular between the Education and Culture DG and the 
Member States, by making it a part of the Action plan (Action 51) (European 
Commission 2007a, p.19, European Commission 2007b, p.6). In this connection, 
the Education and Culture DG committed to carry on close cooperation within 
the context of the existing informal frameworks including ministerial meetings 
with EU Sport Ministers and at administrative level by EU Sport Directors. The 
implementation and evaluation phase of the White Paper also provided the 
context for the monitoring of activities that also indicate a strong coordination 
(Zafonte and Sabatier 1998). The Education and Culture DG committed to report 
on the progression of the Action Plan through the mechanism of the Rolling 
Agenda (Action 52) (European Commission 2007a, p. 19, European Commission 
2007b, p.6). For this reason, building upon the Rolling Agenda in 2004, the 
Education and Culture DG asked the Member States to jointly define priorities for 
sport policy cooperation. The Education and Culture DG also pledged to monitor 
the progress made under each Presidency and to report to the Member States 
and the Committee on Culture and Education (European Commission 2007e, 
p.40). 
 
The Member States praised the White Paper as an important European initiative 
aiming at placing sport as a high priority in European policies and declared the 
regulation of players’ agents, particularly the identification of possible solutions 
at European level to eliminate improper practices in their activities, amongst the 
priority items for the Member States’ Rolling Agenda in the implementation 
phase of the Pierre de Coubertin Action Plan (Council of European Union 2007, 
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p.3; Council of European Union 2008a, p. 3). During the informal meeting of 
Sport Ministers under the Portuguese Presidency, the EU Sport Ministers 
expressed their support for the White Paper to strengthen political cooperation 
at European level based upon an ongoing reinforced agenda under the Action 
Plan. The Ministers emphasized the importance of close coordination between 
the Member States and the Education and Culture DG in ensuring efficient and 
timely implementation of the actions, particular in relation to priorities including 
players’ agents (Council of European Union 2007, p.3).25 With the objectives in 
mind, the Ministers took the decision to review the Member States Rolling 
Agenda of 2004 on sport, to reflect the priorities in coordination with the White 
Paper. 
 
The review of the Rolling Agenda was undertaken during the Slovenian 
Presidency and in the EU Sport Directors meeting at Brdo, Slovenia on 4th and 5th 
February 2007. The review was thematic in accordance with the White Paper 
and, known as “Ljubljana priorities”, the progression on players’ agents including 
the identification of possible European level solution for tackling bad practices 
became the key priority of the Member States alongside the elimination of 
discrimination of EU nationals in access to sport under the heading of the 
“organization of sport”. The Sport Directors also underlined the importance of 
the Member States Working Group on the White Paper to ensure a close 
coordination between the Education and Culture DG and the Member States for 
the implementation of the Action Plan.  The Directors also urged the Education 
                                                        
25  The other priority areas include; protection of minors, sport financing, exploitation of audio-
visual rights, sport betting, national teams, protection of local youth training, and the fight 
against doping. 
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and Culture DG to organize working level meetings of the Member States 
Working Group twice a year, 3-4 weeks ahead of each meeting of the Sport 
Directors and to report on the results of these meetings to the EU Sports 
Directors (Council of European Union 2008a, p.3). The EU Sports Directors also 
called on future Presidencies to focus on identified priorities and follow a 
coordinated approach. 
 
In accordance with the Slovenian Presidency conclusions on sport, under the 
French Presidency from July to December 2008, the regulation of players’ agents 
became a priority issues within the Presidency’s work programme in the field of 
sport and received a special attention. The Presidency assisted the study 
commissioned by the Education and Culture DC as a part of the impact 
assessment under the Action Plan to map out the activities of agents within the 
Member States. During the informal ministers meeting in Biarritz on 27th and 
28th November 2008, EU Sports Ministers praised the work by the Presidency 
and recognized it as an contribution made to the impact assessment related to 
players’ agents (Council of European Union 2008b). 
 
In response to the White Paper on Sport, the Committee on Culture and 
Education adopted a resolution in May 2008, again through its own initiative, 
within which the White Paper, and the Action Plan in particular, was broadly 
endorsed. The Mavrommatis Report (European Parliament, 2008), prepared by 
the Committee’s rapporteur Manolis Mavrommatis, followed the findings and 
recommendations of the Belet Report of 2007 related to players’ agents.  The 
Committee made reference to the increased activities of players’ agents as a 
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result of the development of a truly European market for players and the rise in 
the level of salaries in European football (European Parliament 2008, para. AF), 
but also emphasized that a high degree of internationalization of player market 
has led to cross-border corruption that requires attention (European Parliament 
2008, para. AG). Whilst condemning the bad practices in the activities of players’ 
agents resulting in instances of corruption, money laundering and the 
exploitation of underage players, for the Committee, cross-border corruption 
represented a European dimension of the problem and therefore, once again 
urged the Education and Culture DG to support the regulatory efforts of the sport 
governing bodies by, if necessary, presenting a proposal for a directive 
concerning players’ agents (European Parliament 2008, para. 100). 
 
The Education and Culture DG launched an independent study on sports agents 
(KEA et al. 2009) in January 2009 as an initial stage of the impact assessment 
under the Action Plan and the study was published in November 2009. The study 
was an important component of policy analysis for the EU policy actors and 
contributed to their ongoing learning on players’ agents.  Although under the 
White Paper the Education and Culture DG only decided to carry out impact 
assessment with an objective of providing a clear overview of the activities of 
players’ agents, the terms of reference for the study extended beyond players’ 
agents to the analysis of the situation regarding sports agents in all sports. The 
specific objectives of the study were; to chart the current situation regarding 
sports agents in the EU; to identify and analyze the problems within the activities 
of sports agents; to identify private and public stakeholders involved in the 
regulation of sports agents and the relevant laws and regulations governing their 
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activities; and to assess to what extent these laws and regulations are adequate 
to deal with the problem posed by the activities of sports agents (KEA et al. 2009, 
p.17).  
 
The study was important for policy analysis and learning of the actors and its 
findings represented an important input into the analytical debate on the issue.  
The study concluded that football is by far the sport with the largest number of 
agents in Europe and players’ agents are active in all Member States (KEA et al. 
2009, p.4). The complex and incoherent nature of the regulation of agents’ 
activities was highlighted by the study. It was noted that there are different 
regulations applicable in different Member States alongside specific regulations 
adopted by international sports federations. The scope of these regulations 
varies considerably which creates regulatory problem. Additionally, the study 
identified the problems with the activities of agents that give rise to ethical 
issues, such as dual representation and conflict of interest; secret commission 
payments in connection with transfer deals; the exploitation of young players; 
unregulated recruitment amongst academies; and lack of transparency. These 
problems mostly have a cross-border dimension due to the integrated and 
international nature of the player market in Europe. For these reasons, the study 
concluded that there is a need to improve the regulatory framework, but viewed 
this as a responsibility of sport governing bodies. The EU could play a role in 
encountering the problems within the activities of agents by assisting sport 
governing bodies through facilitating structured dialogue and coordinating 
action. 
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The results of the study, especially the findings relating to criminal activities 
carried out in connection with sport where the involvement of players’ agents 
cited, led to analytical interaction (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, p.46) 
between the Committee on Culture and Education and the Education and Culture 
DG. Doris Pack, then the Chair of the Committee on Culture and Education, 
submitted an oral question on players’ agents to the Education and Culture DG 
on 10th of March 2010 (European Parliament 2010) followed by a debate.26 The 
parliamentary debate was held on the 15th June 2010 and attended by the 
Commissioner responsible for sport, Androulla Vassiliou and a number of 
members of the Committee on Culture and Education27, including Ivo Belet of the 
Committee who was the rapporteur for the parliamentary report of 2007 on the 
future of professional football in Europe. The Committee members particularly 
underlined the problems identified by the study, particularly focusing on the 
dealing of players’ agents with underage players, and reiterated its calls on the 
Commission for EU legal initiative to govern the activities of players’ agents. 
Doris Pack also tabled a motion for resolution at the same procedural file and the 
resolution was adopted by the Parliament on 17th June 2010. The Education and 
Culture DG responded to the resolution by the Committee on 21st September 
2010 (European Commission 2010). In its response, the DG confirmed its 
consensus on the points raised by the Committee and confirmed the ongoing 
analysis on the regulation of players’ agents in the form of impact assessment to 
                                                        
26The procedure followed was pursuant to Rule 115(5) of Rules of Procedures for the European 
Parliament. 
27The members that attended the debate on behalf of the Committee on Culture and Education 
were; Dorirs Pack (the chair of the Committee), Ivo Belet (the member of the Committee), Mary 
Honeyball (the member of the Committee),Emma McClarkin (the member of the Committee), 
Marie-Christine Vergiat (the member of the Committee), Sean Kelly (the member of the 
Committee), Piotr Borys (the member of the Committee), Emine Bozkurt (Substitute member of 
the Committee), Iosif Matula (Substitute member of the Committee). 
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assess what type of action might be needed at European Level (European 
Commission 2010). 
 
The impact of the new competency under the Lisbon Treaty 
The Lisbon Treaty, for the first time, incorporated a specific competency for 
sport under Article 165.28 The fundamental characteristic of Article 165 of TFEU 
is that the competency provided is only a soft law competency for the EU 
meaning that only action of a complementary, coordinating and supporting 
nature can be implemented (Gardiner et al. 2012). Article 165 (1) requires the 
EU to contribute the promotion of European sporting issues, 165(2) refers to the 
EU actions to be aimed at developing the European dimension in sport and 165 
(3) expects the EU and the Member States to foster cooperation at an 
international level in the field of sport and education.29 The measures that can be 
taken by the EU are limited to the promotion and fostering of cooperation 
meaning that legislative measures may not be adopted seeking to harmonize the 
actions of the Member States. Additionally, the actions at European level need to 
                                                        
28The final text of the Treaty agreed on the European Council meeting on 18th and 19th November 
2007 in Lisbon following the drafting work of Intergovernmental Conference under the 
Portuguese Presidency and it was signed by all Member States in Lisbon on 13 December 2007. 
The Treaty was ratified by all Member States and entered into force on 1 December 2009. 
29Full text as reads; 
Article 165 (1): “The Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while 
taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its 
social and educational function. 
Article 165 (2):“Union action shall be aimed at; developing the European dimension in sport, by 
promoting fairness and openness in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies 
responsible for sports, and by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and 
sportswomen, especially the youngest sportsmen and sportswomen”. 
Article 165 (3):“The Union and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and 
the competent international organizations in the field of education and sport, in particular the 
Council of Europe”. 
Articles 165 (4): “In order to contribute to the achievements of the objectives referred to in this 
Article: a) The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, after consulting with the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonization of the laws and 
regulations of the Member States; b) the Council, on proposal from the Commission, shall adopt 
recommendations. 
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be related to the development of the European dimension of sport which is 
required to provide an added value to the actions of the Member States. Prior to 
the Lisbon Treaty, the EU was not granted competency to operate a direct sport 
policy, under the principle of conferral, and was only able exert influence over 
sport via other competencies (Parrish 2003a; Takorski et al. 2004; Van den 
Bogaert and Vermeersch 2006). The new competency for the first time enables 
the EU to develop a direct supportive and complementary sport policy through 
funding programmes on a number of sport related policy issues and to develop 
the evidence base research on a number of those issues.  
 
The inclusion of sport in the Lisbon Treaty led to a strengthened political 
cooperation between the EU and the Member States in an effort to further the 
European dimension in sport in line with Article 165. In this connection, the 
European Council modified the list of Council configurations in order to reflect 
the changes made by the Treaty and incorporated policy on sport in the 
Education, Youth, Culture and Sport configuration. The Education and Culture 
DG’s communication in sport in 2011, titled Developing the European Dimension 
in Sport, and the Council’s resolution on EU Work Plan for Sport (2011-2014) 
provided the framework and principles for European cooperation on sport 
policy. The Member States, the Education and Culture DG, the Presidencies of the 
Council were asked to work together along agreed guiding principles, to focus on 
priority themes and to implement specific actions. In particular, the Work Plan 
aimed to promote a cooperative and concerted approach among the Member 
States and the Education and Culture DG delivering added value in the field of 
sport at the European level and to address transnational challenges using a 
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coordinated EU approach (Council of European Union 2011, para 9). In this 
regard, the Work Plan and the actions determined by the Education and Culture 
DG within its communication provided the framework for all policy actors to 
cooperate in a coordinated way. Furthermore, the Work Plan also outlined work 
methods in order to support political cooperation, in particular to implement 
plans of actions. The methods include the establishment of informal expert 
groups to report on priority teams, Presidency conferences, informal meetings of 
EU Sport Ministers and EU Sport Directors, and studies and conferences 
organized by the Education and Culture DG (Council of European Union 2011, 
Section 3).  
 
Within this context, both the Education and Culture DG and the Council 
incorporated the regulation of players’ agents into the framework of activities. 
Within the communication, the Education and Culture DG underlined the cross-
border nature of the activities of players’ agents and viewed the associated 
problems as a transnational challenge. In this connection, the issue of players’ 
agents was considered as an area that an action at EU level can significant added 
value (European Commission 2011, p.3 and p.12). 30 Reiterating that the White 
Paper still remains an appropriate policy document for EU level activities related 
to sport and the new communication builds upon the achievements of the White 
Paper and do not replaces it (European Commission 2011, p.2), the Education 
and Culture DG decided to organize a conference in order to further explore 
                                                        
30The Commissioned made reference to the findings of the study on agents in 2009 and 
considered that the main problems identified include financial crimes and the exploitation of 
young players were ethical in nature threatening the fairness of sporting competition and the 
integrity of sports people. The Commission therefore shows a European dimension could be 
developed by illustrating the link between the problems related to the activities of agents and the 
impact upon the sport.  
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possible ways for EU institutions and representatives of the sport movement 
(federations, leagues, clubs, players and agents) to improve the situation with 
regard to the activities of sports agents (European Commission 2011, p.13).  The 
Council, under the Work Plan31, also recognized the themes identified by the 
Education and Culture DG within the White Paper and its new communication to 
serve as a basis for future cooperation noting both documents viewed players’ 
agents within the organization of sport.  The Council prioritized the issue of 
players’ agents under the theme of the integrity of sport for the Education and 
Culture DG and the Member States to work on (Council of European Union 2011, 
Section 2). In order to address the issue, the Council agreed to establish an 
informal Expert Group on Good Governance that was mandated to carry out 
action relating to players’ agents, especially carrying out follow up work on the 
conference to be organized by the Education and Culture DG. 
 
The conference was organized by the Education and Culture DG on 9th and 10th 
November 2011 as a part of the ongoing impact assessment. Building upon the 
2009 study on agents, the conference became another platform providing a set 
up to carry out policy analysis involving information exchange, in particular on 
best practices in place at national and international level (European Commission 
2011c). The conference was attended by Androulla Vassiliou, the European 
Commissioner responsible for sport, Ivo Belet, the member of the Committee on 
Culture and Education and Jacek Foks, the representative of the Polish EU 
Presidency in addition to a number of stakeholders including FIFA, UEFA, FIFPro 
                                                        
31Recognizing the need for reinforced cooperation at European level for sport under the new 
competency, the Work Plan was prepared during the Hungarian EU Presidency in conjunction 
with the Education and Culture DG and the Member States setting out guiding principles and 
priority areas for developing European dimension of in sport. 
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the European Professional League Association (EPFL), the European Club 
Association (ECA), and the European Football Agents Association (EFAA). The 
main points of discussion included the new regulations of FIFA on working with 
intermediaries, the findings of the study on agents, the general position of 
stakeholders on the issue, the regulatory position in sports other than football 
and possible solutions to regulatory problems (European Commission 2011d). 
 
The Committee on Culture and Education, meanwhile, adopted another 
resolution in order to contribute to the progression made on players’ agents in 
the context of ongoing impact assessment. The Fisas Report, prepared by the 
Committee’s member Fisas Ayxela Santiago acting as a rapporteur, expressed the 
need for concerted action between sport governing bodies and public authorities 
for the regulation of players’ agents by effective sanctioning those who infringe 
the rules (European Parliament 2011, para AO). In this context, the Member 
States were asked to supplement the existing regulatory provisions (European 
Parliament 2011, para. 77) and sport governing bodies to cooperate with 
Member States’ authorities to eradicate corrupt practices by players’ agents 
(European Parliament 2011, para. 78). The Committee also called upon the 
Education and Culture DG, in cooperation with sport governing bodies, to draw 
up and implement European licensing and registration system accompanied by a 
code of conduct and a sanctioning mechanism (European Parliament 2011, para. 
75). The Committee proposed that sport federations set up a non-public 
European register of agents which would list the names of the players they 
represent and the Committee viewed such initiative as important to improve 
transparency and the protection of minor players (European Parliament 2011, 
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para. 76). The report represents another significant contribution to the issue by 
the Committee and outlined measures for the Education and Culture DG, the 
Member States and stakeholders to adopt. 
 
The Expert Group on Good Governance held meetings32 to discuss the regulation 
of players’ agents as mandated under the EU Work Plan for Sport. The meetings 
were a platform where the EU policy actors and stakeholders engaged in 
analytical discussions around the issue and the result was recommendations by 
the Group into the ongoing works of the EU policy actors. The meetings were 
organized by the Education and Culture DG and attended by the representatives 
of Member States and a number of stakeholders. Recognizing that the issue 
became a pressing topic that needs to be carefully examined as a result of 
significant role played by players’ agents in European transfer market and the 
economic importance of transfers in football (Council of European Union 2013, 
p.2), the meetings particularly focused on the FIFA’s decision to reform the 
licensing system and its new proposed regulatory framework. These meetings 
and subsequent recommendations represented significant inputs for policy 
analysis, especially for the new regulatory framework by FIFA. 
 
Conclusion 
The Education and Culture DG, the Committee on Culture and Education and the 
Member States, the Maximalists of the socio-cultural advocacy coalition, engaged 
in an intensified degree of coordinated activity over the years in relation to the 
                                                        
32The Group had 3 meetings on the issue of agents. The first meeting was on 9th April 2013, the 
second one was on 18th July 2013 and the final one was 7th November 2013. The 
recommendations were published in December 2013. 
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regulation of players’ agents. The characteristics of the EU policy making 
impacted on their activities providing a supportive environment for 
coordination. The legal context of the activities were defined by the Member 
States, initially through non-binding but highly influential declarations on sport, 
in particular the Nice Declaration, and then the new competency under the 
Lisbon Treaty. The legal basis of the EU actions in the field of sport provided 
guiding principles in accordance with the policy core beliefs of the EU policy 
actors; the protection and promotion of socio-cultural values of sport at 
European level. The Rolling Agendas of the Member States added further 
impetus to the activities of the policy actors which set out priority items to be 
taken into account for the EU sports policy. The EU policy actors also exploited 
the resources available at their disposal at institutional level to steer the 
direction of the policy in line with their policy core beliefs. Those sources were 
the basis of their activities but also provided the institutional context for 
coordination involving repeated interactions and analytical policy debates 
allowing them to exchange information and develop policy preferences with 
regards to players’ agents. In particular, the Education and Culture DG used 
policy documents, consultations, conferences and studies to develop 
understanding of problem parameters and to examine the possibility of 
European level action. The Member States, meanwhile, used soft law resources at 
their disposal including Treaty declarations and resolutions following the Lisbon 
Treaty. Although their activities prior to the new competency were under the 
informal framework outside the formal structure of the Council, the new 
configuration under the post-Lisbon era reinforced coordination at European 
level. The Committee on Culture and Education particularly focused on putting 
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impetus to the Education and Culture DG for European level action through 
reports, resolutions and parliamentary debates providing platform for 
interactions and policy analysis.  
 
A minimum degree of coordinated activity, or weak coordination, amongst the 
EU policy actors was evident during the period from the Nice Declaration of 
2000 to the White Paper on Sport in 2007. The activities purely involved 
interactions and information exchange between the actors. The consultation 
framework established by the Education and Culture DG and the activities of the 
Member States under the framework of the Rolling Agenda aimed at identifying 
policy issues for addressing specific characteristics and social function of sport at 
European level. During the consultation process, the regulation of players’ agents 
was identified as a topic, especially by the European sports federations, where 
that European level action may provide an added value to the regulatory efforts 
of the football governing bodies. The Independent Review by the Member States 
and the Belet Report by the Committee on Education and Culture also provided 
analytical debate for EU action and even more the Belet report called upon the 
Education and Culture DG to propose a directive specific to players’ agents.  As a 
result, the regulation of players’ agents moved into the policy agenda of the EU 
policy actors and under the White Paper on Sport the Education and Culture DG 
decided to carry out the impact assessment to analyze the possibility of 
European level action.  The White Paper on Sport added an imputes to the 
activities of the EU policy actors and a stronger coordination observed on the 
issues not only involving interaction but also a common plan of action, in form of 
impact assessment, guiding the activities of the policy actors. In particularly, the 
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issue became a priority item for the Member States following revision of the 
Rolling Agenda. The new competency under the Lisbon Treaty reinforced 
European level cooperation and the Work Plan of the Council for sport and the 
Education and Culture DG’s communication provided further impetus to the 
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Table 3 
Players’ Agents: The EU Policy Actors and Coordinated Activity  
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Chapter 6 
Selective Perception: Policy Core Beliefs, Information and Policy Analysis 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Introduction 
Theoretical analysis of the ACF pays special attention to policy-oriented learning 
within the activity of public policy making (Sabatier 1988; Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier 1993; Sabatier 1998; Sabatier and Weible 2007). The process of 
learning involves acquiring new information related to policy issues including 
problem parameters, the factors affecting these issues, the effectiveness of 
alternative policy instruments and their impacts on the issues. The model of the 
individual chosen by the ACF, which is instrumentally rational but also with 
cognitive limitations particularly in processing information and policy analysis 
(Sabatier 1986, 1987; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier and Weible 
2007, 2014), impacts on learning; actors are guided by heuristics in order to 
make sense of acquired information. The role performed by the belief systems of 
the actors, as common heuristics, in the context of policy-oriented learning is 
that beliefs, especially policy core beliefs, perform perceptual filtering in 
selecting and interpreting information (Sabatier 1988; Freudenburg and 
Gramling 2002; Sabatier and Weible 2007; Weible 2008; Matti and Sandtrom 
2013; Jenkins-Smith et al 2014). In other words, the policy actors use selective 
perception to select information and other variables to confirm their policy core 
beliefs whilst dismissing information challenging those beliefs (Freudenburg and 
Gramling 2002; Norhstedt and Weible 2010; Heikkila and Gerlak 2013). The 
impact of such selective filtering is significant with regards to the process of 
learning, but also on the dynamics of advocacy coalitions, causing a resistance to 
belief change and also stability to the structure of coalition (Sabatier 1988, 1998; 
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Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier and Weible 2007). Thus, the beliefs of 
actors involved in public policy making shape that policy and selective 
perception means that the policy is more likely to develop so as to confirm the 
beliefs rather than to challenge them. 
 
This chapter examines the EU policy actors’ (The Education and Culture DG, the 
Parliamentary Committee on Culture and Education and the Member States) 
selective perception in processing information in the context of policy core 
beliefs (the socio-cultural regulation of sport) within policy analysis of the 
regulation of players’ agents and the process of policy-oriented learning at 
European level. In other words, the chapter investigates to what extent the pre-
existing policy core beliefs of the actors affect the selection and interpretation of 
acquired information related to players’ agents. In doing so, the chapter aims to 
deduce policy core beliefs by evidencing selection and interpretation of 
particular information by the EU policy actors that confirm their policy core 
beliefs.   
 
The chapter firstly commences by analyzing the period between the Nice 
Declaration in 2000 and the White Paper on Sport in 2007. During the period 
policy-oriented learning related to the problems associated with players’ agents 
was evident and that learning stimulated policy analysis as the actors perceived 
the problems as threats to their policy core beliefs. As a result, they sought 
further information on the issue whilst also developing a policy position. The 
components of that policy position and the conceptual relationship of selective 
perception with that position are examined in detail. The chapter then moves on 
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to examine the aftermath of the White Paper on Sport and identifies that the 
Education Culture DG’s decision to carry out an impact assessment on the 
regulation of players’ agents caused a conflict between the EU policy actors, in 
particular between the Education and Culture DG and the Committee on Culture 
and Education in the Parliament. The conflict relates to the secondary aspects of 
the actors’ beliefs system (policy instrument). The result of the conflict was an 
analytical debate between the Education and Culture DG and the Committee on 
Culture and Education. In the discourse of analytical debate, selective perception 
guided the actors to select specific information to elaborate and to justify their 
specific policy position (the overall findings of the research in relation to the 
evidence of selective perception on the issue of players’ agents are presented in 
Tables 4 and 5). These findings add also to our understanding of the scenario 
depicted by Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993, p.45) for the process of policy-
oriented learning and the role played by policy analysis and information which 
represents the original contribution of the research. 
 
Learning Related to the Problems and Developing a Policy Position  
The preparatory phase of the White Paper on Sport provided an institutional 
context for policy-oriented learning by the EU policy actors with regards to the 
regulation of players’ agents as per coordinated activity investigated in chapter 
5. In particular, the interaction with sport governing bodies involving an 
exchange of information on the issue was instrumental for that learning in 
understanding problems related to the activities of players’ agents and 
developing policy perspectives. The consultation process, entitled the EU and 
Sport: Matching Expectations, enabled the Education and Culture DG to interact 
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with the wider European sport movement, as well as with the Member States 
and the Committee on Culture and Education, and to acquire information with 
regards to players’ agents. The meeting with the European sport federations in 
September 2006, which was also attended by FIFA and UEFA33 and purely 
focused on governance issues of sport in Europe, was an important platform to 
discuss the regulation of agents with football governing bodies. For the Member 
States34, the working process for the European Independent Sport Review 
(Arnout 2006) had a similar impact on their learning. Football was the subject 
matter of the Review and there were a number of consultation meetings with 
football governing bodies and relevant stakeholders, facilitating interaction and 
information exchange. 35 The Committee on Culture and Education in Parliament 
had also learned about players’ agents through engaging with the consultation 
processes36 and various internal and external reports on the EU and sport. In 
particular, the working paper, entitled Professional Sport in the Internal Market 
(European Parliament 2005), commissioned by the Committee on Internal 
Market and Consumer Protection, and the Stevens Report37 commissioned by the 
Premier League in the UK were very influential for the Committee.  Within this 
                                                        
33 The meeting was one of the largest meetings attended by 30 federations and their 
representatives including the International Olympic Committee, the European Olympic 
Committee, International Basketball Federation, FIFA and UEFA. 
34 The review is considered to be the right policy document reflecting the beliefs and perceptions 
of the Member States, although prepared by independent group of authors. The reason for this is 
that firstly, the final and complete version of the Review incorporated thoughts and feedbacks of 
the EU Sports Ministers following their meeting in Brussels on 19 September 2006 (Arnout 2006, 
p.14). Furthermore, the Review clearly states that the Terms of References were drafted in 
consultation between UEFA and under the UK Presidency, involving some of the Member States. 
The EU Sports Minsters were part of the governance of the report (Arnout 2006 p.149). 
35 In particular, the Review purely focused on football as a case study for analysis and also 
involved the representatives of five big Football leagues in Europe (England, Spain, France, 
Germany and Italy) where there is a large concentration of players’ agents’ activities and their 
numbers are the highest. 
36 The members of the European Parliament attended a majority of the consultation meetings. 
37 “Inquiry into Alleged irregular Payments from Transfer Dealing” was an inquiry carried out by 
Quest Limited on behalf of the Premier League and the final report was published in June 2007. 
The report was generally referred as “Stevens Report”. 
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context, the EU policy actors became aware of the problems associated with the 
activities of players’ agents which stimulated policy analysis and led to the 
development of a policy position. 
 
The policy position of the actors on the issue was in line with their policy core 
beliefs. The significant components of the policy position were their perceptions 
of the problems associated with their policy core (the problems with the 
activities of players’ agents are detrimental to the socio-cultural values and its 
role in Europe) and their perspectives on their secondary beliefs (in order to 
tackle the problems there is a need for a more effective regulatory framework 
governing players’ agents and it requires action at European level possibility 
through the adoption of a European legal initiative in form of a directive on 
players’ agents). The policy position was the result of the process of policy-
oriented learning, particularly related to the problems, involving the acquisition 
of information from sports governing bodies, and from internal policy analysis.  
 
The policy position became evident within a number of policy documents at 
European level. The Member States, through the Independent European Sport 
Review (Arnout 2006), made reference to a number of on-going challenges in 
connection with the regulations of players’ agents.  These included dealing with 
non-licensed agents, tackling the involvement of several agents working on the 
same transaction and regulating payments to agents for the protection of players 
and clubs (Arnaut 2006, p.46). According to the Member States, these were 
“pressing concerns for the efficient administration and financial well-being of 
football and for the image of the game” (Arnaut 2006, p.46). They proposed a 
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European players’ agents directive to be implemented to provide the tools for 
the effective regulation of players’ agents at European level (Arnaut 2006, p.120 
&131).  The Committee on Culture and Education, additionally, focused on the 
economic reality surrounding the activities of players’ agents and called upon the 
Education and Culture DG to support the efforts of football governing bodies in 
regulating players’ agents by presenting a legislative proposal for a directive 
(European Parliament 2007, para. 44). The Education and Culture DG, in the 
White Paper on Sport, underlined the bad practices in the activities of players’ 
agents and claimed that “these practices are damaging for sport in general and 
raise serious governance questions” (European Commission 2007a, p.15) and 
committed itself to carry out an impact assessment to establish the necessity of 
European level of action (European Commission 2007a, p.16). Consequently, it 
became evident that the EU policy actors were determined to find a solution to 
the problems of players’ agents at European level. 
 
The impact of selective perception in the process of learning (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1999; Freudenburg and Gramling 2002; Sabatier and Weible 
2007; Norhstedt and Weible 2010), i.e. perceptual filtering performed through 
the policy core beliefs of the EU policy actors in acquiring information and 
engaging in policy analysis, was multifaceted. Firstly, the actors, by selecting 
particular information related to the problems that were perceived as threats to 
their policy core meant that they developed a policy position corresponding with 
their policy core beliefs, i.e. sport in Europe has socio-cultural values and 
functions that need to be protected and promoted. Secondly, the actors also 
selected information to support their policy position, in particular related to 
  162 
secondary aspects of their belief system in support of European level action. In 
this connection, the actors focused on information contained within the reports 
and written submissions by the sport governing bodies and stakeholders, 
including the UEFA’s strategic policy document, Vision Europe (UEFA 2005), and 
the Stevens Report by the Premier League. Conversely, the analysis of the 
regulation of players’ agents from a single market perspective received very little 
attention and any such information was also selected in a way to support their 
policy position. The findings of the CFI in the Piau case and the analysis in the 
report by the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection were 
either totally ignored or selected in such ways as to support their policy core.  
 
Both, the Member States and the Education and Culture DG, highlighted the 
factors that contributed to the increasing activities of players’ agents, which 
echoed the analysis of UEFA in Vision Europe. UEFA emphasized the shifting 
bargaining power between clubs and players within which players became more 
powerful as a result of the liberalization of the player market following the 
Bosman judgment. The shift in bargaining power meant that players were able to 
negotiate higher salaries, which in turn contributed to the increase within 
numbers of players’ agents entering into the profession with a view to operating 
in a lucrative European player market (UEFA 2005, p. 21). However, UEFA also 
underlined the lack of effective regulations for players’ agents by claiming that 
“this area has been more or less unregulated in European football to date, despite 
the existence of regulations” and “vast sums of money have been effectively ‘lost’ to 
football” (UEFA 2005, p.21). According to UEFA, under normal circumstances, 
players’ agents in professional football would be properly regulated, act ethically 
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and would not distort sporting values.38  The Member States also emphasized 
that the increased commercial revenues and consequential increase in salaries 
paid to players, combined with de facto liberalization of the European player 
market, actually created another service industry, i.e the profession of players’ 
agents, in European football (Arnaut 2006, p.18 and p.46). They also emphasized 
the danger of compromising important sporting values and undermining the 
social function of sport against an overly commercial approach to it (Arnaut 
2006, p.19). The Education and Culture DG made reference to the development 
of a truly European market for players and the rise in the level of salaries for 
players which meant that players and clubs sought the services of players’ agents 
for negotiating the contracts in an increasingly legal environment (European 
Commission 2007a, p.15; European Commission 2007e, p.49). These analyses 
within the official policy documents of the EU policy actors illustrate that the 
analyses by UEFA found their way into those documents. 
 
The EU policy actors particularly selected the problems related to the activities 
of players’ agents and highlighted the role played by players’ agents with regards 
to some of the other problems within European football including corruption, 
money laundering and the exploitation of minors.  According to the actors, these 
problems constituted criminal activities and significantly impacted upon the 
socio-cultural values of sport (European Commission 2007e, p.51; European 
Parliament 2007a, para. E). The Member States considered the regulation of 
players’ agents as a notorious problem at European level and particularly 
                                                        
38 In Vision Europe, UEFA also list a number of socio-cultural values of football that the body 
believes in and stands for. According to UEFA, football is entertainment, it is educational, it is part 
of European culture, it keeps people healthy and fit, it is a valuable activity for society (UEFA 
2005, p.11). 
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underlined regulatory problems based upon a written submission by the French 
Football League during the consultation period.39 Unlicensed agents, the work of 
a number of agents on the same transfer and irregularities of payment to agents 
were considered to be on-going challenges in connection with the regulation of 
players’ agents (Arnaut 2006, p. 46).  
 
With regards to money laundering, both the Member States and the Education 
and Culture DG, noted the risk that sport was being used for such criminal 
activities, and money flows on transactions in football involved a particular risk 
of money laundering. Amongst those transactions, player transfers and 
payments to players’ agents were deemed to be particularly problematic (Arnaut 
2006 p.90; European Commission 2007b p.47 and p.51-52). Higher financial 
demands by players were considered to be encouraged by players’ agents 
contributing to the financial problems of clubs (Arnaut 2006, p.82). In 
connection with the exploitation of players who were minors, there were 
concerns that the exploitation was an ongoing phenomenon in European 
football. There were reports in relation to several European countries, including 
Belgium, France, Switzerland and Italy, that international networks formed and 
operated by players’ agents were trafficking young players from Africa and Latin 
America to Europe. When the clubs did not select those players, they were 
abandoned by players’ agents without any proper work papers and left exposed 
to further exploitation (Arnaut 2006, p.91; European Commission 2007b, p.50). 
 
                                                        
39 Footnote 53 of the Review indicated that the relevant section is based upon a written 
submission by French Football League (Arnout 2006, p.46). France traditionally follows an 
interventionist approach to support in order to upheld its socio-cultural values and protect 
public interest and the statement was a clear reflection of that. 
  165 
The Committee on Culture and Education particularly pointed out the economic 
reality surrounding the activities of players’ agents and took into consideration 
the analysis and recommendations of the Stevens Report in the UK (European 
Parliament 2007b, para.3). The Stevens Report was a result of an independent 
inquiry commissioned by the Premier League in March 2006, following reports 
of corruption and fraud in English football.40 Lord Stevens was appointed in 
particular to investigate any irregularities, in the form of unauthorized or 
fraudulent payments to managers, clubs or players’ agents, in player transfers 
involving Premier League clubs. There were a total of 362 transfer deals 
examined as a part of the procedure and there were 17 transfers in which 
irregularities were observed, these involved 15 players’ agents. 41 At the end of 
the investigation the football governing bodies, particularly FIFA and the English 
Football Association, were urged to investigate the matters further and there 
were 38 recommendations made in order to improve the financial transparency 
of transfers. The majority of recommendations were eventually incorporated 
into the new regulations of players’ agents adopted by the English Football 
Association (KEA et al. 2009, p. 160&161). The Committee on Culture and 
Education particularly selected these findings and recommendations of the 
                                                        
40 The inquiry was the result of a number of reports in English media with regards to financial 
irregularities in English football. For instance, Swedish football coach Sven Goran Eriksson, who 
was the head coach of English National Team during 2002 and 2006 World Cups, hinted that he 
knew coaches that accept payments to facilitate transfers. The BBC programme, “Panorama”, also 
revealed corruption in English football. Through use of hidden cameras, the programme showed 
meetings between players’ agents, players, managers and senior club officials. For more details 
on these reports, see KEA, Study on sports agents in the European Union: A study commissioned by 
the European Commission, (2009), p. 115. 
41 Some of these transfers involve a high profile players including striker Didier Drogba, from 
Olympique de Marseille to Chelsea, goalkeeper Petr Cech, from Stade Rennais to Chelsea, and 
defender Jean-Alain Baumsong, from Rangers to Newcastle United. For details, see KEA et al. 
(2009), p. 115. 
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Stevens Report to support its policy position regarding the policy preferences for 
a directive. 
 
The EU policy actors also recognized a critical need for more effective regulation 
of players’ agents in Europe in order to overcome the problems. The Member 
States and the Committee on Culture and Education emphasized the need to 
reform the existing regulatory system and the necessity of European level action. 
The Member States believed that without reforming the existing regulatory 
system European football would continue to suffer significant damage to its 
reputation in Europe (Arnaut 2006, p.88). The Committee on Culture and 
Education claimed that the lack of clear standards for players’ agents has had an 
enormous impact on football, and indicated this is in itself warranted new 
legislation to be considered (European Parliament 2007b, p.2). In doing so, both 
the Member States and the Committee on Culture and Education particularly 
focused on specific stimuli that supported their proposed policy instrument in 
accordance with their policy core beliefs.   
 
The Member States, especially taking into consideration submissions by the G-
1442 and the necessity for more rigorous forms of regulatory enforcement, 
expressed the possibility of a system involving a stronger role for UEFA, 
particularly in overseeing adequate enforcement of the regulations (Arnaut 
2006, p.47). Underlining the General Court’s recognition of the regulatory 
                                                        
42 G-14 was a group of some of the European leading clubs representing European clubs. In 
financial terms it covered 35% of the professional football market in Europe at the time. It was 
also the only international club organization in the EU and which eventually became the 
European Club Association (ECA). For more information on G-14, see European Parliament 
(2005), p.93. 
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functions of football governing bodies under the Piau judgment, football 
authorities were urged to reinforce the control and examination of players’ 
agents whilst taking greater care in monitoring and enforcement. Evaluating the 
investigation undertaken by the Commission and the legal analysis under the 
Piau judgment, the Member States underlined the need to reform the system in 
dialogue with EU institutions, preferably through formal consultation between 
UEFA and the Commission (Arnaut 2006, p.89).  
 
The Member States and the Committee on Culture and Education also proposed a 
European players’ agents directive as a tool for adequate regulation of players’ 
agent at European level and to support the efforts of football governing bodies, 
particularly UEFA.43 The proposed directive would include provisions on strict 
examination criteria and standards for acquiring the status of players’ agent, 
transparency in transactions particularly focusing on remunerations, minimum 
harmonized standards for agency contracts including length of contract, method 
of termination and non-competition clause, an efficient monitoring and 
disciplinary system for European sport governing bodies, the introduction of an 
agent licensing system, no dual representation and payments to agents by 
players (Arnaut 2006, p.120 & 131; European Parliament 2007a, para. 44).   
 
Nonetheless, both the Member States and the Committee on Culture and 
Education ignored some of the analysis of UEFA in Vision Europe and the General 
Court’s finding under the Piau judgment, which was also contained in the report, 
                                                        
43 Under the Review, reference was made to the existing directive for commercial agents, the 
Council Directive 86/653 of 18 December 1986, and argued that a similar tool should be 
employed in the case of players’ agents. 
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Professional Sport in the Internal Market, of the Committee on the Internal 
Market and Consumer Protection. UEFA analyzed the division of competences 
between FIFA and the confederations with a view to defining more clearly the 
tasks and competences, so as to complete them in the most efficient way for 
football. Noting that there was already areas of overlapping work underway at 
European level, including cross-border competitions and match agents, UEFA 
clearly indicated that the regulation of players’ agents was within the 
competency of FIFA (UEFA 2005, p.33). However, the Member States and the 
Committee on Culture and Education clearly ignored the position of UEFA on 
players’ agents and instead supported the idea of a system that involved a 
stronger role for UEFA. The Member States even claimed that the system should 
be administered by UEFA in Europe (Arnaut 2006, p.89). Consequently, this 
analysis by the Member States and the Committee on Culture and Education 
highlight the fact that they clearly dismissed the position of UEFA with regards to 
the regulation of players’ agents so as to support their policy position, in 
particular their policy preferences for more effective regulation in Europe. 
 
Additionally, the report of the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection carried out extensive analysis of the existing regulatory framework 
from a single market perspective, especially focusing on the findings of the 
General Court under the Piau case, which was also completely ignored by the 
Committee on Culture and Education. The report particularly outlined FIFA’s 
lack of regulatory authority to unilaterally draft the regulations applicable to 
players’ agents, due to it not having the formal authority over players agents’; 
players’ agents are not members of FIFA but of the national associations instead. 
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The report further stated that there is also no reason for FIFA to regulate 
players’ agents on the basis of specificity of sport.44 The implications of this 
analysis for UEFA is that its status is one of a private entity and it lacks legislative 
power to regulate players’ agents. This actually undermines the role of UEFA in 
regulating players’ agents as proposed by the Member States and the Committee 
on Culture and Education. The report further argued that the profession of 
agents would fall under the services directive45, meaning that players’ agents 
would be able to freely perform their activities in the Member States regardless 
of the FIFA regulations. Viewing players’ agents as private employment agencies, 
the report also stressed that players’ agents needed to be consulted in the 
discussions concerning their regulation and that the IAFA46, the collective 
organization representing players agents, could be involved in dialogues 
(European Parliament 2005, p.50). Hence, the report recommended the 
regulation of players’ agents to be considered under the social dialogue47 at EU 
level involving all stakeholders, including the representatives of players’ agents 
(European Parliament 2005, p.75). Yet, the Member States and the Committee on 
Culture and Education ignored these analyses in order to support their policy 
position related to European level action. 
                                                        
44 This analysis related to the specificity of sport and the regulation of players’ agents  was taken 
from the Piau judgement. 
45 The Services Directive (2006/123/EC) was then at proposal stage and adopted in 2006 and 
implemented by all Member States in 2009. For more details on the directive see 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/services/services-directive/index_en.htm. 
46 IAFA (International Association for Football Agents) was established by Rob Jansen, a players’ 
agent, in order to represent the agents. The association was eventually re-branded as the 
European Football Agents Associations (EFAA) and recognized by the European Commission as a 
stakeholder in the process of social dialogue. For the objectives of the EFAA in relation to the 
regulations of players’ agents, see Branco Martins (2007).  
47 The social dialogue is embedded in the Treaty articles 137 and 138 and brings together 
workers, employees and the social partners to discuss and create a regulatory framework for the 
economic sector that they operate. For further details see, European Parliament (2005), pp.68-
71. 
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On the other hand, the Education and Culture DG focused on a competition law 
analysis of the regulation of players’ agents and the complexity of the regulatory 
scene in order to justify its decision for the impact assessment. Although 
acknowledging the impact of bad practices in the activities of players’ agents on 
the values of sport at European level (European Commission 2007e, p.49), noting 
the analyses within the European Independent Sport Review and Stevens Report 
(European Commission 2007e, p.52) and repeating calls from the European 
Parliament and stakeholders for an EU legislative initiative, the issue required 
further examination and more information so as to be able to assess the 
necessity of European level action (European Commission 2007a, p. 16; 
European Commission 2007e, p. 50). The Commission highlighted the 
complexity of the existing regulatory framework applicable to players’ agents. It 
pointed out that different regulations govern their activities in different Member 
States. Some Member States (France and Belgium) have adopted specific 
legislation on players’ agents whereas the general law on employment agencies 
with specific reference to players’ agents is applicable in other Member States. 
Additionally, sports governing bodies also introduced their own regulations. For 
the Education and Culture DG, this complexity required further analysis. 
 
In addition, The Education and Culture DG brought in EU competition law 
analysis with regards to the compatibility of sports governing bodies’ regulations 
with EU competition law so as to support its position with regards to impact 
assessment. As opposed to the analysis under the European Independent Sport 
Review (Arnout 2005), where the regulation of players’ agents were considered 
to be inherent to the proper regulation of sport and compatibility with EU law, 
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the Education and Culture DG expressed the view that regulation was not likely 
to be considered inherent in the pursuit of a legitimate sporting objective. 
Nevertheless, by making reference to the findings of the General Court in the 
Piau case as regards to the qualitative nature of restrictions under FIFA 
regulations, the Education and Culture DG confirmed that these restrictions 
might possibly be justified under Article 101(3) (European Commission 2007e, 
p.49). The Commission stated that the restrictions imposed by the rules, albeit 
being on a sport-related profession, are unlikely to be inherent in the pursuit of a 
legitimate objective and recognized that they are subject to EU law. Nevertheless, 
it further recognized that it could be justified under Article 101 (3) or Article 102 
by making reference to the Piau case (European Commission 2007b, p.49). For 
these reasons, the impact assessment to establish whether EU-level action is 
required was considered to be the right tool at this stage.  
 
A significant impact of selective perception performed by the policy core beliefs 
of the EU policy actors on the regulation of players’ agents was that the issue 
moved onto the agenda of the socio-cultural coalition under the White Paper on 
Sport in 2007. The actors developed a policy position by carefully selecting 
information related to problems within the activities of players’ agents. They 
perceived problems as threats to their policy core and engaged in policy analysis 
in order to underline the necessity of European level of action.  These findings of 
the research on the impact of selective perception by policy core beliefs in the 
context of policy-oriented learning correlate the theoretical assumptions of the 
ACF. These findings of the research are presented below in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Players’ Agents: The Evidence of Selective Perception on Policy  
 
 
The Nice Declaration to the White Paper on Sport 
 
Selective Perception by 
Policy Core Beliefs 
 






Selection of particular 
stimuli related to the 
problems within the 




 The Actors perceive the problems as threats to their 
policy core beliefs, i.e. detrimental to socio-cultural 
role of sport in Europe. 
 
 Threats stimulate policy analysis on the issue which 
leads to seeking further information and 
development of a policy position. 
 
 
 Policy Position: “The problems are detrimental to 
the socio-cultural role of sport in Europe and a 
European legal initiative is required to tackle them”. 
 
Conversely, the decision to require an impact assessment by the Education and 
Culture DG represented a conflict between the EU policy actors in relation to 
their preferred policy instrument for the regulation of players’ agents. The 
Member States and the Committee on Culture and Education favored a European 
legal initiative at European level and called upon the Education and Culture DG 
to present a proposal to that effect. However, the Education and Culture DG was 
not prepared to come up with such proposal, but rather preferred to carry out 
the impact assessment. The nature of this conflict related to the secondary 
beliefs of the EU policy actors (policy instruments) rather than their policy core 
beliefs. It led to an analytical debate amongst them, particularly between the 
Education and Culture DG and the Committee on Culture and Education, so as to 
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support their secondary core beliefs with regards to players’ agents in the 
aftermath of the White Paper on Sport. This chapter now proceeds to analyze 
selective perception in the context of analytical debate. 
 
Impact Assessment: An Analytical Debate and Further Learning 
The process of impact assessment advanced the EU policy actors’ learning on 
players’ agents and involved further policy analysis particularly related to 
several policy instruments to achieve a more effective regulation. The study on 
sports agents published in 2009 and the conference on the issue in 2011, both 
commissioned and organized by the Education and Culture DG, were important 
sources of information and analysis on various aspects of the issue. The study 
examined the activities of sports agents, the social and economic weight of the 
agents market, the regulations that govern their activities with a focus on specific 
actors and regulations and the necessity of European regulatory framework.   
The conference became a forum involving not only the EU policy actors, but also 
the representatives of various sports governing bodies and stakeholders, to 
exchange views and best practice in place at national and international level. The 
focus of the conference was on several policy instruments at their disposal to 
regulate players’ agents, including FIFA’s new regulatory framework for players’ 
agents (the concept of intermediaries) and the potential standardization work in 
relation to players’ agents by the European Committee for Standardization. 
 
The impact of the conflict on the European-level legal initiative was that it 
caused an analytical debate between the Education and Culture DG and the 
Committee on Culture and Education. Not satisfied with the decision of impact 
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assessments, the Committee on Culture and Education engaged in an analytical 
debate at parliamentary level, in order to advocate for a legal initiative to 
regulate players’ agents at European level. The analysis of the study as regards to 
the problems within the activities of players’ agents was a catalyst for the debate. 
Following the publication of the study in 2009, therefore, the chair of the 
Committee, Doris Pack, presented an oral parliamentary question to the 
Education and Culture DG to respond. The Committee, focusing on the negative 
findings of the study, asked how the Education and Culture DG aimed to address 
these problems and what instruments were at its disposal for resolving them, as 
well as what role the Education and Culture DG intended to take in regulating 
players’ agents. The debate on the oral question took place on 15th June 2010 at 
the Parliament and was attended by the members of the Committee and then the 
Commissioner for Education, Culture, Youth and Sport, Androulla Vasilliou. The 
result of the debate was a parliamentary resolution where the Committee once 
again called upon the Education and Culture DG to present a proposal for a legal 
initiative to regulate players’ agents at European level.  
 
Selective perception performed by the policy core beliefs, in analytical debate 
and in a conflict situation, led to the selection and interpretation of information 
in order to support their policy position with regards to the secondary aspects of 
the belief systems of the actors (policy instruments), i.e. a European legal 
initiative. In particular, the Committee on Culture and Education, according to 
Parrish (2003a, pp.68-69), a strong proponent of the socio-cultural regulation of 
sport at European level, especially selected the findings of the study about the 
problems within the activities of players’ agents to initiate the parliamentary 
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debate and passed a resolution where the problems related to activities of 
players’ agents and their impact on the socio-culture role of sport were 
particularly underlined. Furthermore, the Committee carefully interpreted the 
analysis of the Court in the Piau judgment and used those analyses in advocacy 
fashion to extend their policy position related to players’ agents.  
 
The findings of the study were carefully outlined by the members of the 
Committee during the parliamentary debate. With regards to problems 
concerning the activities of players’ agents48, the study documented particular 
issues around financial crimes and the exploitation of young players. The study 
noted that the activities of players’ agents, particularly in major sports where 
they handle huge financial operations, are liable to give rise to problems (KEA et 
al. 2009, p.98). In this connection, the study highlighted a number of mechanisms 
in player transfers that give rise to the possibility of a high risk of fraud. In 
particular, at elite level these transfers involve substantial sums of money where 
a single transaction spread over several financial years making it extremely 
difficult to control (KEA et al. 2009, p.111). These mechanisms included 
overvaluation of the transfers and secret payments (termed as “bungs”), 
collusion networks facilitated in exchange for the payments of bribes, and the 
use of talent pools operated by players’ agents in football providing 
opportunities for money laundering (KEA et al. 2009, p.111-112). The study also 
highlighted the role of players’ agents in the trafficking of young players and 
explained the problem in an extended real-life scenario in football (KEA et al. 
                                                        
48 Although the study is on sports agents, the term “players’ agents” is used due to the fact that all 
sections quoted are clearly related to players’ agents and stated within the study. 
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2009, p.121-122). The study noted that there are a number of different actors 
involved in the problem, including the exporting clubs and managers, recognized 
training centers and European clubs alongside players’ agents (KEA et al. 2009, 
p.122-123). 
 
During the parliamentary debate, the members of the Committee on Culture and 
Education particularly selected the problems highlighted by the study and also 
underlined the detrimental impact that these problems are having on the socio-
cultural role of sport in Europe which was also reflected in the parliamentary 
resolution.49 Doris Pack, then the chair of the Committee and the person who 
initiated the oral question for the Education and Culture DG, particularly pointed 
to the findings of the study with regards to connections between players’ agents 
and criminal activities. She claimed “such connections damage the integrity of 
sport and are inconsistent with its social role” (emphasis added). She further 
asserted that “against this background, we need a European legislative initiative” 
and hoped that the resolution “will encourage the Commission to get to work on 
this issue” (emphasis added).  Additionally, Ivo Belet, the member of the 
Committee and the rapporteur of the Parliamentary report in 2007, also 
highlighted the finding of the study and emphasized that “an European initiative 
is indeed required” to overcome human trafficking and financial malpractice in 
European football. To further support the proposed European legal initiative, Ivo 
Belet reiterated previous calls by the Committee in the report in 2007 and even 
by the sector itself and considered “that we respond to their calls in the interests 
                                                        
49 The minutes of the parliamentary debate is accessible at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20100615&secondRef=
ITEM-019&language=HR&ring=B7-2010-0343  
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of sport and of its extremely important social role” (emphasis added). Statements 
both by Doris Pack and Ivo Belet clearly evidence the role performed by their 
policy core beliefs in shaping the policy position of the Committee and also 
selecting critical information in supporting that position. 
 
The parliamentary resolution was also significant as a mechanism that 
demonstrates selective perception performed by the policy core beliefs. The 
Committee not only, for the first time in an official document, clearly stated the 
negative impact of problems on sport’s socio-cultural role in Europe, but 
carefully selected the complexity of regulations of players’ agents and the finding 
of the Court in the Piau judgment to support the necessity of an EU initiative at 
European Level. The Committee began by expressing concerns about the findings 
of the study with regards to criminal activities linked them to the activities of 
players’ agents and expressed its belief that “this development is detrimental to 
the image of sport, its integrity and ultimately to its role in society” (emphasis 
added) (European Parliament 2010, para. 3). The Committee then moved on to 
talk about the finding of the study in relation to the existing regulatory 
frameworks and particularly its shortcomings in dealing with problems. In this 
connection, the Committee underscored the findings that the basic objective of 
those regulations by sport federations was to control access to the profession 
and govern its exercise. However, the Committee also underlined limited powers 
held by sports governing bodies in supervising and sanctioning players’ agents, 
as there was a lack of any means of direct control over those who were not their 
members. Therefore, they were not entitled to impose any civil or criminal 
penalties on them (European Parliament 2010, para.8). The Committee also 
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stated its belief that FIFA’s then proposed de-regulation of the players’ agents 
market, without setting a robust alternative system, would not be an appropriate 
as a response to tackle the problems (European Parliament 2010, para. 10). 
 
With regards to the Piau judgment, the Committee pointed out that the General 
Court recognized FIFA’s entitlement to regulate players’ agents only in so far as 
the objectives of the regulation were to raise professional and ethical standards 
in the activities of players’ agents with a view to protecting players (European 
Parliament 2010, para. 14). Conversely, the Committee also underlined that the 
Court in principle also recognized that the regulation of players’ agents 
constitutes policing of an economic activity and one that touches on fundamental 
freedoms which fall within the competence of public authorities (European 
Parliament 2010, para. 13). In its view, for these reasons, the Committee was 
convinced that, also due to the cross-border nature of the activities and the 
diversity of national regulations that are applicable to players’ agents, only the 
joint efforts of sports governing bodies and public authorities could achieve 
effective controls and the enforcement of sanctions at European level (European 
Parliament, 2010, para. 15). 
 
The Committee also highlighted the diversity of regulations applicable to the 
activities of players’ agents. Noting the extensive regulations by sports governing 
bodies at international and national levels, but noting very limited specific pieces 
of legislation adopted by the Member States, the Committee considered that the 
diversity of regulations caused confusion and created loopholes affecting the 
proper monitoring and control of players’ agents’ activities. The Committee 
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therefore believed that a coherent EU-wide approach is required and reiterated 
its call for an EU initiative concerning the activities of players’ agents (European 
Parliament 2010, para. 16-18).  
 
The conference on sport agents, in November 2011, became another forum 
within which the Education and Culture DG and the Committee on Culture and 
Education alongside sports governing bodies and other stakeholders, engaged in 
the on-going analytical debate with a view to identifying a policy instrument for 
more effective regulation of players’ agents.50 Ivo Belet attended the conference 
on behalf of the Committee and Jacek Foks, the representative of the Polish 
Presidency, represented the Member States. The content of the presentations51 
made by both Ivo Belet and Jacek Foks were further examples of selective 
perception by their policy core beliefs. They both focused on the problems 
within the activities of the players’ agents to support the calls for European-level 
action.52  
 
Ivo Belet, in his presentation, particularly quoted the sections from the 
parliamentary resolution of 2007 to reiterate the Committee’s calls on the 
                                                        
50 The conference was attended by the European Commissioner, Androulla Vassiliou, MEP Ivo 
Belet, Jacek Foks, Laurent Hanoteaux of French Ministry of Sports, Marco Villiger and Omar 
Ongaro from FIFA, Emanuel Macedo de Medeiros of the European Professional Football Leagues, 
Rob Jansen and Roberto Branco Martins of the European Football Agents Association, Michele 
Centenaro of the European Club Association, Philippe Piat and Theo van Seggelen of FIFPro, 
Darren Baily of English Football Association, Holger Hieronmus of Dutch Football Association as 
well as the representatives from KEA who had conducted the study for the Education and Culture 
DG,  the representatives of the European Committee for Standardization. 
51 The presentations by the attendees and the relevant reports on the conference can be accessed 
at http://ec.europa.eu/sport/events/2011/conferences_sport_agents_2011_en.htm. (Accessed 
05.03.2015). 
52 The notes of the speeches and presentations of the conference also can be accessed 
http://ec.europa.eu/sport/events/2011/conferences_sport_agents_2011_en.htm. (Accessed 
05.03.2015). 
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Commission to take action at European level. The Committee’s request from the 
Education and Culture DG to represent a proposal for a directive was particularly 
underlined. Belet further pointed out the findings of the study in relation a 
number of dubious practices related to agents’ activities, particularly payments 
for secret commissions and the exploitation of young players. Belet also added 
that “in the Parliament of course we are particularly concerned about the finding 
of the study with regards to criminal activities carried out in connection with sport; 
the study is clear: some professional sport and more specifically players’ agents 
activities are affected by organized crime, which naturally is sad and 
unacceptable”. The concluding remarks for his presentation were related to the 
new report by the Committee on the Economic Dimension of Sport within which 
the Committee once again called upon the Education and Culture DG to draw up 
and implement a European licensing and registration system accompanied by a 
code of conduct and a sanctioning mechanism. Belet’s closing remarks were 
related to the Committee’s policy position and called upon the Commissioner to 
keep up the work to reach a deal with all stakeholders to make considerable 
progress towards higher standards of integrity and better governance.  
 
Jacek Foks, on the other hand, focused on illustrating the link between the 
problems of players’ agents and the integrity of sport. The protection of integrity 
of sport was the one of the main priorities of the Polish Presidency and Foks 
stressed that certain types of activities of players’ agents could be seen as a 
threat to the integrity of sport. In this connection, he considered particularly the 
activities of unlicensed agents; financial irregularities inclusive of non-
transparency of transactions, tax evasion and money laundering; and criminal 
  181 
activities of human trafficking constituted threats to the integrity of sport. He 
also expressed his concerns about how these activities tended to lead to 
corruption in sport, including match-fixing, and emphasized necessity of action 
at European level. 
 
Table 5: Players’ Agents: The Evidence of Selective Perception on Policy  
 
 
The Aftermath of the White Paper on Sport 
 
Selective Perception by 
Policy Core Beliefs 
 






Selection of particular 
stimuli related to the 
problems within the 
activities of players’ agents 
 
 
 Creates conflict amongst the actors, particularly 
between the Committee on Culture and Education 
and the Education and Culture DG, in relation to 
preferred policy instruments. 
 
The Committee prefers a European legal initiative. 
 
The Education and Culture DG prefers impact 
assessment. 
 
 Causes an analytical debate involving the actors and 
facilitates further learning on the issue. 
 
 Facilitates the use of policy analysis in advocacy 
fashion to elaborate and justify the policy position in 
relation to preferred policy instruments. 
 
 Promotes learning related to secondary aspects of 
the beliefs system of the EU policy actors, i.e.; 
learning related to policy instruments. 
 
Conclusion 
The analyses of the research on selective perception by policy core beliefs of the 
EU policy actors finds evidence that the actors particularly selected specific 
information related to the problems within the activities of players’ agents in 
order to develop their policy position on the issue and later to support the 
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secondary aspects of their belief systems representing the component of their 
policy position. During the preparatory phase of the White Paper on Sport, the 
actors acquired information on the issues within the activities of players’ agents 
and perceiving them as a threat to their policy core led to policy analysis and the 
development of their policy position. This finding also confirms the role of policy 
analysis and information depicted by Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993).  The 
impact of the selective perception at this stage was that the actors particularly 
selected information about the problems in order to support their policy position 
in accordance with their policy core beliefs, in particular to support European 
level of action to achieve a more effective regulatory framework. However, the 
conflict on the secondary aspects of their belief system was caused by the 
decision of the Education and Culture DG on the impact assessment. The result of 
that conflict was that the analytical debate initiated by the Committee on Culture 
and Education which also led to further learning by the actors in relation to 
possible policy instruments at European level to govern players’ agents. The 
analytical debate was significant to examine selective perception amongst the 
actors and particularly the members of the Parliamentary Committee who 
clearly focused on the findings of the study and selected relevant parts of the 
Piau judgment to support their policy position and used those in an advocacy 
fashion. In particular, the statements by Doris Pack and Ivo Belet, both members 
of the Committee, during the parliamentary debate were a clear illustration of 
selective perception. Both statements purely mentioned the problems and their 
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Chapter 7 




One of key assumptions of the ACF is that the policy actors are motivated to 
translate their policy core beliefs into public policies and, therefore, their policy 
preferences are also shaped and in line with their policy core beliefs (Sabatier 
1988 & 1998; Sabatier and Weible 2007; Ingold 2011; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). 
To map beliefs and policies on the same canvas enables the framework to 
analyze the influence of several policy actors over time (Sabatier 1988, p. 132). 
The end result of the policy process is one or more governmental programmes, 
which in turn produce policy instruments at operational level impacting upon 
targeted problem parameters (Sabatier 1988, p.133). These theoretical 
assumptions have important implications for the preferences of the EU policy 
actors related to policy instruments in regulating players’ agents at European 
level. So far, the research has identified coordinated activity amongst the EU 
policy actors on the issue of players’ agents, as analyzed in the chapter 5, and 
also the development of policy positions within which the actors emphasized the 
necessity of regulation at European level in order to particularly tackle the 
problems related to the activities of players’ agents to protect the socio-cultural 
role of sport in Europe, as outlined in the chapter 6. As a result, the outcome of 
the actors’ activities on the issue would be assumed to be a form of policy 
instrument that was preferred by the actors at European level which also would 
be in line with their policy core beliefs. Nonetheless, FIFA’s new regulatory 
framework to regulate players’ agents, the concept of intermediaries, came into 
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force on 1st April 2015 and represents a theoretical paradox. This is somehow in 
contrary with the policy core beliefs of the EU policy actors but also with the 
theoretical assumptions of the ACF and, therefore, requires an explanation. 
 
This chapter aims to understand this theoretical paradox by analyzing the policy 
preferences of the EU policy actors and the exogenous factors that affecting 
policy making within the subsystem that impact on those preferences. Firstly, 
the actors’ preferences for adequate policy instruments to regulate players’ 
agents at European level are examined and the research identifies that there has 
been a change in their preferred policy instruments. Initially, the EU policy 
actors had developed a policy position, which was outlined in the chapter 6, that 
perceived the particular problems within the activities of players’ agents as 
being detrimental to the socio-cultural role of sport in Europe and the EU action 
was considered to be necessary, in a form of a EU legal initiative. Nonetheless, by 
the time FIFA undertook the reforms of licensing system, the EU policy actors 
had changed their preferences completely and became supportive of self-
regulation and the rights of sports governing bodies to regulate players’ agents. 
This is somehow in contradiction with their policy core beliefs and requires a 
theoretical explanation. The chapter then moves on to outline the constitutional 
context of the EU policy-making in the field of sports and argues that the 
limitations embedded within this constitutional context have actually shaped the 
EU’s actions, and limit its preferences of policy instruments, with regards to the 
regulation of players’ agents. Within those analyses, the research argues that the 
constitutional limitations of the EU are the exogenous factors, as outlined within 
the ACF that they affect the sports policy subsystem and the advocacy coalition, 
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impacting upon policy instruments that the EU could adopt in regulating players’ 
agents. Then, it moves on to examine how the emergence of FIFA’s regulatory 
framework can be explained or to what extent the ACF is able to explain the lack 
of European level policy instrument as a result of the process following the 
impact assessment. Finally, the chapter sets out the evidence of that impact 
through the methodical investigation content of policy documents within the 
discourse of the EU’s policy-making on the issue of players’ agents. 
 
Policy Instruments: The EU’s Changing Preferences 
During the preparatory phase of the White Paper on Sport, the EU policy actors 
have developed a policy position on the regulation of players’ agents in line with 
their policy core beliefs53. Their preferences in relation to policy instrument was 
a European level action aimed at tackling particularly bad practices within the 
activities of agents.  Perceiving those practices as being detrimental to the socio-
cultural role of sport in Europe, the policy actors recognized the need for more 
effective regulation at European level. In this regards, the Member States and the 
Committee on Culture and Education were a strong proponent of the EU legal 
initiative. Both actors envisaged a European regulatory system that was to be 
administered by UEFA in Europe in order for better monitoring and enforcement 
of the rules (Arnaut 2006; European Parliament 2007a). Under the Independent 
European Sports Review, it was considered that “it may be appropriate to 
examine a system involving not only EU legal initiative but also with a stronger 
role for the European governing body (UEFA in the case of football) in particular to 
oversee an effective enforcement of the rules” (Arnaut 2006, p. 47). With this 
                                                        
53 This policy position was explained in detail in Chapter 6. 
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objective in mind, they also considered the revision of the licensing system 
which was to be undertaken through a formal consultation process between 
UEFA and the European Commission at European level (Arnaut 2006, p. 89; 
European Parliament 2007a, para. 44). In this connection, the Committee on 
Culture and Education called upon “the Commission to support UEFA’s efforts to 
regulate players’ agents, if necessary by presenting a proposal for a directive 
concerning players' agents” (European Parliament 2007a, para. 44).  The 
directive was considered to be an appropriate legal tool at the disposal of the EU 
and would include several provisions related to a strict examination criteria, 
transparency in the transactions, minimum harmonized standards for agents 
contracts, the prohibition of dual representation, the regulation of payments to 
players agents, and the efficient monitoring and disciplinary system by European 
sports governing bodies (Arnaut 2006, p.131; European Parliament 2007a, para. 
44). The proposed directive by both actors, the Member States and the 
Committee on Culture and Education, as their preferred policy instrument, was a 
reflection of their policy core beliefs and in line with their policy position.  
Conversely, the Education and Culture DG was rather conservative about the EU 
action on the issues and preferred to carry an impact assessment in order to 
assess any proposed solution at European level. In the White Paper on Sport, the 
calls of the Member States, the Committee and some of the stakeholders for the 
EU legal initiative were acknowledged (European Commission 2007b, p.49), yet 
the Education and Culture DG claimed that there was a need for further analyses 
of the extent of the problems within the activities of players’ agents in order to 
make a decision on the form of EU action on the issue. For these reasons, the 
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commitment to carry an impact assessment to gather more information on the 
issue and to analyze the possible options at European level was made was made 
(European Commission 2007b, p.50).  
 
The decision of impact assessment instead of the proposal of directive on 
players’ agents caused a conflict between the EU policy actors. Particularly the 
Committee on Culture and Education was not particularly pleased with the 
decision of impact assessment. The Committee repeated its calls on the 
Commission and urged them “to support the efforts of sports governing bodies to 
regulate players' agents, if necessary by presenting a proposal for a directive 
concerning players' agents” (European Parliament 2008, para. 100). 
 
In addition, the Committee, in order to advocate for the EU legal instrument on 
the issue, engaged in an analytical debate with the Education and Culture DG 
following the publication of the study on sports agents in 2009 through a 
parliamentary debate. The Member States also emphasized their desire to make 
progress on the regulation of players’ agents, particularly in relation to the 
identification of possible European solutions for tackling bad practices within 
their activities. The Committee’s persistence on the EU legal initiative was the 
reflection of their strong policy core beliefs. 54 
 
During the discourse of the impact assessment, the publication of the study on 
sports agents in 2009, which was the initial step of the impact assessment 
                                                        
54 This is inline with the finding of Parrish in relation to the policy core beliefs of the Committee 
on Culture and Education. Parrish argues that the Committee is the one of the strongest 
proponent of the socio-cultural regulation of sport with the European policy subsystem. 
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undertaken by the Education and Culture DG, coincided with the decision of FIFA 
to conduct in-depth reform of the licensing system through a new approach 
based on the concept of intermediaries during its 59th Congress on 3 June 2009. 
The decision was an important one by the football’s world governing body as it 
acknowledged that the licensing system was not effective to overcome a number 
of problems within the activities of players’ agents. The objective of reforming 
the licensing system was aimed at overcoming those deficiencies with the 
regulatory system. FIFA’s Committee for Club Football established a sub-
committee with a mandate to develop the new system and to undertake a 
lengthy and extensive consultation process with representatives of member 
associations, confederations, clubs, FIFPro and professional football leagues in 
order to ensure the input of all stakeholders. The new regulatory system was 
also to be analyzed within the framework of a number of working groups, 
including the Players’ Status Committee and the Legal Committee. 
 
The conference organized by the Education and Culture DG, as the second step 
within the on-going impact assessment, in November 2011 became a platform 
for FIFA to present its efforts on the new regulatory system to the EU policy 
actors and other football stakeholders at European level. Although some of the 
stakeholders expressed their concerns about the new regulatory system55, 
particularly considering it as the de-regulation of the players’ agents sector, the 
representatives of FIFA rejected that notion. Marco Villiger, then the Director of 
Legal Affairs and the one of the executive responsible for the adoption of the new 
                                                        
55 Particularly the European Professional Football Leagues (EPFL) and the European Football 
Agents Association (EFAA) outlined their concerns in relation to FIFA’s new regulatory 
framework and deemed it to be the de-regulation of agent profession. 
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regulatory system, particularly focused on the shortcomings of the licensing 
system and the ongoing consultation process with the key stakeholders under 
the leadership of FIFA (European Commission 2011d, p.1). Additionally, Omar 
Ongar, then FIFA’s Head of Players’ Status and Governance, underlined the 
difficult position of FIFA in regulating players’ agents as divergent views of all 
stakeholders were required to be taken into account. Ongar also dismissed the 
recommendations related to regional regulatory frameworks, implemented in 
the case of basketball, and emphasized that only an inclusive approach was 
acceptable to FIFA (European Commission 2011d, p.4).  Both representatives 
clearly highlighted FIFA’s determination to overhaul the licensing system and 
move ahead with the new regulatory system. 
 
At the same time, the proceedings of the conference highlighted the changing 
preferences of the EU policy actors, in particular of the Education and Culture DG 
and the Committee on Culture and Education, with regards to the regulation of 
players’ agents at European level. First, the EU policy actors seemed to be 
distancing themselves from the idea of a regulatory role on the issue but rather 
preferring sports governing bodies to regulate. The representatives of both 
actors stressed the recognition of sports governing bodies’ right to self-regulate 
on the issue. Androulla Vassiliou, then the European Commissioner responsible 
for sport, welcomed the efforts of FIFA on the new regulatory system and 
emphasized that the preference of the Commission on the issue is to facilitate a 
dialogue amongst the stakeholders and promoting cooperation between them 
instead of taking a regulatory role (European Commission, 2011d, p.1). Gregory 
Paulger, then the Director for Youth and Sport at the Education and Culture DG, 
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also stressed the fact that the Education and Culture DG respects the right of self-
regulation by the European sports movement (European Commission, 2011d, 
p.6). Ivo Belet, representing the Committee, also underlined that the Committee 
“continue to support self-regulation” and “it has never been” their or ambition try 
to govern sport. In addition, Belet stressed that their objective is limited “to assist 
with regards to those aspects of the context of players’ agents that clearly cannot 
be solved at a national level” and “most efficient way to achieve those 
improvements to the system naturally is by means of self-regulation”.56 These 
statements explicitly illustrated the shift in preferences of the EU policy actors.  
Especially, the shift in the Committee’s preferences, from being the proponent of 
direct legislative intervention to one that respects  self-regulation, is significant. 
 
The change in preferences was also apparent in the choice of specific policy 
instruments that emerged during the conference. On behalf of the Education and 
Culture DG, Gregory Paulger did not make any commitments to any form of 
regulatory action at European level. He only revealed the possibility of a 
recommendation on the basis of Article 165 TFEU as a way of bringing the 
different approaches in the Member States closer together (European 
Commission, 2011d, p.6). Ivo Belet, on the other hand, quoted the parts of the 
new resolution, which was to be adopted the following day from the Conference, 
to set out the preferences of the Committee on players’ agents. Within the 
resolution, considering the profession of players’ agents should be a regulated 
activity and subject to and adequate official qualification, the Committee called 
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upon the Education and Culture DG to draw up and implement “a European 
licensing and registration system” accompanied by a code of conduct and a 
sanctioning mechanism (European Parliament, 2011, para. 75). The Committee 
also requested sports governing bodies to establish a European register of sports 
agents in which agents would list the names of the players that they represent 
(European Parliament, 2011, para.76). These measures, conversely, are clearly 
very different than the calls made by the Committee for the European directive 
on players’ agents within the earlier resolutions.  
 
Another possible policy instrument considered by the Education and Culture DG 
was the possibility of working with the European Standardization Organization 
(CEN) with a view to helping to define and raise the quality level of the services 
provisions of sports agents.57 According to the Education and Culture DG, some 
of the substantial problems with the activities of players’ agents, such as the 
protection of minors, the transparency of financial transactions, the level of fees 
and dual representations, could be addressed with some form of standardization 
and approximation and the model could be an opportunity for European and 
international standardization in the field of players’ agents (European 
Commission, 2011d, p. 6). The European Standardization Organization is a 
private non-profit organization whose members are the National 
Standardization Bodies of the Member States and recognized by the European 
authorities as one of the three competent standardization bodies for the EU.58 
The CEN develops standards established by all interested parties in a specific 
                                                        
57 Although the conference was on sports agents, the Education and Culture explicitly indicated 
the main focus of the discussion was players’ agents in football. 
58 Under Directive 98/34/EC. 
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field which are then transposed in national standards to achieve harmonization 
in the internal market.  
 
The Member States were also supportive of self-regulation by sports governing 
bodies in relation to players’ agents and considered that they are the best placed 
to adopt appropriate mechanisms.  In particularly, the recommendations of the 
Expert Group on Good Governance, published in December 2013 following an 
extensive consultation process involving the Member States, the football 
stakeholders, the Commission and the Parliament, were reflective of the Member 
States’ views on the issue. Building upon the study on sports agents and the 
conference in November 2011, the Expert Group also deemed that “the relevant 
sporting bodies are best placed to introduce any needed changes in the supervision 
of the profession of agents, in accordance with good governance principles such as 
democracy and inclusion of stakeholders” (Council of European Union 2013, p.4). 
The Group also underlined that in spite of different regulations applicable to 
players’ agents in various Member States, only minor problems were identified 
in relation to the provisions of services without major obstacles and, for this 
reason, there was no need for public authorities to adopt new rules or change 
their existing rules concerning players’ agents (Council of European Union 2013, 
p.4). The Group also recommended that the objectives of the mechanisms for the 
supervision of sports agents should be towards increasing transparency in the 
transactions involving agents (thus covering club-agent, player- agent, club-
player and club-club transactions) and strengthening the necessary protection of 
the youngest players, in particularly when those players are involved in 
international transfers. The overall goal of such mechanisms should be to set 
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higher standards for the activity of agents, to establish clear and universal rules, 
whilst taking into account the diversity existing in sporting structures, and to 
ensure an efficient monitoring, enforcement and compliance framework, with 
dissuasive and proportionate sanctions as well as equitable disciplinary 
measures in place (Council of European Union 2013, p.5-7). These remarks are 
also clearly very different than the ones under the European Independent Sport 
Review (Arnout 2006) under which a case for the European Directive for 
players’ agents was made. 
Eventually, whilst the EU action has been pending on the issue, the new 
regulatory framework by FIFA came into force on 1st April 2015. Under the new 
system FIFA aimed at establishing an overarching regulatory framework for an 
efficient control of the agency activity rather than regulating the access to the 
profession. The new framework superseded the licensing-based regulatory 
framework and the license requirement is abandoned. The framework lays down 
minimum standards and requirements as well as a registration system for 
agents, who are called intermediaries now, who represent players or clubs in the 
conclusion of employment contracts or transfer agreements. FIFA considers the 
new system to be more transparent and simple to administer and to implement 
which will result in a better enforcement at national level.  
So, how can this change in the preferences of the EU actors in relation to policy 
instruments and the emergence of FIFA’s new regulatory framework be 
theoretically explained? The ACF has particular focus on policy change and 
differentiates between major and minor policy change (Sabatier 1998; Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier and Weible 2007; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). 
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Change in the policy core beliefs indicates major change in the direction or the 
objectives of the subsystem, and defined as major policy change, whereas change 
in secondary aspects of the belief systems, in other words change in means for 
achieving those objectives, is evidence for minor policy change (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1999, p. 147-148). Policy instruments represent secondary 
aspects of the belief systems and the ACF views policy-oriented learning to be a 
source of minor policy change (Sabatier 1998, p.118). Therefore, policy-oriented 
learning, in particularly policy analysis and exchange of information, related to 
players’ agents could be the explanation for the change in the preferences of the 
EU policy actors. However, as illustrated, the change of policy instruments 
actually occurred in the course of impact assessment, when the process of 
learning on the issue was taking place, and undermines the explanatory powers 
of policy-oriented learning. In addition, the ACF also identifies two sets of 
exogenous factors, the one quite stable and the other more dynamic, that affect 
the constraints and opportunities of the policy actors within the subsystem 
(Sabatier 1988 & 1999; Norhstedt 2005; Sabatier and Weible 2007). For this 
reason, these factors could have an explanatory power that is required to be 
examined. 
 
Defining the EU’s Constitutional Limitations  
The ACF makes a distinction between policy subsystems and the broader 
political environment that affects policy making at subsystem level (Sabatier 
1988 and 1999, Weible et al. 2009, Jenkins-Smith, et. al., 2014).  The broader 
political environment is defined by relatively stable parameters and external 
events that are exogenous to policy subsystems and both can substantially alter 
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the constraints and opportunities confronting the actors within the subsystem 
(Sabatier 1988, p.136). The relatively stable parameters include basic attributes 
of the problem area, basic distribution of natural resources, fundamental socio-
cultural values and social structures, and basic constitutional structures (rules). 
These factors are reasonably hard to change over the course of time and they 
rarely become the subjects of coalitions’ strategies.  Nevertheless, they can 
certainly limit the range of feasible alternatives available to policy actors 
(Sabatier 1988, p.135). The external events, on the other hand, are more 
dynamic and can vary substantially over the course of a few years or a decade. 
These includes changes in socio-economic conditions, changes in public opinion, 
changes in systemic governing coalitions and the impact of policy decisions from 
other subsystems. The ACF argues that these events continuously challenge the 
subsystem actors to understand how to anticipate and to respond to them 
consistent with their policy core beliefs (Sabatier 1998, p.103). These events are 
also a critical pre-requisite for major policy change (Sabatier 1998; Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier and Weible 2007).  Therefore, understanding the 
factors that affecting the EU sports policy subsystem can offer an explanation for 
changes in the preferences of the EU policy actors in relation to policy 
instruments. 
In the context of the broader political environment as defined by the ACF, and 
also taking into the analyses of the research so far on the EU’s activities with 
regards to the regulation of players’ agents, the constitutional context of the EU 
seems to be a correct parameter to be analysed at this stage. This is because of 
the fact that the principle of conferral, embedded with the Treaties, requires the 
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EU to act upon within the limits of its powers. The principle is now located in 
Article 5 TEU since the entry of force of the Lisbon Treaty and sport was not a 
conferred competence for the EU prior to that. The lack of legislative competency 
on sport immediately reveals the limitation of the EU in the field of sport, 
particularly in relation to the governance of sport, which forced the EU to 
develop an indirect sport policy since its first incursion with sport in 1974. 
Although the Lisbon Treaty for the first time brings sport within explicit reach of 
the Treaties establishing the EU, it is considered to be a declaration of peace 
between the EU and sport governing bodies in regulating sport and the 
constitutional limitations of the EU in the governance of sport prevails (Garcia 
and Weatherill 2012, p.251). Furthermore, the new competency under the 
Lisbon Treaty could be potentially considered to be a major policy change under 
the ACF, yet it is argued to be not so new after all (Weatherill 2010) and unlikely 
to alter the EU’s existing approach to sport (European Parliament 2010b, p. 61). 
Therefore, it is important to analyse the constitutional limitations of the EU in 
the field of sport which also constrains the EU’s actions and its preferences with 
regards to the regulations of players’ agents.  
The constitutional limitations of the EU’s action in the field of sport, particularly 
in the governance of sport in Europe, manifest themselves within the historical 
discourse of the EU’s relationship with sport. Up until the Lisbon Treaty, the EU 
did not possess legislative competency on sport as it was not mentioned in the 
Treaties. As a result, the EU derived powers to oversee sporting practices and 
rules of sports governing bodies from the broad functional reach of the relevant 
provisions of EU law, namely internal market and competition rules (Weatherill 
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2009a). In particular, the CJEU and the Commission, developed EU law in its 
application to sport recognizing the autonomy of sport governing bodies in 
regulating their sports but only as far as EU law respected. This conditional 
autonomy, an autonomy conditional upon respecting EU law (Weatherill, 2007), 
was based upon the notion that sports governance would not be rigidly held to 
be exempted from EU law, particularly as an economic activity which can have a 
damaging impact on the achievements of the Treaties in relation to the internal 
market.59 The principle of sport being subject to EU law as far as it constitutes an 
economic activity was established by the CJEU in its first ever ruling on sport in 
1974, Walrave and Koch, but at the same time allowed sport governing bodies to 
show why sport is different from other industries to justify a special treatment 
from the EU, especially in application of the EU law. The specificity of sport, 
developed and argued by sports governing bodies, arguing that sport has a 
specific nature and is different from other industries became the line of defence 
for sports governing bodies in protecting their autonomy from the EU’s 
interventionist approach (Weatherill 2010; Garcia and Weatherill 2012; Parrish, 
2003a & 2003b). This legal model allows the cohabitation of sporting regulations 
and EU law and Parrish claimed that European sports law as a distinctive body 
emerged from this approach based upon the separate territories principle 
permitting the autonomy of sport and legal intervention to live together (Parrish 
2003a & 2003b). As a result, sports governing bodies, to a certain degree, 
enjoyed autonomy to govern their sport at European level whilst the EU’s actions 
in the field of sport were constrained. 
                                                        
59 Ken Foster defines this as supervised autonomy, whereas Weatherill calls it conditional 
autonomy. 
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Nonetheless, sports governing bodies, although enjoying conditional autonomy, 
aimed at gaining full autonomy through achieving an exemption for their 
activities from EU law via an article under the EU Treaties. The negotiations of 
the Lisbon Treaty provided a right institutional context for sport governing 
bodies to ask the EU for an exemption. They engaged in an intensive lobbying 
strategy facilitated within the multi-level nature of the EU (Garcia 2007; Garcia 
and Weatherill 2012). This was not the first time sports governing bodies pushed 
for full autonomy. Both at Amsterdam and at Nice the non-binding declarations 
on sport were outcomes of the process of Treaty reforms, although sport-
governing bodies had not been able to convince the EU to provide them an 
exemption from EU law and full autonomy in governing their sports (Weatherill 
2010). During the Convention on the Future of Europe, opened in February 2002 
and stretched to the middle of 2003, there was a general agreement that the EU 
should acquire some formal competence in the field of sport (Garcia and 
Weatherill 2012, p.244).  Both the Member States and the Education and Culture 
DG during this period supported and worked in favour of an article on sport 
(Garcia and Weatherill 2012, p.245-247). The subsequent intergovernmental 
conference agreed the text of the Treaty establishing Constitution in the late 
2004 establishing sport as an area of “supporting, coordinating or complementary 
action”. Despite the rejection of the Treaty establishing a Constitution in 
referenda in France and Netherlands during 2005, the new article on sport has 
been rehabilitated into the Lisbon Treaty, which was agreed in 2007, and 
remained untouched providing for the first time legislative competency to the EU 
on sport.60 
                                                        
60 The Article reads as Under Article 165 of the Lisbon Treaty for the first time the competency 
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Despite providing legal competency, the influence of the Lisbon Treaty on the 
governance of sport was considered to be trivial (Weatherill 2010 and 2011; 
Garcia and Weatherill 2012; European Parliament 2010). Falling short of 
granting sport an exemption from the Treaty, the text of Article 165 TFEU 
provides the next best solution for sport governing bodies by constraining the 
EU’s interventionist tendencies on the governance of sport (Garcia and 
Weatherill 2012, p.251). There is nothing in the realm of Article 165 TFEU that 
suggests a powerful role in regulating sports governance. Instead it only 
provides a supporting competence for the EU on sport and even an enhanced 
level of autonomy for sports governing bodies through constitutionally 
recognizing the specific nature of sport in Europe. Therefore, the Lisbon Treaty 
empowers sports governing bodies in regulating their sports whereas the EU’s 
ability to regulate sport in Europe is further constrained. 
The inclusion of sport in the Treaty is in no way to advance the EU into a primary 
position in the regulation of sport (Weatherill 2011; Garcia and Weatherill 
2012). In this connection, with regards to the type of competency, Article 165 
TFEU creates soft legislative competency which is the weakest type of the three 
principal types of competence laid down under the Lisbon Treaty. Embedded 
                                                                                                                                                              
on sport is given. Article 165 (1) of TFEU stipulates “The Union shall contribute to the promotion 
of European sporting issues, while taking into account of the specific nature of sport, its structures 
based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function”. The Article 165 (2) provides 
that “Union action shall be aim at: developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting 
fairness and openness in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible for 
sports, and by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, 
especially the youngest sportsmen and sportswomen”. Article 165 (3) states that “The Union and 
the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international 
organizations in the field of education and sport, in particular the Council of Europe”. Article 165 
(4) allows the EU to adopt incentive measures and recommendations whilst excluding any 
harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States. For the first time sports finds 
itself with the constitutional framework of the EU. 
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under Article 6(e) the competency allows the EU to support, coordinate or 
supplement the sports-related actions undertaken at Member States. 
Additionally, Article 5 of TEU stipulates that the competences of the EU is 
governed by the principle of subsidiary, meaning that when areas do not fall 
within the EU’s exclusive competency the EU can only act if, and in so far as, the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States. Article 5 of TFEU even reinforces the scope of competency. For these 
reasons, Article 165(4) expressly excludes any harmonising legislation and 
allows the Parliament and Council to adopt only incentive measures and 
recommendations. As a result, the Treaty constrains the actions of the EU in the 
field of sport and not in any way suggests that the EU play a prevailing role in 
regulating sport.  
The Lisbon Treaty also offers a greater level of autonomy for sport governing 
bodies in regulating their sports and intends not to prejudice their legitimate 
autonomy and discretionary decision-making power (Weatherill 2010). 
Historically sports governing bodies made claims of autonomy as regulators of 
their disciplines around the argument of the specificity of sport.  Yet, the EU, 
particularly the CJEU and the Commission, have considered the strength of 
sport’s autonomy claims and generally reached their own conclusions which 
have been less persuasive than the need for sporting autonomy claimed by the 
governing bodies (Weatherill 2010).  Despite their argument, sports governing 
bodies failed to keep the EU out of sport and settled for the second best 
(Weatherill 2010; Garcia and Weatherill, 2012). They have successfully 
negotiated a text that enhanced their autonomy.   For the first time, Article 165 
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TFEU requires the EU to take into account the specific nature of sport, its 
structure based on voluntary activity and its social and education function when 
contributing the promotion of European sporting issues. The explicit recognition 
of sport’s specific nature strengthens the argument for an enhanced autonomy 
and provides the first line of defence for sport governing bodies in the post-
Lisbon era (Garcia and Weatherill 2012, p.252.). Conversely, for the EU the 
recognition of the specific nature of sports means another constraint for the 
possible EU actions in regulating sport and dictates a softer approach to the 
decisions made by sports governing bodies who have a greater understanding of 
what really is specific about their respective sport. 
The analysis illustrates the constitutional limitation of the EU in the field of 
sport. The EU institutions, particularly the CJEU and the Commission, historically 
recognised and respected the autonomy of sports governing bodies in governing 
their sports although this autonomy has been conditional upon respecting the EU 
law. Additionally, the lack of legislative competency on sport meant sport has 
been the primary responsibility of the Member States and sports governing 
bodies. Despite for the first time the Lisbon Treaty changing things for the EU by 
providing legislative competency, in practice the change is minimal and not 
profound in terms of the governance of sport. The competency given is 
supporting and very limited in scope in relation to regulating sport and the 
principle of subsidiary is embedded within the Treaty. Furthermore, the Treaty 
requires the EU to take into consideration sport’s specific nature when 
supporting the activities of the Member States and sports governing bodies 
whilst also respecting the rule-making power of governing bodies. Therefore, the 
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next step is to investigate the evidence highlighting the constraining impact of 
these constitutional limitations on the EU policy actors’ actions in relation to the 
regulation of players’ agent and particularly to show the impact on the changing 
preferences related to policy instruments.  
The Constraining Impact of the EU’s Constitutional Limitations: the 
Evidence  
The constitutional limitations on the EU’s actions in relation to the governance of 
sport by the EU policy actors were recognized prior to the Lisbon Treaty. 
Although Weatherill claims that the Commission was anxious to spell out the 
limits and deficiencies of the EU competency (Weatherill 2010, p.3), the 
Education and Culture DG, in the White Paper on Sport, recognized the limits of 
the EU actions in the governance of sport. From the outset in its first page, the 
White Paper pointed out “sporting organizations and the Member Sates have 
primary responsibility in the conduct of sporting affairs, with a central role for 
sports federations” (European Commission 2007a, p.2). The Education and 
Culture DG further reiterated later in the document that “governance is mainly 
the responsibility of sports governing bodies and, to some extent, the Member 
States and social partners”, and “most challenges can be addressed through self-
regulation respectful of good governance principles, provided that EU law is 
respected” (European Commission 2007a, p.13). These statements are in line 
with the principles outlined under the Nice Declaration and the Lisbon Treaty, 
recognizing the autonomy of sports governing bodies and the subsidiary 
principle.  The Education and Culture DG also outlined the role that the 
Commission can play in governance of sport in Europe. Accordingly, the 
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Education and Culture DG considered taking a role of encouraging the sharing of 
the best practice in sport governance and also to help to develop a common set 
of principle for good governance in sport, such as transparency, democracy, 
accountability and representation of stakeholders (European Commission 
2007a, p.12). This is a clear outline of intention by the Education and Culture DG 
that it prefers to play a facilitator role than a regulator role. 
 
Moreover, the Education and Culture DG clarified the notion of specificity of 
sport. This was considered to be approached through two prisms. The first one 
deals with the specificity of sporting activities and of sporting rules, such as 
separate competitions for men and women, limitations on the number of 
participants in competitions or to preserve a competitive balance between clubs 
taking part in the same competitions. The other one consists of the specificity of 
the sport structure including the autonomy and diversity of sports organizations, 
the organization of sport on a national basis, and the principle of a single 
federation per sport (European Commission 2007a, p.13).  The Education and 
Culture DG also underlined that the specificity of sport to be recognized by the 
EU, yet it cannot be construed so as to justify general exemption from the 
application of EU law. The Commission recognized the autonomy of sports 
governing bodies in running their sport, but no exemption was provided. 
 
Knowing the constitutional limitations on a possible EU legislative action with 
regards to the regulation of players’ agents, the Education and Culture DG was 
very careful in its analysis of the issue within the White Paper to justify its 
decision to carry out an impact assessment instead. Firstly, players’ agents as a 
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policy issue was placed under the theme of “the organization of sport” on which 
the Education and Culture DG clearly wanted to take a supportive and 
encouraging role as opposed to a regulatory one. Additionally, some of the bad 
practices within the activities of players’ agents were considered to be raising 
serious governance questions which the Education and Culture DG explicitly 
stated to be the responsibility of sports governing bodies and to some extent the 
Member States earlier in the document (European Commission 2007a, p.15). In 
the Staff Working Documents, accompanying the White Paper on Sport 
(European Commission 2007b), a careful analysis of Piau judgment was 
undertaken and the General Court’s findings related to the compatibility of the 
FIFA’s regulations with EU competition law was particularly underlined.  The 
document also highlighted the diverse regulations applicable to the agents at 
national level. With these considerations in mind, the Education and Culture DG, 
acknowledged the calls for EU legislative action but committed to impact 
assessment claiming that there is a need for further information related to the 
extent of the issue as well as analyzing the impact of any proposed solution at EU 
level.  
 
The conference organized by the Education and Culture DG became to explain 
the constitutional limits of the EU’s actions in the field of sport. Jan Figel, then the 
European Commissioner in charge of sport, in his key speech for the opening of 
the conference explained the political context for launching the White Paper 
process and also the future framework for sport provided by the inclusion of 
sport in the Lisbon Treaty. Figel pointed out that the principle of subsidiarity and 
the autonomy of sport organizations to govern their sport were fully respected. 
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Underlining the lack of specific legal competency for sport, the White Paper 
actions were built upon a mixture of soft provisions not on regulatory or 
legislative measures and the Commissioner emphasized that the Education and 
Culture DG could not go beyond the limits of existing EU competences. The 
Commissioner also outlined the key objectives of the White Paper and in relation 
to players agents it was to encourage debate on specific problems in the field of 
sports governance.  
 
The process of analytical debate between the Committee on Culture and 
Education and the Education and Culture DG, caused by the conflict about 
preferences related to policy instruments and particularly the decision of impact 
assessment61, enabled the Education and Culture DG to explain the constitutional 
limitations with regards to EU action, in particularly in relation to the proposed 
EU legal initiative. Not satisfied with the decision of the impact assessment the 
Committee adopted the resolution in response to the White Paper on Sport in 
May 2008 (European Parliament 2008). Within the resolution, the Committee 
repeated its calls on the Education and Culture DG to support the efforts of 
sports governing bodies to regulate players’ agents, if necessary, by presenting a 
propose for the directive concerning players’ agents (European Parliament 2008, 
para. 100). 62   In contrast, the Committee, by taking into consideration 
particularly the new competency under the Lisbon Treaty, requested the 
Commission in, exercising the new competency, to take into account the 
principle of subsidiarity, to respect the autonomy of sports organizations and the 
                                                        
61 The conflict and analytical debate fully explicated within the Chapter 6. 
62 The Committee used the exact wording of the previous resolution in 2007 on the future of 
football in Europe.  
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relevant governing bodies with due regard to the specificity of sport (European 
Parliament 2008, para 3.). The contradiction in relation to the limits of the EU 
action on the issue and still requesting EU legal initiative in the form of a 
directive, illustrates the strong policy core beliefs held by the Committee in 
relation to the regulation of players’ agents and especially its will to overcome 
the problems within the activities which the Committee deemed to be 
detrimental to the socio-cultural role of sport in Europe. 
 
In response to the resolution, The Education and Culture DG affirmed that the 
principle of subsidiarity must be fully respected when any actions are taken at 
European level and confirmed that the specificity of sport and the autonomy of 
sport governing bodies would be fully respected (European Commission 2008, 
point 8). With these principles in mind, the Commission’s response to the 
Committee’s calls for a directive on players’ agents was very conservative and 
stated that “It will evaluate the situation of players' agents in order to assess 
whether it is appropriate for the EU to intervene in this area and look at the 
options available” (European Commission 2008, point 8) (Emphasis added). This 
was a slightly different reasoning for the assessment than the one under the 
White Paper. The emphasis was on the appropriateness of the EU intervention 
rather than the necessity of the action indicates the mindfulness of the Education 
and Culture DG about the limits on the EU action particularly for the adoption of 
any legal instrument to regulate players’ agents. 
 
The deliberation process of the Committee’s resolution on players’ agents in June 
2010 clearly illustrated the change in preferences of the Committee in relation to 
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policy instruments whilst the Education and Culture DG was more explicit in 
outlining the constraining impact of the constitutional limitations, particularly of 
the new competency under the recently enacted Lisbon Treaty. Although the 
majority of the resolution’s text was in line with the Committee’s earlier 
resolution in 2007 and 2008, the Committee this time instead of requesting a 
proposal on a directive on players’ agents used the generic term of “European 
initiative” without specifying what it would be (European Parliament 2010, 
para.18). In response to the Committee’s resolution, the Education and Culture 
DG was quick to point out the Committee’s changing preference. In its analysis of 
the overall text of the resolution, the Education and culture DG highlighted that 
the Committee was “stopping short of asking for a Directive to regulate agents” 
and instead “the European Parliament calls for a generic EU initiative” (European 
Commission 2010, point 6) (Emphasis added). In reply to the Committee’s call on 
the generic initiative, the Education and Culture DG was reluctant to make any 
commitments to any EU action on the issue and stressed that an internal analysis 
of the results of the study on sports agents were currently being undertaken 
with a view to assessing which type of action might be needed at EU level. 
Additionally, once again the Education and Culture DG underlined the fact that 
any decision on the regulation of players’ agents was to be taken by “giving due 
consideration to the new legal framework represented by the entry into force of the 
TFEU and to the instruments the Treaty offers in the area of sport” (European 
Commission 2010, point 6). In other words, the Education and Culture DG was 
simply pointing out the importance of the new legal competency under the 
Lisbon which would impact on what action the EU can take on the issue. There 
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was also an emphasis on limited instruments available to the EU due to the 
complementary nature of new competency. 
 
Following the Lisbon Treaty, the Education and Culture DG once again outlined 
the limits on the EU’s actions in the field of sport in its new communication, 
Developing the European Dimension in Sport, in January 2011 (European 
Commission 2011a). Highlighting the soft competency given under the Lisbon 
Treaty, the Education and Culture DG stressed its respect for both the autonomy 
of sport governing structures as a fundamental principle relating to the 
organization of sport and also the competences of the Member States in the field 
in line with the principles of subsidiary. In this connection, to develop the 
European dimension in sport, EU action would aim at supporting the Member 
States’ actions and complement them. Additionally, such action can help 
addressing transnational challenges encountered by sport in Europe including 
the regulation of players’ agents (European Commission 2011a, p.3). For this 
reason, in line with the Education and Culture DG’s role as a facilitator for a 
dialogue on the issue of players’ agents, as outlined under the White Paper, the 
decision to organize a conference as a next step in impact assessment was taken 
(European Commission 2011a, p.13). The decision of the conference was another 
indicator of the Education and Culture DG’s preference for a dialogue to identify 
potential solutions to the issue. 
 
The Committee on Culture and Education, meanwhile, also became fully aware of 
the limits on the EU action and completely adjusted its preferences.  During the 
conference, Ivo Belet, representing the Committee, explicitly stated that “in order 
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to avoid any confusion, let me repeat: we continue to support self-regulation in 
sport, and it has never been our intention or ambition to try to govern sport. Our 
only role in this respect is a serving one” (Belet speech 2011, p.2). The statement 
was completely the opposite of the earlier calls on the Education and Culture DG 
for an EU legislative initiative. Taking into consideration the limits of the EU’s 
new competency, in particularly the principle of subsidiarity, Belet further stated 
“ we want to assist with regards to those aspects of the context of players’ agents 
that clearly cannot be solved at a national level” (Belet speech, 2011, p.2). 
Dropping its legislative calls, the Committee in its new resolution, adopted in 
February 2012 in response to the communication by the Education and Culture 
DG, called on the Commission to draw up and implement a European licensing 
and registration system accompanied by a code of conduct and a sanctioning 
mechanism. The Committee further considered that the agent profession should 
be a regulated activity and subject to an adequate official qualification and 
agents’ fiscal residence should be within the EU territory in the interest of 
transparency (European Parliament, 2012, para.75).  The Committee also called 
upon the Member States to supplement existing regulatory provisions governing 
players’ agents with deterrent sanctions and to implement these sanctions 
rigorously (European Parliament 2012, para.77), whilst asking sport governing 
bodies to enhance transparency with regards to players’ agents activities and 
cooperate with Member States’ authorities to eradicate corrupt practices 
(European Parliament 2012, para.78).  
The Education and Culture DG, mindful of the constitutional limitations on EU 
action, once again was quick to undermine the requests made by the Committee. 
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In response to the resolution, the Education and Culture DG pointed out that the 
specific request to draw up and implement a European licensing and registration 
system were not considered to be legally feasible on the basis of Article 165 
TFEU (European Commission 2012, p.2). Furthermore, in response to any action 
intended to be taken, the Education and Culture DG explicitly stated that no 
commitments can be made on the feasibility of proposals exceeding the 
competence of the Commission and the EU on the regulations of agents 
(European Commission 2012, p.2). The Education and Culture DG once again 
illustrated the constraining impact of Article 165 on the EU action on the issue. 
Conclusion  
The adoption of FIFA’s new regulatory system for agents and the lack of any 
form of EU legislative initiative represented a theoretical paradox that this 
chapter aimed to explain. This theoretical paradox is based upon two prisms. 
Firstly, the ACF assumes that the policy actors are motivated to translate their 
policy core beliefs into actually public policies and the end results of the process 
are policy instruments that are in line with the actors’ beliefs. The implication of 
these assumptions is, therefore, that the policy preferences of the policy actors in 
relation to policy instruments would also reflect their policy core beliefs, and, as 
a result, practically those beliefs can be deduced from the policy preferences of 
the actors. Secondly, the research so far have evidences both coordinated activity 
and selective perception in the context of EU policy making with regards to the 
regulation of players’ agents. The research so far has argued that the EU policy 
actors within the socio-cultural advocacy coalition have coordinated their 
activities on players’ agents, as a policy issue within the EU sports policy 
  211 
subsystem. Additionally, the actors developed a policy position through selective 
perception performed by their policy core beliefs, in particularly selecting 
stimuli that confirmed their beliefs. Their policy position is that the problems 
within the activities of players’ agents are detrimental to the socio-cultural role 
of sport in Europe and, therefore, it necessitates EU legal initiative to tackle the 
problems at European level. In line with this policy position, the output of the 
process at European level would be some form of EU legislative action, namely 
the European players’ agents directive. Nonetheless, contrary to both prisms, the 
emergence of FIFA’s new regulatory framework which has been supported by 
the EU policy actors represents the theoretical paradox that is required to be 
explicated.   
 
With this objective in mind, the research initially outlined the change in the 
preferences of the EU policy actors with regards to policy instruments to 
regulate players’ agents in Europe. The change was significant as the EU policy 
actors, in particularly the Member States and the Committee on Culture and 
Education, initially called upon the Education and Culture DG to present a 
proposal for EU directive on players’ agents in order to overcome the problems 
within their activities. Especially, the Committee on Culture and Education was a 
strong proponent of the EU legal initiative which reflected the strong policy core 
beliefs held by the Committee, as argued by Parrish. However, particularly after 
the inclusion of sport in the Lisbon Treaty, the EU policy actors changed their 
preferences and became supportive of self-regulation and the efforts of sports 
governing bodies on the issue. The Education and Culture DG preferred to take a 
facilitator role instead of a regulatory role and the decision to organize the 
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conference, as a part of the ongoing-impact assessment, with sports governing 
bodies and relevant stakeholders was a clear reflection of that role.  Both the 
Member States and the Committee on Culture and Education also supported self-
regulation and the efforts of sport governing bodies, in particularly the efforts of 
FIFA, and the end result was the FIFA’s new regulatory framework. 
 
The research then analyzed the constitutional limits of the EU policy-making in 
the field of sport and investigated the impact of those limits on the policy 
preferences of the EU policy actors in the context of the regulation of players’ 
agents. The ACF defines the broader political environment by exogenous factors, 
the one stable and the other one dynamic. The research argues that the 
constitutional limits of the EU are the relatively stable parameters that 
constraints the preferences of the EU actors in relation to the regulation of 
players’ agents. These limits includes the autonomy of sports governing bodies in 
regulating their sports and the principle of subsidiarity that makes the Member 
States and sports governing primary responsible for sport in Europe. Despite the 
new competency given under the Lisbon Treaty, the effect of the competency in 
relation to the governance of sport is trivial. The Lisbon Treaty actually enhances 
the autonomy of sport governing bodies in regulating sport by requiring the EU 
to take into consideration specific nature of sport when contributing to the 
actions of the Member States and sports governing bodies. As a result, the 
research illustrates how these constitutional limitations actually forced the EU 
policy actors to prefer self-regulation instead of the EU legal initiative to regulate 
players’ agents at European level. 
 





This research aims to explain the EU’s intervention into the regulation of players’ 
players’ agents. There were several reasons for researching the EU and players’ 
agents. First, and foremost, the initial incursion of the EU with the regulation of 
players’ agents was from the single market perspective. The Competition DG and 
the Court of First Instance had scrutinized the compatibility of FIFA’s regulations 
of players’ agents. Both institutions have confirmed the eligibility of FIFA to 
govern the activities of players’ agents and the compatibility of regulations with 
the EU law. Yet, the EU has not stopped there. The issue found its way into the 
White Paper on Sport in 2007 and several policy documents emerged during the 
last decade analyzing the regulation of players’ agents at European level. This 
involvement represents a paradox in the context of EU sports policy that the 
research has intended to explicate. Additionally, the EU has traditionally 
recognized and respected the autonomy of sports governing bodies in governing 
their sport. In this context, players’ agents have been subject to the regulatory 
framework established by football governing bodies. As a result, the EU’s 
intervention, as a public regulator, into the issue that has conventionally been 
confined within the regulatory sphere of football governing bodies was plausible 
and required an elucidation. These were considerations that originated this 
research. 
 
In a broader context, the research has investigated the EU policy making in the 
fields of sport through locating the regulation of players’ agents within the socio-
cultural strand of the EU sports policy. This contextualization was the result of 
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identifying the conceptual meaning of the EU’ socio-cultural regulation of sport 
within the wider literature of the EU sports policy. In particular, in the process of 
literature review in chapter 3 Parrish’s analysis on the development of EU sports 
policy postulated a conceptual insight and led to the adoption of the research’s 
two key assumptions: the existence of the socio-cultural advocacy coalition 
within the EU sports policy subsystem and the socio-cultural regulation of sport 
as policy core beliefs of the EU policy actors. Parrish explains the development of 
EU sports policy as the result of negotiations between two advocacy coalitions 
that operates within the EU sports policy subsystem (Parrish 2003a, 2003b). The 
single market coalition advocates for a regulatory approach to sports as an 
economic activity, whereas the socio-cultural coalition focuses on the socio-
cultural elements of sport (Parrish 2003a, pp.65-71). Moreover, Parrish 
identifies the belief systems of each coalition and views the socio-cultural 
regulation of sports as policy core beliefs of the actors of the socio-cultural 
coalition (Parrish 2003, pp.66-67). The concept of policy core beliefs within the 
analysis of Parrish provides the conceptual meaning of the socio-cultural 
regulation of sport that the research used. 
 
This conceptualization has also underpinned the research’s theoretical and 
methodological choices. With regards to the theory, the research has utilized the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) which is outlined in chapter 4. The 
decision is based upon the fact both advocacy coalitions and policy core beliefs 
are the key aspects of the framework. The ACF is developed to examine the 
public policy process (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier 
and Weible 2007, 2014). In doing so, public policies are deemed to be the 
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translation of the belief system of policy actors and they are conceptualized the 
same way as belief system (Majone 1980; Sabatier 1988). Policy core beliefs are 
theoretically located within the concept of belief systems. The ACF also combines 
the belief systems of actors with network structure analysis to simplify the 
analysis within policy subsystems (Sabatier and Weible 2007; Ingold 2011; 
Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014) and develops the concept of advocacy coalitions. 
These two ACF’s concepts are central to the research’s two key assumptions and 
justify the theoretical choice of the research. Methodologically, the research has 
used primary documentary sources to carry out content analysis in order to 
deduce the policy core beliefs of the EU policy actors. Content analysis, as a 
research method, was considered one of the most appropriate methods in 
investigating the aspects of ACF (Sabatier 1988, p. 147). Therefore, the research 
had adopted the same method. 
 
The research has developed three sub-research questions to investigate the EU’s 
socio-cultural regulation of sports as the EU’s policy actors’ core belief. These 
sub-research questions are based upon the hypotheses of the ACF within which 
policy core beliefs are central. The sub-research questions represent three 
research dimensions of this research and aim to deduce the EU policy actors’ 
policy core beliefs (the socio-cultural regulation of sport) through analysis of: 
coordinated activity, selective perception and policy preferences. The sub-
research questions are; 
 RQ1: Is there a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity amongst the EU 
policy actors of the socio-cultural advocacy coalition in relation to the 
regulation of player`s agents within the subsystem? 
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 RQ2: Do policy core beliefs of the EU policy actors perform selective 
perception in the process of policy-oriented learning, in particular to 
policy analysis and information, related to the regulation of players’ 
agents?  
 RQ3: What are the policy preferences of the EU policy actors in relation to 
policy instruments to regulate players’ agents at European level and to 
what extent do the policy preferences reflect the policy core beliefs of the 
actors? 
This research is a deductive study and its theoretical analysis has a duality which 
represents the research’s original contributions to knowledge under two 
strands. Firstly, the research contributes to our understanding of the EU policy 
making in the field of sport through examining a specific policy issue, the 
regulation of players’ agents, in the context of EU sports policy. In doing so, the 
research’s findings advances the existing theoretical literature related to the 
broader theme of the EU’s relationship with sport (Parrish 2003a, 3003b; Garcia 
2008).  Additionally, the research for the first time develops a socio-cultural 
perspective on players’ agents at European level. Secondly, the research also 
contributes to the theoretical advancement of the AFC through examining some 
of the key concepts of the framework in the context of the EU policy making. In 
this connection, the research’s analysis contributes to clarifying the concept of 
coordinated activity which is the one of the most criticized aspects of the ACF 
(Schlager 1995; Kubler 2001; Fenger and Klok 2001). Furthermore, the 
examination of selective perception adds to the very limited literature on the 
topic. 
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This concluding chapter now proceeds to summarize the findings of the research 
related to three sub-research questions in the light of evidence presented in 
chapter 5, 6 and 7 in order to expand on the research’s originality. With this 
objective in mind, the summary is divided into two broader headings in relation 
to the research’s original contributions to knowledge: the understanding of the 
EU policy making in the field of sport and the theoretical advancements of the 
ACF. 
 
The EU and Players’ Agents: Understanding of the EU Policy Making in 
Relation to Players’ Agents 
From the perspective of EU sports policy, the research investigated three 
research dimensions to deduce the EU policy actors’ policy core beliefs. The first 
research dimension is coordinated activity and the research has identified the 
degree of coordinated activity between the EU policy actors in relation to the 
regulation of players’ agents in chapter 5. The presence of coordinated activity 
combined with the assumption of the existence of the socio-cultural coalition 
theoretically underline that the socio-cultural regulation of sport, as the policy 
core beliefs of the EU policy actors, underpins the EU’s intervention into the 
regulation of players’ agents. In other words policy core beliefs are deduced from 
the existence of advocacy coalition and coordinated activity as both congruent 
shared policy core beliefs and a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity are the 
necessary components of the advocacy coalition. 
 
The research identified a gradually intensifying degree of coordinated activity 
between the EU policy actors in relation to the regulation of players’ agents.  
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There was a minimum degree of coordinated activity involving interactions and 
information exchange during the preparatory phases of the White Paper on 
Sport. The institutional context in the form of a consultation framework 
facilitated the interaction of the EU policy actors with each other and sports 
governing bodies. The EU policy actors also exploited the resources available at 
their disposal at institutional level to steer the direction of the policy in line with 
their policy core beliefs. The consultation framework was particularly important 
in bringing players’ agents, as a policy issue, to the attention of the EU policy 
actors. During the consultation process the EU policy actors also learned about 
the problems within the activities of players’ agents and deficiencies of the 
FIFA’s licensing based regulatory framework to tackle those problems. The EU 
policy actors also exploited the resources available at their disposal at 
institutional level to steer the direction of the policy in line with their policy core 
beliefs and those sources were the basis of their activities. As a result of these 
activities, the regulation of players’ agents moved into the socio-cultural policy 
agenda of the EU sports policy and the Education and Culture DG decided, in the 
White Paper on Sport, to carry out the impact assessment to analyze the 
possibility of European level action.   
 
In the aftermath of the White Paper on Sport, the activities of the EU policy 
actors in relation to regulation of players’ agents intensified and there was a 
stronger coordination or a greater level of coordination between them. The 
activities not only involved repeated interactions through use of institutional 
resources, but also there was a common plan of action on the issue of players’ 
agents guiding their activities. The Action Plan under the White Paper on Sport 
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provided a plan of action and the study on sport agents, published in 2009, and 
the conference in 2011 were the result of that. The Member States also revised 
the Rolling Agenda in 2008. Players’ agents and the identification of possible 
European level solution for tackling bad practices within the their activities 
became the key priority of the Member States. The Committee on Culture and 
Education also intensified their activities. Especially due to the Committee’s 
dissatisfaction with the decision of the impact assessment under the White Paper 
on Sport, the Committee engaged in analytical debate with the Education and 
Culture DG which led to an intensified interaction. The Lisbon Treaty reinforced 
European level cooperation further and the Work Plan of the Council for sport 
2011-2014 and the Education and Culture DG’s communication in 2011 provided 
further impetus to the activities on players’ agents at European level. 
 
These initial findings of the research on coordinated activity between the EU 
policy actors fits well with Parrish’s analysis of the EU sports policy. The findings 
reinforce Parrish’s findings in relation to the evolution of EU sports policy. 
Parrish argues that the members of socio-cultural advocacy coalition were 
unhappy with the economic single market approach of the single market 
advocacy and consequently coordinated their activities to seek greater 
protection for sport from the application of EU law (Parrish 2003a, p.207). This 
research focuses on the EU policy actors of the socio-cultural advocacy coalition 
and identifies coordinated activity with an objective of finding solutions to the 
problems of players’ agents at European level. Additionally, Parrish identifies 
resources (institutions and institutional venues) available to policy actors at 
European level (Parrish 2003a, pp.72-76) and these resources were used to 
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influence the direction of the policy and to coordinate sporting activity at 
European level (Parrish 2003a, p.72).  The resources at the disposal of the EU 
policy actors were also the basis of coordinated activity in relation to the 
regulation of players’ agents. Therefore, although the research has a much 
narrower focus of analysis in terms of the policy issue (the regulation of players’ 
agents) and policy actors (the EU policy actors), the research’s findings reaffirm 
Parrish’s finding in relation the EU sports policy, in particular the socio-cultural 
advocacy coalition and the beliefs system of the EU policy actor. 
 
The second research dimension is selective perception, perceptual filtering 
performed through the policy core beliefs of the EU policy actors in acquiring 
information and engaging in policy analysis, and the research identified selective 
perception performed by policy core beliefs of the EU policy actors in Chapter 6.  
Selective perception was investigated in the context of policy-oriented learning 
in relation to players’ agents. As selective perception directly relates to policy 
core beliefs, selective perception combined with the assumption of the EU actors’ 
policy core beliefs (the socio-cultural regulation of sport) theoretically concludes 
that the socio-cultural regulation of sport underpins the EU’s intervention into 
the regulation of players’ agents.   
 
Selective perception of the EU policy actors’ policy core belief in selecting and 
interpreting information within policy analysis related to players’ agent was 
instrumental for developing their policy position on the issue. The institutional 
context during the preparatory phase of the White Paper on Sport enabled the 
EU actors to learn about the problems of the activities of players’ agents through 
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interaction and information exchange with each other and sports governing 
bodies. This learning was the catalyst for the development of the policy position.  
The EU policy actors’ policy position was in line with their policy core beliefs. 
The key components of the policy position were the actors’ perceptions of the 
problems integrated with their policy core beliefs (problems with the activities 
of players’ agents are detrimental to the socio-cultural values and its role in 
Europe) and their perspectives on their secondary beliefs (in order to tackle the 
problems there is a need for a more effective regulatory framework governing 
players’ agents and it requires action at European level possibility through the 
adoption of a European legal initiative in form of a directive on players’ agents).  
 
The impact of selective perception in this learning process was 
multidimensional. Firstly, the EU policy actors particularly selected information 
related to the problems of players’ agents which they perceived as threats to 
their policy core beliefs. Consequently, this led to the development of policy 
position on players’ agents. Secondly, the actors also selected information to 
support their policy position. In this connection, information contained within 
the reports and written submissions of the sport governing bodies and the 
stakeholders were considered, whereas the analysis of players’ agents from a 
single market perspective received was given very little attention and selected in 
a way to support their policy position.  
 
Despite developing a policy position with regards to players’ agents, there was a 
division between the EU policy actors in relation to their preferred policy 
instruments to regulate players’ agents at European level. In particular, the 
  222 
decision of impact assessment by the Education and Culture DG in the White 
Paper on Sport instead of proposing a legal initiative (directive) evidenced this 
division and resulted in a conflict. The conflict was related to the actors’ 
secondary aspects of their belief systems (policy instrument). The impact of the 
conflict was an analytical debate between the actors, especially the Committee 
on Culture and Education engaged debate with the Education and Culture DG at 
parliamentary level, in order to advocate for a legal initiative to regulate players’ 
agents at European level.  
 
The function of selective perception in a conflict situation and in analytical 
debate is to select and interpret information in order to advocate a policy 
position. In the context of analytical debate between the EU policy actors, this 
meant that the actors selected and interpreted information in order to support 
their policy position related to the secondary aspects of belief systems (policy 
instruments), i.e. a European legal initiative.  At this stage, the strong policy core 
beliefs of the Committee on Culture and Education became evident. During the 
parliamentary debate, the statements of some members of the Committee 
explicitly highlighted the detrimental impacts of players’ agents’ problems on the 
socio-cultural role of sport in Europe. Moreover, in the Parliamentary resolution 
in 2010, the Committee selected specific information about the problems of 
players’ agents from the study on sports agents and interpreted the findings of 
the Court in the Piau judgments in such a way as to support the Committee’s 
policy position in relation to their preferred policy instrument (a legal initiative) 
at European level.   
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These findings are in line with Parrish’s analysis about the Committee. Parrish 
(2003a, p.68) claims that the European Parliament generally has a strong socio-
cultural tradition. The Committee within the Parliament has the spirit of 
Adonnino and holds strong policy core beliefs related to socio-cultural function 
of sport in Europe (Parrish 2001, p.193). Therefore, Parrish places the 
Committee with the Maximalists within the socio-cultural advocacy coalition 
(Parrish 2003a, p.69). In correlation, the research identifies policy core beliefs of 
the Committee acting as a strong perceptual filter in selecting and interpreting 
information so as to support the Committee’s policy position. The Committee 
was a strong proponent of the European legal initiative as its members viewed 
the problems of players’ agents as detrimental to the socio-cultural values of 
sport in Europe.  
 
The policy preferences of the EU policy actors in relation to policy instruments to 
regulate players’ agents at European level are the third dimension of this 
research.  In this connection, the emergence of FIFA’s new regulatory 
framework, the concept of intermediaries which came into force on 1st April 
2015, represented a theoretical paradox. The research assumes that, in 
accordance with the theoretical assumptions of the ACF, the policy preferences 
of the EU policy actors would be in line with their policy core beliefs as the actors 
are motivated to translate them into policies. Additionally, in chapter 5 and 6, the 
research identified coordinated activity amongst the EU policy actors on the 
issue and evidences the development of a policy position at European level 
through selective perception. As a result, the adoption of the new regulatory 
framework somehow contradicts with the policy core beliefs of the EU policy 
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actors and also undermines the research’s findings in relation to coordinated 
activity and selective perception which, therefore, requires an explanation. 
 
With this objective in mind, in Chapter 7, the research focused on policy 
preferences of the EU actors and identified a change. During the preparatory 
phase of the White Paper on Sport, policy preferences reflected the actors’ policy 
position. Perceiving the problems within the activities of players’ agents as being 
detrimental to the socio-cultural role of sport in Europe, the actors recognized 
the need for a more effective regulation at European level. In this connection, 
especially the Committee on Culture and Education and the Member States 
became a strong proponent of the EU legal initiative. Therefore, the Education 
and Culture DG’s decision of impact assessment in the White Paper on Sport in 
2007 caused the conflict between the actors as the decision was contrary to their 
policy core beliefs. Nonetheless, during the conference in 2011, the change in the 
actors’ preferences was evident. Firstly, the actors seemed to distance 
themselves from the idea of a regulatory role on the issue, but preferring sports 
governing bodies to regulate instead. The statements by both the representatives 
of the Education and Culture DG and the members of the Committee on Culture 
and Education highlighted this change. Especially, the change in the Committee’s 
preference was significant as the Committee has traditionally been a strong 
proponent of direct legislative intervention at European level. Furthermore, 
another possible European instrument emerged during the conference which 
was the possibility of working with the European Standardization Organization 
(CEN) with a view to help in defining and raising quality level of the services 
provisions of agents. This change of preferences theoretically was a minor 
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change as it related to secondary beliefs of the EU policy actors and needs to be 
explicated. 
 
The research identified that the policy preferences of the EU policy actors were 
actually affected by the constitutional limits of the EU’s policy making in the field 
of sport. Defined as relatively stable parameters by the ACF, these constitutional 
limits constrained the preferences of the policy actors. The factors are exogenous 
to policy subsystems. The research ascertained that there are two important 
limits of the EU policy making that are now constitutionally recognized: the 
recognition of the autonomy of sports governing bodies in governing their sports 
and the principle of subsidiarity that makes sport a primary responsibility of the 
Member States and sports governing bodies in Europe. Despite the new 
competency given under the Lisbon Treaty, the effect of the competency in 
relation to the governance of sport is trivial as claimed by Weatherill 
(2010,2011) and Garcia and Weatherill (2012). An actual impact of the Lisbon 
Treaty is that the autonomy of sport governing bodies was enhanced in 
regulating sport as the EU is required to take into consideration the specific 
nature of sport when contributing to the actions of the Member States and sports 
governing bodies. Furthermore, the principle of subsidiarity is also underlined. 
As a result, the research evidenced how these constitutional limitations actually 
forced the EU policy actors to prefer self-regulation instead of the EU legal 
initiative to regulate players’ agents at European level. Therefore, the emergence 
of FIFA’s regulatory framework found a theoretical explanation under the 
research. 
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This research aimed to deduce policy core beliefs of the EU policy actors within 
the socio-cultural advocacy coalition operating under the EU sports policy 
subsystem. In doing so, three research dimensions were examined in relation to 
the regulation of players’ agents: coordinated activity, selective perception and 
policy preferences under chapter 5, 6 and 7. Although each chapter could 
contribute to our understanding of the EU policy making in the field of sport, 
how the research’s finding could holistically presented.  After all, the ACF 
conceptualizes public policies in much the same way as belief systems which 
enables the ACF to be able to map beliefs and policies on the same canvas 
(Sabatier 1988, p.132). In this connection, therefore, the Table 6 below maps the 
findings of the research out in order to conclude the contribution of the research 
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The Theoretical Advancement of the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
This research also contributes to the theoretical advancement of the ACF, i.e. our 
understanding of the ACF as a theoretical framework, through clarifying two key 
concepts of the ACF: coordinated activity and selective perception.  Despite the 
ACF having become one of the most promising and utilized theoretical 
frameworks to analyze public policy process (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014; Capano 
2009; Sotirov and Memmler, 2012), coordinated activity has been the one of the 
most criticized aspects (Schlager 1995; Schlager and Blomquist 1996; Kubler 
2001; Fenger and Klok 2001; Henry 2011; Sotirov and Memmler 2012). Scholars 
particularly criticized the focus of the ACF in locating the role of beliefs system 
for their formation of advocacy coalitions within subsystems whilst neglecting to 
explain how actors overcome the problems related to collective action. 
Additionally, the belief homophily hypothesis, which is based upon the 
assumption that shared beliefs are the key components of coalition, (Calanni et 
al. 2014; Jenkins-smith et al. 2014), required testing. This research, by 
identifying coordinated activity between the EU policy actors on the issue of 
players’ agents, strengthens the explanatory power of shared policy core beliefs 
in formation and stability of advocacy coalitions under the ACF. Selective 
perception, on the other hand, has been central to the ACF’s model of individuals 
and its impact on the process of policy-oriented learning and subsequent policy 
change is paramount. Nonetheless, there is a very limited literature on selective 
perception, actually only one study by Freudenburg and Gramling (2002) 
specifically focused on the topic which highlighted the importance of selective 
perception in policy making process. This research also fills this gap in the 
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literature through examining and identifying the role of selective perception by 
the EU actors’ policy core beliefs in relation to the regulation of players’ agents.  
 
In relation to coordinated activity, the research identified a gradually 
intensifying coordinated activity between the EU policy actors. The findings on 
coordinated activity correlates with the ACF scholars’ analysis on coordinated 
activity between policy actors. Firstly, the research identified the elements of 
coordinated activity between the EU actors that fit well with the analysis of 
Zafonte and Sabatier (1998). Zafonte and Sabatier (1998) clarified the concept of 
coordinated activity and defined it as “the spectrum of activities” involving a 
variety of interactions including information exchange, monitoring and aligning 
political behavior, and also developing, communicating and implementing 
common plan of action. The research identified particularly a strong 
coordination between the EU policy actors following the adoption of the White 
Paper on Sport (European Commission 2007a). The Action Plan (European 
Commission 2007c) provided a common plan of action in the form of impact 
assessment, combined with the amendments to the Rolling Agenda by the 
Member States. The process of impact assessment created also contextual 
framework for further interaction and information exchange between the EU 
policy actors.   
 
Secondly, Schlager (1995, p.262) identified additional characteristics of the 
situation alongside shared policy core beliefs that affect the degree and longevity 
of coordination. Amongst those characteristics, repeated interactions are 
important to promote communications amongst policy actors and the acquisition 
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of information about the problem leading to a common understanding of the 
problem and acceptable policies for its resolution. The findings of the research 
certainly correlate to Schlager’s analysis. In particular, repeated interactions 
within the consultation framework, not only with each other but also with sports 
governing bodies, during the preparatory phase of the White Paper on Sport 
were instrumental for the EU policy actors especially to understand about the 
problems with the activities of players’ agents. The understanding of the 
problems led to the stronger coordination following the adoption of the White 
Paper on Sport within which the EU policy actors developed the common plan of 
action on the issue.  Repeated interactions and information exchange moved into 
the context of impact assessment after the White Paper. Furthermore, Schlager 
(1995, p.262) argued that repeated interactions not only supports the 
acquisition of information, but it also postulates a context within which policy 
actors can change and shape each other’s preferences.  Sharing preferences so 
that actors’ goals are congruent support coordinated activity amongst the actors. 
In this connection, despite the EU policy actors had a division in preferences in 
relation to actual policy instruments to regulate players’ agents, their shared 
preference with regards to the regulation of players’ agents was congruent. As 
the actors developed an understanding of the problem, the research identified 
that they developed a policy position and within that their policy preference was 
the necessity of a more effective regulation for agents at European level so as to 
tackle the problem which are considered to be detrimental to the actors’ policy 
core, i.e. the socio-cultural role of sport in Europe. Therefore, findings of the 
research also relate to the analysis of Schlager. 
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 Finally, the research focuses on examining coordinated activity as opposed to 
empirically measuring policy core beliefs as the drivers of coordination between 
the actors. This approach represents the originality of the research as the 
majority of the literature on the components of advocacy coalitions within the 
ACF focus on the role of policy core beliefs in the formation of the coalitions, i.e. 
the belief homophily hypothesis. There are a number of studies investigating an 
empirical justification of the hypothesis through analyzing policy core beliefs 
(Sabatier and Weible 2005; Matti and Sandstrom 2011, 2013). However, none of 
these studies focused actually on the concept of coordinated activity. Their 
assumption is that the actors will coordinate their activities with others that hold 
congruent shared beliefs. In contradiction, this research assumed that the EU 
policy actors already hold congruent policy core beliefs and, hence, aimed to 
identify coordinated activity. Overall, these findings of the research contribute to 
our understanding of the concept of coordinated activity within the ACF. 
 
In relation to selective perception, the research’s original contribution is to fill 
the gap in the literature and clarify the concept of selective perception. Firstly, 
the research located selective perception within the scenario depicted by 
Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993, p.45) for the process of policy-oriented 
learning. The research identified that the EU policy actors became aware of the 
problems within the activities of players’ agents initially through interaction 
with sports governing bodies. The actors perceived these problems as being 
detrimental to their policy core beliefs (the socio-cultural regulation of sport) 
which led to policy analysis and learning. Eventual conflict on their preferences 
related to their preferred policy instrument caused an analytical debate. In this 
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context, selective perception performed by policy core beliefs was to support 
their policy position in relation to the regulation of players’ agents. Furthermore, 
the research’s investigation also evidenced the principles of policy analysis and 
information in the process of policy-oriented learning as outlined by Jenkins-
Smith and Sabatier (1993, p.45). According to Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, policy 
analysis and information is governed through four principles. Policy analysis is 
stimulated by threats to policy core beliefs and such threats lead policy actors to 
seek further information on the issue which also facilitates learning. In this 
context, the actors develop a policy position and then analysis and information is 
used in advocacy fashion to support this position. The research evidenced these 
principles in the process of the EU actors’ learning in relation players’ agents. 
Leaning about the problems with the activities of players’ agents stimulated the 
analysis and search for more information by the EU policy actors as they 
perceived these problems detrimental to their policy core beliefs. A further 
learning led to the development of their policy position and analysis then used in 
advocacy fashion to support their position. These findings of the research in the 
process of policy-oriented learning and the impact of selective perception are the 
research’s original contribution to understanding of the ACF. 
 
The Table 7 summarizes the findings of the research in relation to the ACF and 
relates them to the research’ finding on the EU sports policy on players’ agents.
  233 
  234 
To conclude, this research investigated the EU’s intervention into the regulation 
of players’ agents from the perspective of the EU’s socio-cultural regulation of 
sport. In doing so, the focus has been on the EU policy actors of the socio-cultural 
advocacy coalition operating within the EU sports policy subsystem. The 
research identified that over the years the EU policy actors coordinated their 
activities in relation to the regulation of players’ agents and selected and 
interpreted information in line with their policy core beliefs. The identification of 
coordinated activity between the actors and the evidence of selective perception 
indicate their policy core beliefs. However, their policy preferences with regards 
to policy instruments and the emergence of the FIFA regulatory framework may 
indicate the contrary. However, the research also identified that rather than the 
policy core beliefs it was the constitutional limitation of the EU that impacted on 
the policy preferences of the EU policy actors.  On this basis, the research argues 
that it was actually the socio-cultural regulation of sport that has driven the EU’s 
intervention into the regulation of players’ agents. 
 
Possible future avenues for research 
This research has focused on the EU policy actors of the socio-cultural advocacy 
coalition within the EU sports policy subsystem.  This is due to the research’s 
objective to understand the motivations of EU’s intervention into the regulation 
of players’ agents. Nonetheless, the policy actors of the socio-cultural advocacy 
coalition are not limited to the EU policy actors. There are a number of sports 
governing bodies, stakeholders and the representative of players’ agents 
involved. Therefore, it would be interesting to analyse beliefs systems of these 
actors in relation to the regulation of players’ agents. Once these actors from 
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sport is articulated better, this would also pave the way for further analysis 
around potential players’ agents subsystem within the wider EU sports policy 
subsystem. The understanding of potential players’ agents subsystem would also 
fully explain the motives behind FIFA’s new regulatory framework and make 
propositions for future direction of regulation in this field.  
 
In addition, this research represents a theoretical contribution to the EU policy 
making in the field of sport. The regulation of players’ agents, as a policy issue, 
provides the right context for further theoretical analysis. The ACF, as a 
theoretical framework, has a number of aspects that need to be explored.  These 
aspects can be investigated in the context of regulation of players’ agents. 
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